

Serhiy Troyan • Alla Kyrydon • Svitlana Kosiak • Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk

NEO-POST-BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TURBULENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Serhiy Troyan
Alla Kyrydon
Svitlana Kosiak
Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk

NEO-POST-BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TURBULENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Monograph



**Serhiy Troyan
Alla Kyrydon
Svitlana Kosiak
Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk**

**NEO-POST-BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS:
TURBULENCE IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR**

Monograph

**Kyiv
Interservice
2025**

UDK 94(477):327:343.337
T64

*Recommended for publication by the Academic Council of the State Research Institution
«Encyclopedia Press»
(Protocol No. 5, 28. 08. 2025)*

Author's team: Serhiy Troyan, head of the author team (introduction, chapters 1–8, conclusions); Alla Kyrydon (chapters 2–8); Svitlana Kosiak (chapters 4–5); Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk (chapters 1, 6).

Reviewers:

Bilobrovets Olga, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Professor at the Department of History of Ukraine, Zhytomyr Ivan Franko State University

Fisanov Volodymyr, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Professor at the Department of International Relations and Public Communications of Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University

Kyrylenko Olesia, Doctor of Sociological Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of General Theoretical Legal and Humanitarian Disciplines of the Rivne Institute of the Kyiv University of Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Troyan S., Kyrydon A., Kosiak S., Nechaieva-Yuriichuk N. NEO-POST-BIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TURBULENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: Monograph. Kyiv: Interservice, 2025. 196 p.
ISBN 978-966-999-564-3

The monograph is devoted to conceptualising the category of “neo-post-bipolar international relations” within the chronological framework of 1991–2025. In a scientific and theoretical context, the nature, features, and stages of the evolution of modern international relations, from post-bipolarity (1991–2014) to neo-post-bipolarity (2014–2025), are highlighted. The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War (2014–2025), the largest interstate armed conflict since the end of World War II, on the growth of chaos, conflict-proneness, and deliberalization of international relations is comprehensively investigated. Scientific reflection on the phenomenon of neo-post-bipolar international relations combines an interdisciplinary approach with paradigmatic research constructs, primarily of representatives of neo-realism and the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Interdisciplinarity and reliance on modern theoretical visions of international relations make the monograph relevant not only to the academic environment but also to a wider circle of readers interested in understanding the issues of neo-post-bipolar international relations and the collisions that have shaped the genesis of the modern world order.

The proposed book is for everyone who is interested in modern international relations.

UDK 94(477):327:343.337

ISBN 978-966-999-564-3 © S. Troyan, A. Kyrydon, S. Kosiak, N. Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, 2025.

**Сергій Троян
Алла Киридон
Світлана Косяк
Наталія Нечасва-Юрійчук**

**НЕОПОСТЫПОЛЯРНІ МІЖНАРОДНІ
ВІДНОСИНИ: ТУРБУЛЕНТНІСТЬ
У КОНТЕКСТІ РОСІЙСЬКО-
УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ**

Монографія

**Київ
Інтерсервіс
2025**

УДК 94(477):327:343.337
Т64

Рекомендовано до публікації Вченою радою Державної науково-дослідної установи
«Енциклопедичне видавництво»
(протокол № 5, 28. 08. 2025)

Авторський колектив: Сергій Троян, керівник авторського колективу (вступ, розділи 1–8, висновки); Алла Киридон (розділи 2–8); Світлана Косяк (розділи 4–5); Наталія Нечаєва-Юрійчук (розділи 1, 6).

Рецензенти:

Білобровець Ольга, доктор історичних наук, професор, професор кафедри історії України, Житомирський державний університет імені Івана Франка

Фісанов Володимир, доктор історичних наук, професор, професор кафедри міжнародних відносин та публічних комунікацій, Чернівецький національний університет імені Юрія Федьковича

Кириленко Олеся, доктор соціологічних наук, професор, завідувач кафедри загальнотеоретичних правових та гуманітарних дисциплін Рівненського інституту Київського університету права Національної академії наук України

Троян С., Киридон А., Косяк С., Нечаєва-Юрійчук Н. НЕОПОСТБІПОЛЯРНІ МІЖНАРОДНІ ВІДНОСИНИ: ТУРБУЛЕНТНІСТЬ У КОНТЕКСТІ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ: Монографія. Київ: Інтерсервіс, 2025. 196 с.

ISBN 978-966-999-564-3

Монографія присвячена концептуалізації категорії «неопостбіполярні міжнародні відносини» в хронологічних рамках 1991–2025 років. У науково-теоретичному контексті висвітлено природу, особливості та етапи еволюції сучасних міжнародних відносин від постбіполярності (1991–2014) до неопостбіполярності (2014–2025). Всебічно досліджено вплив російсько-української війни (2014–2025), найбільшого міждержавного збройного конфлікту з часів закінчення Другої світової війни, на зростання хаосу, конфліктності та делібералізації міжнародних відносин. Наукова рефлексія над феноменом неопостбіполярних міжнародних відносин поєднує міждисциплінарний підхід із парадигматичними дослідницькими конструктами, насамперед представників неореалізму та Копенгагенської школи досліджень безпеки. Міждисциплінарність та опора на сучасні теоретичні бачення міжнародних відносин роблять монографію актуальною не лише для академічного середовища, а й для ширшого кола читачів, зацікавлених у розумінні проблематики неопостбіполярних міжнародних відносин та колізій, що сформували генезис сучасного світового порядку.

Пропонована книга призначена для всіх, хто цікавиться сучасними міжнародними відносинами.

УДК 94(477):327:343.337

ISBN 978-966-999-564-3

© С. Троян, А. Киридон, С. Косяк, Н. Нечаєва-Юрійчук, 2025.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	
THE CONCEPT, STAGES OF EVOLUTION, AND THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	6
CHAPTER 1.	
EVOLUTION OF THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WARS: HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ASPECTS	14
CHAPTER 2.	
CONCEPTUAL FUNDAMENTALS OF POST-WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	32
CHAPTER 3.	
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A SYSTEM AND A DISCIPLINE: FROM THE WESTPHALIAN TO THE POST-WESTPHALIAN WORLD ORDER	47
CHAPTER 4.	
THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: BASIC PRECONDITIONS AND CAUSES	61
CHAPTER 5.	
SAVING RUSSIA. NEOREALIST THEORISTS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE KREMLIN'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY ACCORDING TO THE ACTOR-NETWORK CONCEPT	81
CHAPTER 6.	
THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY	99
CHAPTER 7.	
THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS A FACTOR FOR RECONFIGURING NEO-POST-BIPOLARITY	124
CHAPTER 8.	
THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: INTERFERENCE FACTORS OF THE WAR	134
CONCLUSION (AFTERWORD).	
TURBULENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE TWILIGHT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY	152
BIBLIOGRAPHY	177
INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS	194

INTRODUCTION

THE CONCEPT, STAGES OF EVOLUTION, AND THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introduction

In systemic and conceptual terms, international relations constitute a multidimensional category that integrates normative, institutional, ideological, economic, and power-related elements into a dynamic and interdependent whole. This complex synthesis determines not only the structure and architecture of global interactions among states, supranational actors, and non-state participants (such as transnational corporations, international organizations, NGOs, and global media), but also the principles according to which the global community organizes coexistence and competition. As the British scholar Hedley Bull persuasively noted, international relations cannot be reduced merely to a balance of power among sovereign entities. Rather, they encompass a shared understanding – or at least a minimal consensus – regarding fundamental norms, rules, and principles of coexistence: sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the legitimacy of intervention in cases where the basic principles of international order are violated.

At the philosophical core of the discipline lies the problem of justice, security, and legitimacy. Every historical model of international relations reflects a specific normative vision of world order – an implicit “social contract” between major powers and the rest of the international community. As G. John Ikenberry of Princeton University argued, the postwar liberal order rested on the idea of a rules-based international system, within which the leading states voluntarily accepted institutional constraints in exchange for stability, predictability, and access to common goods (such as open markets and collective security). The history of international relations, therefore, may be interpreted as an alternation between periods of institutional consolidation – when global norms and mechanisms are widely recognized – and

periods of systemic crisis and transformation, when the legitimacy of the established order erodes under the pressure of new power centers and ideological challenges.

Theoretical and Chronological Dimensions of Systemic International Relations

The question of when international relations acquired a systemic character remains one of the key debates in the field. Hedley Bull confined the notion of a “society of states” to the twentieth century, arguing that only the emergence of universal norms and global institutions (such as the League of Nations and later the United Nations) created a truly systemic structure. In contrast, Henry Kissinger, in his monumental work *Diplomacy*, traced the foundations of the modern international system back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War and codified the principle of state sovereignty. The Westphalian system thus institutionalized the idea that states are equal under international law and possess exclusive authority over their domestic affairs. Although Eurocentric in character, this order provided a conceptual model later applied globally through colonization, decolonization, and globalization.

The Vienna system (1814–1815), shaped by the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, institutionalized a balance of power mechanism – known as the Concert of Europe – based on the coordination of the “great powers” (Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, and later France). Its conservative nature sought to maintain the geopolitical status quo, suppress revolutionary movements, and prevent unilateral dominance. The Vienna order demonstrated the relative stability of collective diplomacy and multilateralism but also its fragility in the face of emerging nationalism, industrialization, and imperial ambitions.

The Versailles–Washington system following the First World War marked an ambitious attempt to construct a liberal peace order founded on collective security (through the League of Nations), arms limitation agreements, and economic cooperation. However, the lack of participation by crucial actors – the United States, the Soviet Union, and several colonial empires – rendered the system inherently unstable. Economic crises, punitive peace terms imposed on Germany, and the

ideological polarization between liberal democracies and totalitarian regimes (fascism, Nazism, Stalinism) undermined its foundations. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent aggression in Manchuria (1931), Ethiopia (1935), and Czechoslovakia (1938) symbolized the collapse of interwar internationalism.

The Yalta–Potsdam system that emerged from the ashes of the Second World War established a bipolar world order, defined by ideological, military, and economic antagonism between two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Within this bipolar architecture, global governance was effectively structured around opposing blocs, with their respective institutions: NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), the IMF and the COMECON, the Bretton Woods system and the socialist economic model. The United Nations served as a universal platform but was constrained by the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. Stability rested on nuclear deterrence and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which paradoxically preserved peace through the threat of annihilation. Despite periodic crises – the Berlin blockade (1948–1949), the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War – the bipolar order maintained a degree of predictability until the late 1980 s.

The post-bipolar or unipolar system emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States, as the “single superpower,” exercised unprecedented dominance in the political, economic, and ideological spheres. The liberal international order – anchored in free markets, democratic governance, and multilateral institutions such as the UN, WTO, IMF, and World Bank – appeared, for a time, to embody the “end of history” (as famously proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama). This period saw the expansion of NATO and the European Union, humanitarian interventions justified by the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the acceleration of economic globalization. Yet beneath the surface, the seeds of future crises were already present: regional wars (in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan), social inequalities generated by neoliberal globalization, and cultural backlash against Western universalism. Accordingly, the crises and conflicts themselves were not long in coming.

From Liberal Unipolarity to Fragmented Multipolarity

Beginning in the early twenty-first century, the apparent stability of the unipolar world began to erode. Several interrelated processes contributed to this transformation. First, the rise of new centers of power – China’s economic ascent, the reassertion of Russia’s revisionist ambitions, India’s regional leadership, and the growing influence of the EU and BRICS – undermined the hegemony of the United States. Second, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 exposed structural weaknesses in the neoliberal economic order and delegitimized the Western model of globalization. Third, technological and informational revolutions, coupled with disinformation, cyberwarfare, and digital authoritarianism, altered the nature of power and security in the international system. Finally, the rise of populism and illiberal movements within Western democracies weakened the moral and political coherence of the liberal order itself.

These trends converged into what many scholars now describe as a transitional era – a liminal phase between the decline of unipolarity and the emergence of an uncertain multipolar configuration. The defining characteristics of this transitional order include:

1. The erosion of international legal norms, particularly the principles of sovereignty and non-aggression.
2. Fragmentation of global governance, as multilateral institutions (the UN, WTO, WHO) lose effectiveness.
3. Increased conflict intensity and regionalization of power, exemplified by wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.
4. Ideological diversification, where liberal democracy competes with models of authoritarian capitalism and “civilizational states”.

The ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war, which began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and escalated into a full-scale invasion in 2022, has become a watershed in the transformation of the global order. It exposed the impotence of existing security guarantees and demonstrated the limits of international institutions in restraining aggression. At the same time, it revitalized the Euro-Atlantic alliance,

strengthened transnational solidarity, and reasserted the centrality of democratic values in global politics. Similar dynamics can be observed in the Asia-Pacific region, where China's assertiveness in the South China Sea and its confrontation with the United States over Taiwan have intensified the logic of strategic rivalry.

On October 31, 2025, in a speech at the APEC session, Chinese leader Xi Jinping outlined a unifying agenda for Southeast and East Asia. He noted, in particular, that “Currently, changes unseen in a century are accelerating around the world. The international situation is dynamic and turbulent. The Asia-Pacific region faces increasing uncertainties and destabilizing factors in its development. The rougher the sea, the more we must stick together. We must remain true to APEC's founding mission of promoting economic growth and improving people's lives, and uphold open development where everyone gains opportunities and emerges as a winner. We must promote mutually beneficial and inclusive economic globalization and build an Asia-Pacific community”.

It should be noted that over the past five years, China has ranked first in the world in terms of trade in goods and second in terms of trade in services. It has attracted more than 700 billion US dollars in total foreign investment, and its foreign investment is growing at an average of more than five percent annually. In order to expand its global influence, China is actively using its “soft power” policy, its powerful economic and trade initiatives. Examples include the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and 22 pilot free trade zones.

Prospects for the Future of the International System

According to the American analyst Charles Kupchan, the world is now undergoing a profound structural reconfiguration – “one of those rare moments in history when the center of global power begins to shift”. For the first time in three centuries, the dominance of the Western-centered system faces serious challenge from non-Western civilizations proposing alternative models of order based on sovereignty, cultural pluralism, and regional autonomy. The contours of the emerging multipolar world remain fluid and uncertain. It may evolve toward fragmented regionalism – a

constellation of semi-autonomous spheres of influence – or toward a concert-type coordination among major powers that seek pragmatic coexistence.

The outcome depends largely on whether key actors – above all the United States, the European Union, China, India, and Russia – can find a minimum normative consensus concerning global governance, climate security, technological regulation, and the use of force. If such consensus fails, the world risks sliding into a neo-Hobbesian condition of disorder, where power replaces law and geopolitical competition supplants cooperation. Conversely, a renewed pluralistic order, built upon institutional reforms and equitable representation, could restore a measure of stability.

The contours of the emerging multipolar world remain fluid and highly uncertain. Several likely trajectories of development exist:

1. **Fragmented Regionalism (or “Zero-Sum World”).** This scenario posits that the world could evolve towards a constellation of semi-autonomous spheres of influence dominated by regional hegemons. In this case, international cooperation would be limited to narrow regional frameworks, and global institutions would become definitively irrelevant. Such an order would be characterized by an increased risk of local conflicts and economic deglobalization (decoupling).

2. **“Concert” Coordination among Major Powers.** The alternative scenario foresees the formation of a more orderly world where the leading powers (the US, China, the EU, India, and Russia) reach a pragmatic consensus on coexistence. In this event, these actors, driven by the shared necessity to avoid catastrophe, might establish an informal mechanism, akin to the European Concert of the 19th century, to manage key challenges and balance interests.

The outcome of this structural struggle depends largely on whether the key global actors—above all the United States, the European Union, China, India, and Russia—can find a minimum normative consensus. This consensus is critical for addressing a number of vital global challenges: concerning global governance (UN reform), climate security (achieving climate goals), technological regulation (standardizing cybersecurity and AI), and, most importantly, limiting the use of force.

In sum, the evolution of international relations reflects the continuous dialectic between power and legitimacy, anarchy and order, universalism and pluralism. The contemporary world finds itself at a historical crossroads: between the erosion of the liberal unipolar order and the yet-unrealized architecture of a just and stable multipolar system. The direction it takes will define not only the character of global governance but also the prospects for peace and security in the twenty-first century.

Monograph includes published and actualized scientific papers of the following authors' research for 2014–2025 years:

Troyan S. Świat po zimnej wojnie: zasady ewolucji współczesnego porządku międzynarodowego [w:] *Ład światowy w perspektywie relacji transatlantyckich* / Red. nauk. Wojciech Gizicki. Lublin: Instytut Sądecko-Lubelski, 2014. S. 37–46.

Troyan, S., Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, N. Evolution of the Westphalian Order under the Influence of the World Wars: Historical and International Relations Aspects [w:] *Codrul Cosminului*. 2020. Vol. 26. No. 1. July. P. 187–206.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. Conceptual Fundamentals of Post-Westphalian International Relations [w:] *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych*. 2020. T. 12 (48). No 4. P. 69–85.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. International relations as a system and a discipline: From the westphalian to the post-westphalian world order [w:] *Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce*. No 1. 2021. P. 107–122.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. The civilization war 2014-2022: the national liberation war of Ukraine in XXI century (theoretical discourse) [w:] *The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2022): historical, political, cultural-educational, religious, economic, and legal aspects*: Scientific monograph. Riga. Latvia: “Baltija Publishing”, 2022. P. 523–534

Troyan S., Kyrydon A., Kosyak S. The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-2022): Basic preconditions and causes [w:] *Balkan Social Science Review*. 2022. Vol. 20. P. 157–179.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska w kontekście bezpieczeństwa globalnego [w:] *Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja*. Internetowe czasopismo naukowe poświęcone studiom globalnym 2023. № 29. S. 75–92.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. Deconstructing stability: the impact of the russian-ukrainian war on the formation of a new system of international relations [w:] *International Relations of Ukraine: Scientific Searches and Findings*. 2024. № 33. P. 10–24.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. Russian-Ukrainian war 2014–2024 as a postponed great European war War [w:] *Diplomacy in international relations: modern challenges and Perspectives*: Collection of materials. Kyiv: National Aviation University, 2024. P. 9–13.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. Saving Russia. Neorealist Theorists and the Interpretation of the Kremlin's International Policy according to the Actor-Network Concept [w:] *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*. 2024. T. XXXIII. S. 171–189.

Troyan S., Kyrydon A. Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska jako czynnik rekonfigurowania neopostbipolarności [w:] *Kultura—Historia—Globalizacja*: Internetowe czasopismo naukowe poświęcone studiom globalnym. 2024. № 31. S. 71–81.

CHAPTER 1.

EVOLUTION OF THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WARS: HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ASPECTS

Introduction

The 20th century entered history as a period of profound epochal change that affected nearly all areas of social life. In less than a century, the international relations system has undergone three dramatic shifts. The first two times happened at the dawn of the previous century, in the first half of the twentieth century. It was triggered by the world wars – the global conflicts of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, which reshaped not only borders in Europe and the world, but also the fate of individuals and entire nations. And the final instance occurred at the end of the 20th century: the breakup of the communist system and the USSR, which completely changed the direction of political, economic, social, and cultural development in several countries, and, most importantly, the system of international relations as a whole. It is worth noting that the profound political transformations that took place in the twentieth century were incomplete, and the effects of the changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the formation of the post-Westphalian world are only noticeable at the beginning of the present century.

Not only have world wars become the following change in the Westphalian world order, but they have also radically caused the globalization and transformation of international relations with the collapse of the USSR, the end of the communist era, the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, and the gradual crystallization of a multipolar international system at the end of the twentieth century. It is necessary to point out that during the “short” interval from 1914–1991 – to the 20th century, the state-centered multipolar international Westphalian system has undergone some crucial changes. For the first time, this happened under the influence of the First World War. First of all, we mean the collapse of empires and the rapid transformation of the world, which led to its geopolitical structure change and the emergence of several

important international actors, including the USSR, Weimar Germany, Central and Southern Europe, Turkey, along with the existing ones (USA, UK, France, Italy, Japan). Second, the United States went beyond the frames of the policy of isolationism and became actively involved in international processes outside the Americas. Third, the globalization of international relations has led to the creation of the first world's international organization – the League of Nations. World War II led to a new change in the Westphalian world order. This manifested itself, first of all, in the transition from a multipolar to a bipolar world; the impact of a new nuclear factor on international policy; the collapse of the colonial system; the growing importance of regional and global integration processes; universalization and instrumentalization of international relations in the context of unprecedented influence on the global (such as the UN, October 24, 1945) and regional international organizations. Finally, the third amendment of the Westphalian world order, under the influence of the collapse of the communist system, the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War, and the destruction of the bipolar international system, led to the globalization of international relations and their structural changes in the genesis and formation of the modern post-bipolar world.

The centennial of the end of World War I and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II became a significant informational occasion for a new, unbiased view in the context of a retrospective analysis of the problems of war and peace, war and politics, war and diplomacy, war and society, war and culture, etc. The study of the causes, consequences, and lessons of the world wars becomes especially relevant in the context of the threat of destruction of the international legal framework of the modern post-bipolar system of international relations, in particular due to the emergence of new “hot” spots on the planet. These are, for example, the wars waged by the Russian Federation against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014); the revolutionary and armed events of the so-called Arab Spring; the military, political, diplomatic, economic confrontation of various influential international actors of modernity (in particular, the United States, Russia, Turkey) in Syria, Libya and, in general, in the geopolitical space of the Great Middle East (Горбулін, 2017; Магда, 2015; Felsztinski, Stanczew, 2015;

Herpen, 2014; Kleczkowska, 2015). The causal relationships that connect local events to worldwide events and processes, first clearly identified on the eve of the Great War (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the outbreak of World War I in 1914) remain relevant today. It is clear that these processes have arisen and will continue to hold an objective interest for researchers and experts, as their practical implications are tangible for the vast majority of inhabitants, from both relevant sub-regions and the global world community as a whole.

The identification of the main trends in the socio-political development of the century is impossible without a turn to the events of the past century, first and foremost, the world wars. They established several megatrends of global development and international relations in the 20th century, some of which have become modern. That is why, among contemporary researchers, the problems of the First and Second World Wars remain more relevant than ever. Proof of this is the recent publication of some new studies by local and foreign scientists. In recent years, several scientific conferences, seminars, and roundtables have been held on the beginning, course, and end of the world wars. Fundamental collective monographs were published, including *The Great War of 1914–1918: Origins, Character, Consequences*, *World War I in the Focus of History*, *World Wars in the History and Destiny of Humanity (to the centennial of the end of World War I and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II)* and others (Рєєнт, 2014; Троян, 2014; Троян, 2016; Троян, 2017; Троян, 2018; Троян, 2019; Hlihor, Shkundin, Soare, Stikalin, 2018). The works of historians from different countries and scientific schools (such as Colin Gray (Gray, 2007), Koval (Коваль, 2004), Florin Constantiniu (Constantiniu, 2002), Jörn Leonard (Leonhard, 2014), Rees Laurence (Лоренс, 2010), Andrii Martinov (Мартинов, 2016), Herfried Münkler (Münkler, 2013), Michael S. Neiberg (Neiberg, 2013), Dumitru Preda (Preda, 1998), Ioan Scurtu (Scurtu, 2003; Scurtu, 2018), Timothy D. Snyder (Снайдер, 2018), Serhiy Troyan, Volodymyr Fisanov (Фисанов, Троян, 2013), Peter Hart (Hart, 2014), Andrzej Hvalba (Chwalba, 2014) and many others (Галушка, 2018; Кіпіані, 2019; Enciu, 2018; Otu, 2016; Łoś, 2017)) were dedicated to virtually all aspects of the

twentieth-century global armed conflicts, including the regional dimension of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the context of the suggested scientific exploration, the fundamental researches of Western authors are important, in particular those of Bear F. Braumoeller (Braumoeller, 2012), Barry Buzan and George Lawson (Buzan and Lawson, 2015), Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas (Goertz, Diehl, Balas, 2016), Amitav Acharya (Acharya, 2018), Bertrand Badie (Badie, 2019), Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (Acharya and Buzan, 2019), dedicated to the systems of international relations and the peculiarities of their changes during the 17th-20th centuries (from Westphalia to post-Westphalia). At the same time, we generally follow the approaches of noted scholars in understanding and identifying the essential characteristics of these world systems, as well as their changes under the influence of military, economic, colonial, political, regional, and target processes. In particular, “within this model, the international system is characterized by cooperation and conflict between viable and rational states in an anarchic environment, which reflects the pluralist norms of interaction in diplomacy, law and multilateralism. A Westphalian system is, therefore, said to rest upon the sovereignty of political units, territoriality, and non-intervention” (Newman, 2009, p. 422). At the same time, it is necessary to take into account a very valid remark or clarification by Benno Teschke, a British researcher: “The logic of inter-dynastic relations structured early modern European politics until the regionally very uneven 19th-century transition to international modernity” (Teschke, 2002, p. 6).

The purpose of scientific exploration is to study the impact of the First and Second World Wars on the dramatic changes in the systems of the Westphalian world order. In general, this chapter highlights the current emphasis in the study of complex and sometimes contradictory issues of the period, as outlined by the British Prime Minister W. Churchill as “An era of the New Thirty Years War 1914–1945,” and expands the field of fruitful scientific discussion on this issue. The purpose is to inspire new scientific research on the history, politics, international relations, and other aspects of the First and Second World Wars, as well as their impact on the modern world and the evolution of international relations.

The Great War and the new configuration of powers in the world

The fateful events that radically affected the modernization shifts in international relations, based on the state-centric paradigm of the Westphalian world order, were the world wars of the 20th century.

The Great War of 1914–1918 entered history as the first global armed conflict of two coalitions of states at war, the results of which in turn led to dramatic changes of an international nature. World War I of 1914–1918, known to the contemporaries as the Great War, was a reflection of profound modernization transformations of a global and internal nature in different countries. It should be emphasized that the changes brought by World War 1914–1918 remain noticeable to this day, which is especially evident in the field of propaganda and manipulation of the public consciousness. Preparation of the population for war began almost simultaneously with the creation of military-political coalitions at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the countries that would later become part of the future world conflict, the genre of military-utopian novels gained significant popularity. The authors, according to national (state) affiliation, portrayed the coming war as an inevitable conflict that would lead to the renewal of the existing system and victory of a certain state. In the military utopias of that time, war was seen as a prerequisite for improving future life, and the moral superiority of one of the parties was a key factor in determining victory. In fact, these novels served several purposes: promoting war as a means of resolving conflicts of interest, as a pledge to renew the world order, and as a form of propaganda. They created the necessary image of the enemy and the moral opposition between “we” and “they”, “ours” and “strangers”. This is just the tip of the iceberg of war and political propaganda launched on the eve of World War.

The Great War of 1914–1918 was the first major crisis of the modern era, much larger and more destructive than previous wars. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly noted that it was not provoked by ideological tensions or the direct economic crisis: “Its main driving force was the balance of power” (Acharya and Buzan, 2019,

p. 28). In fact, it was a growing confrontation in the struggle for the redistribution of colonies in the situation of the growing power and search for their “place under the sun” of Germany, Japan and the USA.

The creation of two triple military-political alliances - the German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1879–1882 (the Triple Alliance) and the coalition of France, the Russian Empire and Great Britain (the Entente) during 1893–1907 testified for the moral readiness of the governments of these states for the future open confrontation (Girault. 1979). Domestic politics aimed at popularizing certain ideas, including the superiority of one “civilization” over another, only confirms this thesis. The political and economic confrontation between these blocs, against the backdrop of the struggle for the redistribution of the world, quickly led to the exacerbation of contradictions in almost all regions of the world, particularly in Europe. It was here that a symbolic powder keg exploded – a political and diplomatic struggle in the Balkans escalated into an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The Kaiser of Germany came to the side of the Danube monarchy, and Serbia was supported by the Entente states. The crisis of July 1914, a “cold” phase of the bloc confrontation in early August, went into the “hot” phase of a long war, best known as the Great War or the World War I.

The first global armed conflict ended in the defeat of the states of the German bloc. On September 29, 1918, Bulgaria capitulated and concluded a truce with the Allied powers, also known as the Entente. On October 30, Turkey capitulated and signed the Armistice of Mudros. At the time of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under pressure from national liberation movements and due to war failures, on November 3, 1918, the Habsburg dynasty signed the terms of the truce. On October 4, 1918, German Chancellor M. Badensky sent the first proposal for a truce to President W. Wilson. The German government proposed a “democratic peace” based on “14 points” by US President W. Wilson. However, the winning states demanded the complete surrender of Germany. In November, a revolution began in the country and the monarchy was overthrown.

The Union Forces of Commander-in-Chief Marshall Ferdinand Foch signed the armistice, which ended World War I, in the forest of Compiègne on November 11, 1918. A 36-day Compiègne Armistice resulted, whose main conditions were: evacuation of German troops from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine within 15 days; occupation by the Entente of the cities of Mainz, Koblenz, Cologne; disarmament and removal to ports of Allied or Neutral States of the entire German Navy; Germany's rejection of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; the transfer of all German weapons to the victors and the return of prisoners to their homeland was signed by the representatives of the Allies and the German Generality, under the leadership of the Reichstag MP M. Herzberger. It is symbolic that the end of World War I was announced at 11 o'clock on the same day by 11 artillery rounds. This is how World War I ended. In total, 38 countries with a population of more than 1 billion people participated. The total number of armies reached 70 million. During the war, there were 20 million deaths and 21 million wounded. The total number of deaths includes 9.7 million military personnel and about 10 million civilians. The Entente Powers (also known as the Allies) lost approximately 5.7 million soldiers, while the Central Powers lost around 4 million (Mougel, 2011, p. 1).

World War I 1914–1918 was characterized by several fundamental features that were clearly visible for hundred years and which witnessed a new major modernization of Westphalia after the Napoleonic wars and the decisions of the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815. The Great War revolutionized the world on an unprecedented scale, particularly in Europe. It led to the explosion of revolutions and revolutionary movements in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Finland, Ukraine, India, China, and Mexico. One of the results of the Great War was the collapse and demise of four empires – Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman. The former imperial periphery, or some of its cores, first became a mobile revolutionary segment of the post-war world order (e.g. Finland, Ukraine, Hungary etc.), and then either acquired national and international entities (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes etc.) or became part of other states (Ukraine) or an element

of the League of Nations' mandate system (former colonies of the German and Ottoman empires).

The first global armed conflict confirmed the dominant trend at that time: the change in the international system was only the result of a large-scale war. Given this, the Great War of 1914–1918 was a logical extension of a chain of events: Thirty Years' War – Westphalian System of International Relations – Napoleonic Wars – Vienna International System – World War I – Versailles-Washington international world, but had a different reputation as compared to its predecessors (Gray, 2007; Braumoeller, 2012; Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Goertz, Diehl, Balas, 2016; Acharya and Buzan, 2019). Specifically, the first post-war global international organization, the League of Nations, has assumed the obligation and responsibility of preserving, securing and maintaining world peace, preventing a new global war as a means of resolving conflicts and contradictions of an interstate nature. However, due to the imperfection of the proposed mechanism for the prevention of military conflicts, it failed to achieve its objectives. This eventually led to its elimination after the end of World War II and the creation of a new international UN organization, whose activities today are often criticized for the inconsistency of existing mechanisms for prevention and resolution of global and local conflicts with contemporary realities.

World War I is organically combined, because of the nature of trends in the evolution of the world and the development of international relations, with the interwar twentieth century with its numerous wars, armed conflicts and annexations, and with World War II. It is reasonable to speak not of two world wars, but of a single Thirty Years' War of the 20th century, which also spanned the years from 1914 to 1945. Despite all the tragedy, the Great War created the conditions for new transformational shifts in almost all spheres of society. At the same time, it has deepened the rifts between the victors and the vanquished and in the camp of the victorious states, the discontent and opposition of the peoples who have only partially or completely failed to realize their state aspirations. In addition, the end of World War was the beginning of the confrontation with Soviet Russia, and subsequently the USSR, which, as a result, quickly signaled the instability of the new world order.

In general, the end of the Great War brought the world to a new stage in the development of economic and financial relations, the political and international system. The hundred-year-old Vienna's international system was replaced by the Versailles-Washington international order. Generally, with some modifications, the Westphalian model of the world was still preserved. It was based on the following fundamental laws: 1) the Westphalian world consists of sovereign states and lacks a planetary supreme authority; 2) Westphalia's international order functions to respect the sovereign equality of the states and their non-interference in each other's affairs; 3) in the Westphalian world order, the sovereign state has all the power in its territory; 4) in Westphalia's model framework, international law acts as the law of treaties between sovereign states; 5) in the structure of the Westphalian world, only sovereign states are subjects of international law and recognized international actors.

It became the least lengthy chronological segment of the evolution of international relations and entered the annals of history as the Interwar period.

The aggravation of the contradictions between the leading states of the interwar period after the global economic crisis, the dissatisfaction of several great powers with the results of World War I (first of all, the USSR, Germany, Italy, Japan), the condemnation of the aggressive policies of Germany, Japan, Italy by the victorious states, the failure of the League of Nations to secure peace and to prevent slipping into another global armed conflict resulted in a struggle for a re-division of the world again. Marshal Ferdinand Foch's prophetic words about the system of treaties that resulted from the consolidation of the victory of the Entente states in World War I were prophetically correct: "This is not a peace, but a truce for twenty years" (Churchill, 1948, p. 113).

Unsecure security: interwar peace

World War II, from 1939 to 1945, became the largest and most devastating conflict in human history. Hostilities took place in the territory of 40 states, and the military expenditures of the participating states amounted to \$1 trillion 117 billion. Among the causes of World War II were the contradictions of the interwar world,

embedded in the Versailles-Washington system. These deep contradictions were expressed in the confrontation between the two groups of states plus one: the victorious states of the First World War, that found themselves in the camp of the losers, and the Soviet Union.

The principles of international politics declared after the end of World War I, first consecrated by the Charter of the League of Nations, have been violated in the next decade. Since the late 1920s, the world community has been following the tactical political steps of Germany and the USSR, designed to conceal their strategic goals: spreading their influence to the rest of the world. It is worth noting that, at the same time, the victorious countries of World War I were not fully aware of the threat to the entire international security system in general of those states.

In late 1933, the Soviet government outlined the basic principles of its foreign policy. They provided for compliance with neutrality, non-interference in any military conflicts, a pacification policy towards Germany and Japan (to certain limits) and concrete steps to create a collective security system in Europe under the auspices of the League of Nations.

In November 1933, the USSR received recognition from the United States. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. In September 1934, the Soviet Union was accepted into the League of Nations, which created favorable conditions for its integration into international politics. The USSR responded to the proposal made by French Foreign Minister L. Barthès to establish a collective security system in Europe. On May 2, 1935, a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in case of aggression was signed in Paris. But even at the formal level, its effectiveness was limited by the absence of a separate military convention. In the same year, the USSR signed a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia, but here, too, a separate article made the USSR's military assistance dependent on France's assistance.

Despite the declared "openness" of the USSR, the idea of collective security was not fully realized. The Western powers were wary of the Soviet Union. Strengthening authoritarianism, the personal power of Stalin and the consolidation of one-party rule provoked the opposition of traditional Western politicians, some of whom saw Nazi

Germany as a bastion against Bolshevism. At that time, ideological differences between the political regimes of these countries were more evident than their similarities. Therefore, in March 1938, when the USSR initiated an international community conference to devise practical measures to prevent the threat of a new war as an answer to suggestions of Great Britain and France, Britain refused to participate. An explanation was that such measures could lead to the formation of blocs in Europe and undermine the prospects for peace. Instead, the USSR approached Germany and, in March 1938, signed an economic agreement on trade exchange with it (Laqueur, p. 174) that had devastating consequences for the mass consciousness of the Soviet population, which at the beginning of the German-Soviet War in 1941 could not understand how the ally turned into a major enemy. The mass repression of the 1930s played a negative role for the reputation of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Western counterparts, which led to concerns about the Red Army's fighting capacity and the reliability of the Soviet regime.

The precariousness of the international security system compelled states to take more decisive steps to prevent the recurrence of the tragedy of 1914–1918. In 1939, the last attempt was made to create a collective security system in Europe. The USSR, after much hesitation, annexed the guarantees of the Western powers to Poland, and in April 1939, Great Britain and France proposed to begin trilateral negotiations and invited Germany to establish close relations. Not far behind was Great Britain, which was also negotiating with Hitler in Moscow at the same time. In such a situation, negotiations began between Great Britain, France, and the USSR in April 1939.

The Soviet side offered to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance, including military, in the case of an aggressor's attack on any of the three parties. Western powers have avoided solving this issue, promising to think. It was not possible to sign a separate military convention, and the responsibility for disrupting the negotiations fell on all participants. At the same time, at the end of July 1939, negotiations between the USSR and Germany were resumed. The Soviet side sought to sign an economic agreement, through the mediation of Germany to resolve the armed conflict with Japan in the Far East, and both sides were also not opposed to a mutually

beneficial solution of territorial issues in Europe. On August 19, 1939, a Soviet-German trade agreement was signed, which, in addition to providing credit, expanded the Soviet Union's capabilities in exporting food products and importing new equipment. In addition, during the official Soviet-German talks in Moscow, the German side stated that any economic, political, and territorial interests of the USSR would be satisfied. Representatives of Germany also informed Moscow of plans to launch hostilities against Poland after August 25, 1939. On August 23, 1939, German Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow with an agreed text of the treaty. It was signed on the night of August 23–24, 1939 and published the next day. The Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the USSR and Germany was to regulate relations between the two states for 10 years. An important part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the Secret Protocol on the Delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Contrary to Soviet aspirations, the Treaty of August 23, 1939, did not create a reliable and effective barrier against Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, if before 1939–1940 there were several states from the Barents to the Black Sea that acted as a kind of buffer between Germany and the USSR, a confrontation between their armed forces happened on the eve of the German attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, neglecting the security of other countries led to severe and unpredictable consequences: the Soviet army and the Soviet society were completely unprepared for such events. The latter had huge losses, both territorial and human, in the first months of the war. The signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret protocol was one of Stalin's most controversial and ambiguous political steps, although he considered the agreement a victory because he allegedly managed to outplay Hitler politically. By the way, the Nazi elite considered the agreement a great victory. Hitler even said that now the whole world was in his pocket. Despite the state importance of the agreement of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union, answering to the request of the German side, and to accelerate its ratification, went so far as to reduce the share of this agreement from interstate to intergovernmental documents. On August 31, the Supreme Council of the USSR, and on September 1, the German Reichstag ratified the treaty.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, with Nazi Germany's attack on Poland. According to the "Fall Weiss" (Plan White) plan, approved in early April 1939, Germany threw 62 divisions against Poland, including 7 of tanks and 2,000 aircraft. The Polish army numbered 1 million 750 thousand soldiers and 400 aircraft. On September 6, the Polish government fled Warsaw and, on September 17, it moved to Romania. On September 28, the Nazi captured Warsaw. In the East, a hopelessly outdated army was quickly dismembered by tank units operating under the guise of superior aviation forces using new methods of warfare.

On September 17, under the terms of a secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Soviet troops crossed the border and began advancing through Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. This day marked the Soviet Union's entry into World War II. The Polish state virtually ceased to exist (by analogy with the end of the eighteenth century, when the Rzeczpospolita was liquidated as a result of three partitions, the September 1939 events are famous as the "fourth division of Poland"). The Treaty of Friendship and Borders signed with Germany on September 28, 1939, became a legal consolidation of the Soviet-German borderline, which was formed as a result of the implementation of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During the second half of September-November 1939, the USSR officially legalized the entry of new territories, which were transferred to the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics.

World War II as a factor of geopolitical changes

World War II began as an invasion. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their own territories, to conquer new markets and sources of raw materials. In these circumstances, the USSR tried to subordinate the spheres of influence that the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 23 August 1939 provided. Since June 22, 1941 – from the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR – World War II has entered a new phase. The three historical, political, military and diplomatic processes that would be considered central were the following: first, the collapse of the Soviet-German military-political, diplomatic and economic union and the war between Germany and

the USSR; second, the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition, the cornerstone of which was the joint action of the countries of the Great Trinity – Great Britain, USSR, USA; third, the war against militaristic Japan and the fighting of anti-Hitler coalition states in the Asia-Pacific region.

The military and political actions of the countries participating in World War II were supported by the widespread use of propaganda aimed at involving the population in support of ideological postulates to win the war.

For more than six years of war, the governments of the belligerent countries have used various means of manipulating collective consciousness, actively engaging visual, textual and audio messages. The development of the film industry, the emergence of color films and photography had only contributed to the affirmation in the minds of the masses of the enemy's image. For almost 80 years after the end of World War II, the terms "Fascism" and "Nazism" are abusive for most of the population of the world, including the population of the post-Soviet republics.

It should be emphasized that the defeat of Germany and Japan and their satellites was the result of concerted and victorious foreign policy, diplomacy and military interaction of the great powers that were embodied in the decisions of several international conferences, in particular those of Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam. This played a special role in creating the foundation for the post-war system of international relations in the world and its peaceful settlement.

International relations were still set up as the system of states, and many of the defining basic institutions remained in force. By contrast, the Second World War generated several major changes to the material and ideational structure of global international relations. At the same time, after the end of World War II, changes have occurred in the international arena and in the nature of the evolution of international relations to bipolar in the context of the widespread Cold War. Those changes indicated the further evolution of the Westphalian world under the influence of political, economic and cultural globalization. The United States and the Soviet Union were the big winners of the Second World War. They functioned as the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition.

According to leading Western scholars, the Cold War order that emerged quickly in the years after 1945 is commonly summed up by the term “bipolarity”, and in some ways, there is a good case for doing so. The United States and the Soviet Union were the major victors of World War II. These two states quickly transformed into the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition. It can be emphasized that the ceasefire lines between them in Europe and Northeast Asia have become the boundaries that define the new world order. This was an East-West formation, defined as a global ideological competition between liberal democratic capitalism and a totalitarian communist economy. The development of large arsenals of nuclear weapon quickly differentiated these two “superpowers” from great powers. The traditional set of great powers all faded into the second rank of merely great powers, or even worse. The two superpowers occupied, disarmed and subordinated Germany and Japan. While they quickly recovered economic strength, during the first decades after the war, they largely lost not only the political will and the international legitimacy but also the political independence from the great powers. The so-called “German problem” was solved by dividing the country between the Soviet and US blocs. Britain was also among the winners and briefly played a role as the third superpower. However, GB’s great power status was quickly reduced by its economic weakness and the loss of the empire. Europe fell from the core of world politics and the balance of power, becoming the main prize in the rivalry between the superpowers. The main focus of the remaining powers in Western Europe has shifted from playing the game of global empires to finding a path for regional integration and keeping the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect them. Japan became America’s subordinate ally and forward base in the western Pacific (Acharya and Buzan, 2019, p. 113–114).

There is also a case against using bipolarity. The polarity theory distinguishes only between great powers and the rest. It neglects the distinction between great powers and superpowers, which arguably remains of considerable consequence to how GIS works. Following this thinking, during the Cold War, GIS had two superpowers and several great powers: China, the European Community, and arguably Japan. The same

error was repeated after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Unipolarity was widely declared, but in fact, the structure consisted of one superpower and four great powers. There is a massive structural difference between a system with only superpowers and minor or regional powers and one in which great powers are standing between the superpower(s) and the rest (Buzan, 2004).

However, while bipolarity tells a powerful story, it was not the only story that defined this era. In a long historical perspective, bipolarity may not even be the main story. The key developments were the bipolarity package, the Cold War and nuclear weapons on the one hand, and decolonization on the other. The first of these played a significant role for the core of IR, but the second did not. Decolonization severely affected IR at the periphery. While bipolarity defined two superpowers and their camps, and two rival ideologies for the future of modernity, decolonization defined a Third World, and a position of non-alignment, outside the bipolar structure. Bipolarity mainly tells the story of the core powers, privileging the core and marginalizing the periphery. However, to be honest, since 1945 decolonization changed global international relations: the international society remained the core of the periphery in terms of dominant and subordinate economic positions, but the so-called colonial periphery now had its own political status and voice. After 1945, the sharp separation between international relations, as happened among the states of the “civilized” core, and the colonial relations, as happened between the metropolitan core and the colonial periphery, collapsed, and these two elements increasingly merged into a single story. The determining factor in the international relations of the second half of the 20th century was the peaceful and armed struggle for independence.

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly remarked, “The Cold War and the decolonization occurred side by side and have crossed each other in a myriad of ways” (Acharya and Buzan, 2019, p. 131). Nevertheless, during this period, the periphery remained largely weak and dependent on the core. During this time, international relations became truly global in the sense that all peoples – or, more accurately, all governments – now participated independently. However, global international

relations were still dominated by the West, and the Third World was still weakly placed at the center–periphery of the global economy.

However, though there were many big changes, there were changes in the system of international relations, not changes to the system itself. International relations were still set up as a system of states, and many of the defining primary institutions remained in force.

Radical changes in the system of world international order took place only at the end of the twentieth century. Further development of the world community showed the absence of resistance to internal and external challenges within the system itself, which ended with the collapse of the socialist system and the USSR in the late 1980s – early 1990s, drawing a line under the Cold War era. It has also shown the fundamental impact of globalization on all world processes and in such context on the international sphere by the entry of the world into the era of post-Westphalian international relations. New challenges for today’s global community and the post-Westphalian world, in particular, are the threats posed by international terrorism, hybrid / unconventional wars, the disruption of the balance of power and the principles of international law globally. The “rethinking of the sovereignty” (Jacobsen, Sampford, Thakur, 2008) as the basic category of classical Westphalia along with its above-noticed characteristics, the essential evolution under the influence of the world wars of the 20th century eventually led to the transformation of the international world order into a modern post-Westphalian world system.

Conclusions

The end and consequences of the First and Second World Wars resulted in substantial transformations in the international arena. They led to the reformation of the entire field of international relations and laid the foundations first of the Versailles-Washington (1919–1939) and then of the Yalta-Potsdam (1945–1991) systems. Although both armed conflicts led to another modification of the Westphalian order and marked the beginning of its serious erosion, the Westphalian model of the world has generally survived.

At the same time, after the Second World War, several factors testified to the obvious structural and systemic changes in the Westphalian world order. First, the tendency to limit the field of activity of states as leading international actors in the context of the organizational instrumentation of world politics, which began as a result of the First World War, has been preserved and strengthened. An important place in the international arena is occupied by international organizations of both global and regional nature. First of all, it is about the creation of the UN on October 24, 1945, which for 80 years has remained the main international and organizational instrument in compliance with the principles of international law by all players of world politics, and also, the strengthening of peace. Secondly, the role of integration processes in different regions of the world has increased. For example, European states created in the 1950s three Communities – coal and steel, nuclear energy, and a common market, which has already become the basis for the organizational integration of twelve Western European countries into the European Union in a post-bipolar world order. For the next decades, it expanded and nowadays it became one of the leading international actors in the world.

Even though, after the end of World War II, the new world of international relations was not, for the first time, the result of a major/global armed clash of hostile coalitions of states, changes in the nature and manifestations of international threats and conflicts in the post-bipolar era confirm the relevance of the lessons of the world wars of the twentieth century to minimize the risks and threats in the evolution of modern systems of international relations.

CHAPTER 2.

CONCEPTUAL FUNDAMENTALS OF POST-WESTPHALIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Introduction

Post-bipolar international relations as a sphere of action and interaction of numerous and various state and non-state actors in political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and humanitarian, scientific and technical, etc. levels are the subject of systematic analysis, which is organically combined with detailed characterization of significant structural and functional components of the whole international complex. Conceptual approaches to understanding the current stage of the evolution of international relations were put in place during the destruction of the bipolar world of the Cold War and the formation of new foundations of the world and international order. The distinctiveness of this process is that the collapse of the postwar system took place in peaceful conditions. Accordingly, there are definitions of a new era in international relations, which have spread rapidly and even become winged. Let's name, for example, S. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" or F. Fukuyama's "End of History", E. Toffler's "FutureShock" and "Third Wave", M. Castells' "Information Age", Zb. Brzezinski or I. Wallerstein's "World System", A. Strauss's "Unipolar International System", etc. At the same time, none of the above definitions reflects the complex characteristics of the modern, post-1991 system of international relations.

Most often, two terms are used to describe the interconnectedness and interdependence of world politics after the fall of the Iron Curtain: the post-bipolar (post-Westphalian) international system or international relations after the end of the Cold War. In the first case, the post-bipolar international system seeks to emphasize the disappearance of dualism in the arena of international politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower. The United States remains the only superpower, although certain elements of the superpower are inherent in the influential actors of modern international relations. First of all, we are talking about the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the European Union. The well-known American

international researcher S. Huntington in his article “The Lonely Superpower” (1999) (Huntington, 1999) even proposed to regard the international system “after the Cold War” (Kuźniar, 2011) as a combined model in the format of a uni- multipolar world in which US dominance borders on a polycentric conglomerate of the rest of countries. In the second case (the system of international relations after the end of the Cold War), the key to assessing the current state of international relations is the emphasis on the disappearance of the main dividing lines in world politics: between socialism and capitalism, between government-controlled and market economy, and finally between the USSR and the United States. Hence, according to the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, R. Haas, the modern world can be interpreted as “no-polar”, where power is distributed among numerous, but “relatively equal” centers. It is not difficult to see that both terms, post-bipolar international system and international relations after the end of the Cold War, have common features, which usually allows them to be used as synonyms and makes them the most popular when choosing a common comprehensive definition for the modern international relations.

Structural features of modern international relations

It is worth noting that the system of international relations in the modern world has a highly complex structure, and any definition or typology reflects international realities to a greater or lesser extent. One cannot fail to notice the fact that its structure plays a fundamental role in understanding the laws of the functioning of the international system. According to the basic idea, the uncoordinated activities of sovereign states with their interests form an international system, the main feature of which is the dominance of a limited number of the strongest states, and its structure determines the behavior of all international actors. Hence, the most general law of international systems is the dependence of the behavior of actors on the structural characteristics of the system. Scientists, such as R. Aron, call the law of equilibrium of international systems or the law of balance of power another common law, which allows for the maintenance of the relative stability of the international system.

Regarding the transformation of the international system, its basic law is the law of correlation between polarity and stability of the international system. However, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the global bipolar system put on the agenda issues that cannot be resolved within the traditional terms of “poles”, “balance of power”, and “configuration of the balance of power”, etc. The world has entered a period of uncertainty and growing risks: the Yalta-Potsdam order collapsed, and the international system began to slide into deregulation. As a result, the global international system is experiencing profound shocks associated with the transformation of its structure and changes in its interaction with the environment, which in turn affect its regional and peripheral dimensions. Proofs of this are the events around Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq or Afghanistan, and more recently in North Africa and the Middle East, which, according to international relations experts, have entered a period of long-term “emergency”.

The Belgian scientist A. Samuel in his book “Nouveau pays age international” even believes that humanity has already entered the “new international world” (Samuel, 1990). The American scientist J. Rosenau in his work “Turbulence in World Politics” (Rosenau, 1990) spoke of the “world of post-international politics”. First of all, we are talking about the policy of a “bifurcated world”, where two simultaneously interdependent and irreconcilable sides were formed. On the one hand, these are traditional interstate relations, which are determined by the “laws” of classical diplomacy and strategy; on the other hand, the interaction of “actors outside sovereignty”, i.e. non-state actors in international relations. The relationship between these two groups of international actors, state and non-state, is very complex and has a structure of a network. This means that any earthquake in one area is immediately reflected in the others, regardless of the boundaries between domestic and international processes, which, although leveled, still persist.

The speed and depth of changes observed in such a “world of post-international politics” has at least three main consequences. First, a transition from a bipolar world to a complex or to some extent transitional post bipolar world had place. “Network” theorists (primarily J. Rosenau and the Anderson’s spouses) especially emphasize that

everything is so intertwined in the modern world that a return to the previous structure of the world order is impossible (Rosenau & Singh, 2002; Rosenau, 2006). Secondly, this transitional world has become unpredictable and it is no longer possible to resolve issues of international security only by the old military-force methods with the participation of state participants in the international political process only. Third, information technology is extremely important in today's world, including in world politics. This allowed us to characterize modern society as information one, which has a cardinal influence on the evolution of traditional politics, diplomacy and strategy in international relations. These consequences can be narrowed down to one conclusion: a restructuring of the entire world political space is taking place, which is marked by stochasticity and the influence of new types of phenomena (virtualization, "hybrid war", cyberattacks, assemblage, etc.).

Hence, the laws of international relations, although preserved, but acquire new features and are often considered in the form of universal laws or trends in modern international relations. Universal or most general laws must meet the criteria of spatio-temporal and structural-functional nature. This means the following. First, their influence had to impact not only certain regions but the world as a whole. Secondly, they must be observed in historical retrospect, in the current development of international relations, as well as not to be excluded in the future. Third, they must cover all participants in international relations and all spheres of public life. Hence, we can identify two main universal patterns or two leading trends in the development of modern international relations. These include globalization and fragmentation of international relations, the formation of a single, integrated world and all new forms of its polarization. These universal laws are dialectically opposite sides of one internally contradictory tendency: the growing interdependence of the modern world, as well as its specific, often contradictory and even unpredictable instances in the field of international relations. The increase in conflict and chaos in international relations in the first quarter of the 21st century requires leading international actors to return to effective mechanisms for regulating world order based on current norms and principles of international law. Otherwise, uncontrolled polarization of the international field can

lead to serious and even unpredictable consequences for the entire global international system. Therefore, the search for a balance of power and a balance of interests remains not only relevant, but also vital for the international community.

Post-Westphalian international relations: from unipolar to multipolar world

The end of the Cold War era with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the world system of socialism resulted in the transformation of the United States into a hegemon on the international arena in the 1990s. This was determined by the fall of the Eastern bloc led by the USSR, as well as the powerful economic, financial, trade, information, political, military capabilities of the United States to influence the international situation, its nature and course. According to proponents of the dominance and leading role of the United States in international relations in the 1990s, they have become a “single superpower”, a leader, a hegemon, and the center of a new imperial-type international system (Nye, 2002; Wohlforth, 1999). However, this unipolar world could not last long in time. This, in particular, drew the attention of Western researchers in 1994 (Friedberg, 1994, p. 20–21). General trends in the development of a multipolar world and gradual reduction performance abilities US effectively influence world development across complexity, inconsistency and global problems of international relations, occurrence / recovery and active development of new centers of power already in the short term, showed the necessity of forming a multipolar world or complex.

The limited capacity of the United States to maintain a unipolar world was largely confirmed by the realities of international relations in the XXI century. The fight against international terrorism against the background of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, steadily dictated the creation of an international anti-terrorist coalition. The United States was unprepared to respond unilaterally to a wave of armed and peaceful protests and social protests in the Arab world. The Arab revolutions, and especially the events of the civil war in Syria and external intervention in it, have also shown the limited ability of the United States to influence the situation. This means that the American strategy of managed crises and conflicts (strategy of managed chaos)

has lost its effectiveness and requires at least a “restart”. Russia’s violations of international treaties on Georgia and Ukraine, the annexation of the territories of independent UN member states and the threat of destruction of the entire system of modern international law, as well as Russia’s growing influence in the anti-American Islamic world are also evidence of limited US capabilities to restore the status quo.

This is associated by the researcher with a number of challenges to the unilateral dominance of the United States. F. Zakaria called this phenomenon “the rise of others” (Zakaria, 2008), among which – the growth of economic and military power of the European Union; tangible economic and even military opposition from the United States by such Asian giants as China, Japan, and India; the desire to gain real influence on world politics, and in particular within the Western Hemisphere, from Mexico and Brazil; transformation of the Russian Federation into a powerful imperial center, especially in terms of geopolitical and geoeconomic (primarily – energy) influences in the post-Soviet space.

It should be noted that the process of forming multipolarity in international relations, although clearly evident, is still far from complete and is extremely controversial. Thus, showing the tendencies of confrontation with the United States, the EU at the same time remains an element of the only Western civilization with the United States with common values and ideological orientations for them. Europe has not yet identified the position of a new cultural, historical, economic and political center, an alternative to that retained by the United States. Even more problematic from an economic, political, and military perspective, the above can be considered in relation to countries such as Russia or China, or even the hypothetical alliance of Russia and China, directed against the United States. The own interests of each of the potentially new centers of power in modern international relations – China, the EU, Russia, India, Brazil, etc. – very often do not coincide in political, economic, security and other areas. This leads to confrontation between them at both the global and regional levels, and as a result – to the increase of global instability, the resolution of wars or armed conflicts.

There is also a decline in the effectiveness of leading international organizations, including the UN and the OSCE, in the political settlement of existing security

problems. To some extent, this statement also applies to NATO as the main tool for realizing American interests. This is evidenced by local military conflicts and wars of low and medium duration and intensity in Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia, Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan and others.

Thus, the analysis of the main trends in modern international relations shows that in place of a unipolar world with US hegemony, a multipolar world order is being formed. Along with the United States, new centers of power are emerging within it, including China, the EU, India, Brazil, Russia, and so on. We believe that the process of formation of a multipolar post-Westphalian world order will be complex and contradictory with the long-lasting parallel preservation of the role of the United States as the most powerful international actor.

Models of modern international relations

In fact, we can talk about modern international relations, using the concept of assemblage. “Assemblage” is the basic concept of postmodern philosophy. The term was coined by French thinkers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in “The Thousand Plateau: Capitalism and Schizophrenia” (Deleuze, Guattari, 2003) to denote a complex set of objects, connections, and relationships as a synthesis of various elements, signs, discourses, and associations that express a particular idea. Deleuze and Guattari singled out two types of assemblies: concrete (or anthropological, a way of constructing one’s self, a way of understanding one’s identity) and abstract (a striking example of an abstract assembly is, for example, the war machine, the state machine, and the ideology machine, machine of revolution). In the context of the analysis of approaches to the understanding of modern international relations as an “abstract assembly” we will consider the models of S. Cohen, J. Galtung, N. Onuf and others (Wohlforth, 1999; Onuf, 2017).

Already S. Huntington proposed to regard the international system after the Cold War as a combined model in the format of a “unipolar world” (Huntington, 1999). In this system of international relations, US dominance borders on a polycentric conglomerate of other countries. Instead, President of the Council on Foreign Relations

Incumbent Richard N. Haass believed that the distribution of power and influence in international relations allows us to interpret the modern world as “non-polar” (Haass, 2008), where power is distributed among numerous but “relatively equal” centers: large influential states and blocs of states, international and regional organizations, local military formations, numerous non-governmental organizations and large corporations. In such a multipolar world, no pole of power can dominate, because under hegemony, the model of the international system becomes unipolar. Such a multipolar world can be built 1) on the principle of cooperation (states jointly develop the rules of the game, monitor their observance and punish violators), 2) on the competitive principle (stability is ensured by the balance of power), 3) on the conflict principle (when this balance is violated).

The polycentric and hierarchical model of the geostrategic spheres and geopolitical regions of the American Saul Cohen covers five levels (Cohen, 2003; Cohen, 2015):

First level – geostrategic areas – Maritime and Eurasian, identified by G. Mackinder. Plus, S. Cohen singles out three more independent entities: South Asia, Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe as a “gateway” region;

Second level – geopolitical areas. The Maritime areas include: Anglo-America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and the Maghreb, Extra-Continental Asia and Oceania, South America and sub-Saharan Africa; Hartland and East Asia are parts of the Eurasian area.

Third level – first world states and their “cores” – the United States (Atlantic coast, the Great Lakes region); EU (“Central Axis of Development”); Japan (conurbation of the Pacific industrial belt); Russia (industrial-agrarian triangle of St. Petersburg – Rostov-on-Don – Kuzbass); China (East, North, South, and Northeast coastal areas);

Fourth level – second world states – dominate within the regions, but, due to limited participation in integration entities and international relations, have no global influence: Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, the

Republic of Korea, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Canada;

Fifth level – subnational territories – the “Gates” (links of communication), which in the future will play the role of leaders in relations between states, stabilizing the global geopolitical system. The “Gates” are usually located along the boundaries of geostrategic areas: the Baltics, Slovenia, the Far East of Russia, Alaska, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Kashmir, Western Australia, Punjab, Eritrea, the Azores, Fr. Madeira, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Quebec, northern Mexico, Catalonia, Gaza, the West Bank, the Basque Country, Lebanon and more. According to the author, being formed as independent geopolitical units, the “Gates” transformed from zones of conflict to zones of compromise development. TNCs that carry out direct foreign investment, technology transfer, and detailed specialization of production can also be such “Gates”.

Scandinavian political scientist Johann Galtung in his “Seven Parallels of Unipolar World” hypothesis identified seven centers that can claim global (regional) hegemony (Galtung, 1998; Galtung, 2020):

The United States with hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East and a desire to be a hegemon of hegemons;

The EU, which plays on the confrontation between Russia and Turkey;

Russia with the CIS and possibly the Orthodox and Slavic countries of Central Europe;

Turkey with more secular Muslim states;

India and Hindu states;

China – the spread of influence as a result of “hidden capitalism”;

Japan, which will lack economic leadership.

Even now, six of the seven centers are “coordinated” by the United States, and in the future J. Galtung predicts possible geopolitical coalitions: in particular, the United States – EU – CE and Russia against China – Japan – Korea – Vietnam. He draws this conclusion from an analysis of the confrontation of four worlds: the First is the West, the Second is the post-socialist countries, the Third is the non-aligned countries, and the Fourth is Southeast and East Asia. The main line of division at this

stage is between the First and Fourth Worlds. It is possible that all seven centers will be on the path of struggle for markets and raw materials, as they develop in a capitalist way.

Director of the Institute of Political Analysis and International Relations S. Tolstov reasonably noted that a specific feature of the modern international system, if interpreted as a state of “diffusion” of unipolarity, or as the initial phase of transition to a multipolar (polycentric) model, are changes in politics and complication of political motivations in relations between the leading states, as well as a significant increase in the number of states involved in the dialogue on fundamental global issues and the search for potential common solutions. In this sense, polarity is expressed primarily as a set of factors and motivations in the relationship between the “old” and “new” large powers (dynamically developing economies), including former third-world countries with significant expected development potential (Толстов, 2013). Other countries that participate in situational regional combinations of interests and forms of interaction, and, depending on their individual characteristics and capabilities, participate in regional balances, communities and coalitions, also participate indirectly in these processes.

Hence, if we deepen the understanding of global political trends, not only in terms of history but also in the sociology of international relations, based on the study of state influence on society and the study of mechanisms of influence of social communities and institutions on the state and political order in general, we should make an emphasis on the fundamentally important, in our opinion, features of all trends in the evolution of international relations after the Cold War: their vector of development is not straight, but rather has the form of a zigzag, and evolves in a zigzag pattern. This reflects not only the complexity of their course and, accordingly, analysis, but also the dialectic of deep internal contradictions, often ambiguity and even tactical or strategic ambiguity or uncertainty. Such an assessment of the general process of evolution of the basic tendencies of modern international relations not only does not contradict the latter, but in fact reflects their existing and implicit state.

Conflictogenic potential of modern international relations

J. Rosenau notes that the world of “post-international politics” is characterized by chaos and unpredictability, distortion of identity, reorientation of traditional ties of authority and loyalty (Rosenau, p. 71). In other words, the growing number of participants brings great uncertainty to the system of international relations. Therefore, ensuring the military security of states remains an urgent task. In addition, it is accompanied by challenges related to the growing influence of integration and globalization processes, rates in the field of economic competition, the problems of international terrorism, and so on. The state system will eventually give way to the double process of “globalization” and “localization”, which Rosenau called “framigration” (from fragmentation and integration) (Rosenau, 1994).

It is necessary to pay special attention to the fact that in the modern world there is a transformation of current concepts and structures of security of the confrontational type into concepts and structures of security based on cooperation. This aspect characterizes the interaction and interdependence of national and international aspects of security. There is a new understanding and interest in each subject in ensuring national security by strengthening global security. But such an understanding, even in the light of current challenges and threats, is not a panacea for the traditional arbitrariness of powerful state actors in the international arena. One recent example is the Russian Federation’s annexation and militaristic policy towards Ukraine. In May 2020, A. Merkel said: “Russia is implementing a strategy of hybrid warfare”.

At the same time, globalization processes lead to the growth of conflictogenity, as they are backed by enormous interests (economic, political, informational, military, etc.), fundamental differences between the potential and capabilities of different countries, cultural and civilizational differences and challenges, and the emergence of new and exacerbation of many old global problems. All of the above is expressed in the preservation of the influence of geopolitical, economic, financial, demographic, environmental factors on international relations. Anderson’s spouses from Sweden even created their own “network” model in the field of modern world economy and international economic relations. Based on scientific facts and international practice,

they consider the rapid integration of national economies into the global economic system to be the main reason for the transformational shifts. Andersons' "network" model can be called a model of the global economy, built on the theory of social networks. From the point of view of the evolution of the modern system of international relations, it should be noted that the tendency to increase the importance and role of geo-economical factors, which significantly complement and expand the field of classical geopolitics, is becoming more and more clear.

The Global Trends 2020 and Global Trends 2030 Estimate (Global Trends 2030), prepared by the US National Intelligence Council back in 2004 and 2012, stated that the geo-political space dominated by American power would become more complex and diverse. These signs can lead to significant changes in the positioning of the United States, as the rise of China will tend to the role of "balancer" between China, on the one hand, and Japan and other Asian countries, on the other. It has been argued that global development trends require leadership of the United States, but that the American leadership will need skill and ingenuity to reach a consensus. Fierce disputes over ethics and morals will be accompanied by the hopes of some international actors to maintain the United States' role as the leading guarantor of international security, as only the United States will have sufficient forces and military means. However, the architecture of international relations is not adapted to ensure the division of responsibilities in security matters. According to the American expert community, no other structure or regional organization than NATO is capable of taking on such a responsibility, although NATO's role has recently provoked the greatest objections from other actors in international relations, primarily the Russian Federation and its allies.

On the other hand, in modern post-bipolar relations of shaky equilibrium, there is an obvious focus on the transformation of the world international order into a "post-American world" (as defined by the famous American political scientist F. Zakaria) (Zakaria, 2008; Clark, 2012). In his like-named book, he drew attention to the critical dynamics of relations between old and new actors at the global level. In this context,

the question of how other states will respond to the reduction or possible fundamental revision of the United States' role and influence in the international arena remains open.

Z. Brzezinski in *The Great Eurasian Chessboard* also tried to give an attractive answer to the question “The last global Superpower: what comes next?” (Brzezinski, 1997). It reads: “Two aspects should be the goal of US policy – and there is no need for apologetics: strengthening America's dominant position over the life of at least another generation, and better – over a longer period, and creating geopolitical structures that can mitigate the inevitable shocks and tensions of social and political changes and at the same time will evolve in the direction of the geopolitical core of joint responsibility for the peaceful management of world processes. The long phase of cooperation with key Eurasian partners stimulated and managed by America will also help to create the preconditions for increasing the role of existing and increasingly inappropriate obsolete UN structures. Then the new division of responsibilities and privileges will respond to the realities of world power, which are now so strikingly different from those that existed in 1945”. Further as the text goes: “Thus, in the coming decades, a functioning structure of global cooperation based on geopolitical realities may emerge, and it will later be able to put on the mantle of the current world “regent”, who is still responsible for stability and peace in the world. Achieving geostrategic success in this matter will be a worthy legacy that America will leave behind as the first, only and last truly global superpower”.

Conclusions

This means nothing else than relative instability and further shifts in the restructuring of the entire modern system of international relations under the influence of transformational evolution and changes in the world of “post-international politics”. The consequence of this at the present stage of the evolution of international relations after the Cold War was the Cold War II. This term has been used since 2010 to describe the political, economic, military and other confrontation between the European Union and the United States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other. According to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Ryzhov, the

fundamental difference of the new Cold War is that it is conducted in the conditions of wars of a new nature, hybrid ones. In August 2015, he noted that the Russian authorities, having started an aggression against Ukraine, had put Russia in a historical and strategic trap, and Cold War II was approaching its apogee.

“We invite you to the Cold War II” is the title of a recent article by political scientist Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, in the prestigious Foreign Policy magazine (Trenin, 2014). The author was probably the first to describe what political analysts on both sides of the Atlantic think that the system of international relations has changed, and even if Russia reduces its pressure on Ukraine, it will not return to its previous state. D. Trenin believes that the Russian occupation of Crimea marked the beginning of Cold War II, a new round of global confrontation between Russia and the West. He even declares that the previous 20 years of peace were not the end of an old conflict, but only a temporary truce. Now the season of competition between the West and Russia for influence in Eastern Europe is reopened. The question of the further evolution of the entire system of international relations in the post-bipolar (post-Westphalian) world and the tendency of its transformation from a confrontational to a system of cooperation remains open.

We consider the process of gradual transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world to be an important trend in the evolution of modern international relations. The way to change the polarity of the international system is determined by the uneven development and changes in the ratio of the potentials of leading actors. Among the countries or blocs of countries that are often considered by modern analysts as possible new, along with the United States, powerful geopolitical centers – the European Union, China, Russia, potentially – even India, Brazil and others. At the same time, the general trends in the evolution of the international system depend primarily on the tactics of the Euro-Atlantic community in terms of finding effective responses and means of influence that can restore control over international political processes and prevent further destructive consequences.

It should also be borne in mind that in the current system of post-Westphalian international relations, associated with the growth of global and regional centers of

power, other factors of global importance are also significantly intensified. In this sense, we pay attention to the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear and missile; international terrorism; maritime piracy; organized and transnational crime; arms and drug smuggling; human trafficking and illegal migration. These factors will not only have an impact on the destabilization of the world order, but also require joint effective countermeasures by real and potential centers of power – states / blocs (US, EU, China, Russia, etc.) and international organizations (UN, OSCE, NATO) – in modern international relations.

CHAPTER 3.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A SYSTEM AND A DISCIPLINE:
FROM THE WESTPHALIAN TO THE POST-WESTPHALIAN
WORLD ORDER

Introduction

Transformations and systemic changes at the European and world levels at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s had a profound effect on international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the world communist system meant the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world. The policy of openness of Russia and China and their inclusion into global economic, political, social processes together with the formation of an integration core in Europe (European Union), Eurasian space (Eurasian Economic Community – until 2014, Eurasian Economic Union – since 2015), America (North American The Free Trade Agreement, Latin American Integration Association), Asia (Association of Southeast Asian Nations and ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), Africa (African Union, New Partnership for Africa Development) marked the final transition to the globalization of international relations. The information revolution and the advent of the Internet age have led to the virtualization of space and even more blurred interstate borders. Finally, globalization, integration, trans-nationalization, and virtualization of international relations have strengthened the influence of non-state actors on world politics. States, as international players in the new post-bipolar realities, use as important means of influence, not just force and diplomacy, but also tools of soft or even smart power, hybrid warfare, digital diplomacy.

This arguments allow us to draw a conclusion about the transition of modern international relations not just to a new system, but also to a new world order quality. This means the final end of the Yalta-Potsdam bipolar era of the Cold war and that it was replaced by the first unipolar post-bipolar system, which as a result of the "rise of others" has already been evolving towards a multipolar one since the beginning of the XXI century. But world order changes are much deeper and mean more than just the

modernization of the state-centric Westphalia world order, which developed in the middle of the XVII century. In fact, deep systemic and structural changes of the late XX century in the international arena had as their main consequence the destruction of the Westphalian world order. The entire modern world order has been radically changed by globalization of international relations, blurring of traditional state borders, creation of a powerful over/inter-state integration spaces, the increasing role of the non-traditional (non-state) international actors, virtualization, diplomacy and even space military operations and transition of inter-state and international military confrontations into cyberspace, and Para militarization and Para diplomacy of international relations. Taking these changes into account, it can be stated that they are the evidence of the fast and real emergence of the global post-Westphalian world order in modern conditions.

Scientific studies and understanding the relevant paradigmatic realities of the causes and consequences of the end of the Westphalian international era can be seen as a certain ideological challenge for researchers of history and theory of international relations. In this context, we would like to draw attention to the fundamental work of the Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington Amitav Acharya and Emeritus Professor in the London School of Economics Department of International Relations, Honorary Professor at Copenhagen, Jilin and China Foreign Affairs Universities, and a Fellow of the British Academy Barry Buzan *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary* (Acharya, Buzan, 2019). Well-known Western scholars have set themselves several goals, in particular, to deepen the understanding of international relations of the XIX – early XX centuries and show the relationship with their subsequent evolution; focus not only on classical but also on non-Western approaches to international relations within the study period; finally, to submit an introductory text on the history of the evolution of international relations as a scientific discipline (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 2).

Structurally, the work consists of an introduction and ten sections. For convenience, they can be characterized by several content blocks.

The World and Foundations of International Relations up to 1919

Describing international relations in the early twentieth century, the authors focused on several notable central themes. In particular, it is about the influence of the revolutions of the XIX – early XX centuries and the colonial policy of Western states on international relations, the rise of Japan as the first step to “the rise of the rest” (Zakaria, 2009), as well as the trauma of the Great War of 1914-1918 and its impact on the evolution of the Westphalian international system and the beginning of disciplinary science of international relationships. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan proved that the century before the First World War was deeply revolutionary and transformational and led to structural changes and peculiarities in the evolution of international relations (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 29-30). However, although the international system was weakened by the first global armed conflict, it has not fundamentally changed in most respects.

For world politics, since the Great War, there have been two big shocks from this war. One was the unleashing of the contradictions inherent to the ideologies of progress into the international political arena. The First World War set loose a three way ideological rivalry between Socialism, Fascism and liberal democracy, with monarchies pushed to the background. The other big shock was the legitimacy and viability of the great war of power as an instrument of policy (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 31–32). The authors argue that the aftermath of the First World War contributed to a kind of reset of the old agenda. Since their foundation in 1919, new international relations were “obsessively focused” on the trauma of the First World War and sought to prevent a recurrence of such disasters. At the same time, all this fundamentally affected the founding of International Relations as a recognised academic discipline. the contemporary field, or discipline (opinion varies), of international relations, conventionally dates its origin to 1919, when its first university chairs and think tanks were set up, and “International Relations” became one of several labels (International Studies, International Politics, World Politics) for a specific field of study. As it was needed to manage the international anarchy of great power relations, arms racing and

the world economy became the overriding priority of the “new” discipline, to prevent another war.

As Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan proved, during the nineteenth century and up to the First World War, the nature and practices of International Relations were structured by a profoundly unequal relationship between a relatively small, but very powerful core (Western plus Japan), and a large, but relatively weak periphery (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 34–66). The practice of core was to make a sharp distinction between “civilized” states, who composed international society, and “barbaric” or “savage” societies, mostly dealt with by degrees of colonial subordination and not counted as part of the international community.

The development of International Relations during this period was much more significant than suggested in the founding myth of 1919. This means that majority of the foundations of modern IR was developed before 1914. This “IR before IR” mirrored it in its concerns and definitions, being almost entirely a view from the core. Despite the trauma of the First World War among the core, the highly unequal colonial relationship of core–periphery carried over largely unaltered into the interwar period. Throughout this time of extreme core dominance, views about ir/IR were developing in the periphery. But since many of them were motivated by anti-colonialism, they were largely ignored or marginalized in the West-centric discourses of International Relations. The colonies mainly were excluded from international society in their own right, and they were hardly a part of International Relations concerns during this period either.

We draw particular attention to the argument of Amitava Acharya and Barry Buzan that the main foundations of International Relations were laid down during the several decades before 1919. The International Relations of the nineteenth century was very much a view of the world, reflecting the concerns of the core powers. Meanwhile, it is possible to trace only a few early instances of modern International Relations thinking outside the West (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 34, 55–64). However, despite the existence of International Relations before the early XX century, it was not until the First World War that the foundations of the science of International Relations had

finally been completed. The priority of the discipline was the problems aimed at preventing war and maintaining peace.

International relations in 1919-1945 and the establishment of the discipline

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan rightly noted that the First World War can perhaps be perceived best as the first round of a systemic crisis of modernity on a global scale. Subsequent rounds of this crisis – the Second World War, the Cold War and decolonization, the “rise of the rest” – occupied much of the twentieth century (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 67). Interwar international politics and World War II became much more significant global crises for the Westphalian order than the Great War. World Wars I and II, the Cold War and decolonization were not exactly distinct events, but phases of a more general crisis. They dramatically influenced the modernization of international relations in the twentieth century.

In the interwar period, in the attempt to rebuild and improve post-war order during the 1920s and in the progressive collapse of that order during the 1930s., anti-colonialism became more organized in Vietnam, India, Indonesia and many parts of the Middle East. The colonial powers had to deal not only with intellectual and political opposition fuelled in part by Wilsonian rhetoric of the right of self-determination but sometimes with fierce protests and insurgencies. However, during the interwar years, colonial concerns were much more along the geopolitical lines of competition between the great powers to re-divide the colonial spoils, with Britain, France and the United States as the status quo powers, and Germany, Italy, Japan and, up to a point, the Soviet Union as the revisionist ones. The colonial powers still enjoyed a significant advantage over the periphery in the fields of authority and development (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 73–74).

All this only added tension to interwar international relations. The three-way ideological division (the liberal democracies – fascism – communism) turned balance-of-power, and balance of threat, into calculations, very tricky and complicated. Such calculations were complicated by the rapid changes in the military balance being created by German, Japanese and Soviet rearmament, and the responses to them in

France, Britain and the United States. These changes were not only quantitative (how many aircraft, ships, tanks, troops), but also qualitative. In this situation, there was no hope of creating a system of collective security and peace.

World War II became a new stage in the crisis of modernity, which World War I had begun. At the same time, as aptly noted by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, social Darwinism and nationalism remained powerful influences on the conduct and rationalization of international relations, and in the Fascism, it took an even more extreme form than they had prior to 1914 (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 78). The Second World War was much larger in scale and intensity than the First. It was, in effect, the merger of two regional wars: one in Europe, which was round two of the First World War (war against Germany), and the other in Northeast Asia (war against Japan). This merger of two regional wars nevertheless made for a truly global world war with much larger imperial stakes. During the First World War, only the Middle East was seriously contested, whatever wider dreams Germany might have had about getting the British out of India. Elsewhere, as in Africa and East Asia, the mopping up of German colonies was a relatively minor affair. But during the Second World War, not only were the Middle East and North Africa at stake, but also the colonial empires in South and Southeast Asia. For a time, Germany and Italy threatened Britain's position in the Mediterranean and Egypt, and Japan took control of Southeast Asia and threatened India. New and improved weapons extended the range of military operations, and, except for the United States, brought the home front much more intensely into the conflict, most notably by the heavy bombing of cities. Some idea of the difference that both the wider scale and the new technologies made to great power war can be seen from the comparable casualty figures: roughly 15 million for the First World War and 41 million for the Second (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 79).

Because of these differences, the consequences of the Second World War were also much larger than those of the First. The main one was the elevation of the United States (the ending of US isolationism and the transition to global engagement) and the Soviet Union to superpower status (these states received large spheres of geopolitical influence, had powerful material potentials, possessed nuclear weapons and the most

advanced military technologies) and the shift from an ideologically and materially multi-polar structure to one that was bipolar both in the distribution of power and in its narrowing of the ideological rivalry driving world politics to that between two versions of universalism: liberal-democratic capitalism and totalitarian communism. It caused the delegitimation of colonialism/imperialism as a primary institution of global international society, and its replacement by development. A corollary of this was the rapid abandonment of formally divided sovereignty, its replacement by universal sovereign equality, and the beginning of a great expansion in the membership of the global international society. As a result of World War II, these are the main features that dominated international relations until the late 1980s.

At the same time, in 1919–1945, disciplinary institutionalization of International Relations took place. That process was strongly influenced by changes and transformations in the international arena that were taking place at the core of the international system and on its periphery. Despite this institutionalization, there was still no agreement on the name of the field. Although some early books did carry the term “international relations” or “international politics” in their titles. It should be noted that the processes of disciplinary institutionalization took place primarily in the core of the international system and had little impact on its periphery (except Japan and, to some extent, India, China, the Islamic world and Latin America). Anti-colonialism was a common theme and motivation for much of the International Relations thinking in the periphery. During the interwar period, International Relations became significantly institutionalized as an academic discipline, mainly in the West, and particularly in the Anglosphere, but also to some extent more globally. Western Idealists and Realists were more concerned with war between the Western nations and the international anarchy problem, and only peripherally with imperialism. But thinkers in the Non-Western world were primarily concerned with imperialism and colonialism. This was the main difference between Western and non-Western academic paradigms, which influenced their development, functioning, and dialogue during the world wars and the interwar period.

The world after 1945 as an era of the Cold War and decolonization, the second foundation of the discipline of International Relations

The key developments in International Relations were the package of bipolarity, the Cold War and nuclear weapons on the one hand, and decolonization on the other. The first of these played very powerfully from its core into international relations, but the second did not. Decolonization played strongly into international relations in the periphery. Although there were many significant changes, they were changes in the system of international relations, not changes to the system itself. International relations were still set up as a system of states, and many of its defining primary institutions remained in place.

At the same time, it is necessary to understand the fact that there are some limitations in the concept of bipolarity and the explanation of the Cold War era, and Barry Buzan drew attention to this in his earlier work (Buzan, 2004). Polarity theory distinguishes only between great powers and the rest. It neglects the distinction between great powers and superpowers, which arguably remains of considerable consequence to how global international relations work. Following this thinking, during the Cold War, global international relations had two superpowers and several great powers: China, the European Community, arguably Japan. The same error was repeated after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Unipolarity was widely declared, but in fact, the structure was one superpower and four great powers. There is a massive structural difference between a system with only superpowers and minor or regional powers and one in which great powers are standing between the superpower(s) and the rest. But in general, the dominant influence of bipolar division and confrontation during the Cold War was perceived as a determining factor influencing the entire international system. The United States and the Soviet Union were the big winners of the Second World War and functioned as the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition.

The two superpowers and their allies competed for influence and allies within the Third World, where the key theme of international relations for the periphery was decolonization. The determining factor in international relations was the peaceful and

armed struggle for independence. As a result, by 1975, colonialism as a formal political structure of unequal core–periphery relations was over. Western researchers drew attention to the fact that the process was complicated and controversial (Buzan, Wæver, 2003). At the regional level, Third World states had to work out economic, political and security relationships with their newly independent neighbours, and develop policies for operating within their regions. This was often far from easy. Many of the new regions were born into conflict. As Barry Buzan and Richard Little argue, the great expansion in the number of states brought about by decolonization created something of a crisis, even for the standard bilateral practices of diplomacy (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 128).

Thus, during the Cold War, under the influence of the processes of bipolarity (confrontation of superpowers and their blocs) and decolonization (change of colonial status to independence), the core and periphery of international relations were transformed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly remarked: “The Cold War and decolonization occurred side by side and played into each other in myriad ways” (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 131). But during this period, the periphery remained largely weak and dependent on the core. Only a handful of Asian Tigers and then, to some extent, China made the jump fully into modernity. During this period, international relations became truly global in the sense that all peoples – or more accurately, all governments – now participated in it independently. But global international society was still dominated by the West, and the Third World was still weakly placed within a core–periphery global economy.

The Cold War ended at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. The unification of Germany, the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR and the world communist system not only ended the era of bipolarity and the Cold War. The whole epoch of the Westphalian world order came to an end and was replaced by the post-bipolar/post-Westphalian world of international relations. Specifically, the United States, and, more generally, the West and Japan, can be said to have won the Cold War. Either way, the Soviet Union and its ideology were clearly the big losers of the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War brought both bipolarity and the nuclear defence

dilemma to an abrupt end. The United States seemed to stand alone as the sole superpower.

During 1945–1989, there was active development of the disciplinary base of International Relations. Western researchers note that a key feature of the “second founding” of International Relations after 1945 was both the great expansion of its academic institutionalization in terms of teaching, university departments, think tanks, textbooks and journals, and the founding of mostly national, academic associations of International Relations (or more commonly the broader “International Studies”) to replace the International Studies Conference (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 142). These developments were mainly in North America and Western Europe, though for this period, we move Japan and Korea from the periphery to the core. As during the interwar years, no consensus emerges about what to call the discipline, with several labels remaining in play. By the end of the Cold War, International Relations has been spreading the more academic approach from the core to the periphery, becoming more of a formal discipline there. In many ways, the institutionalization of International Relations in the core followed a similar pattern to that of the interwar years.

The United States is rapidly becoming the most popular and influential country in the discipline of International Relations, due to its transformation into a global force (superpower). In line with its size, wealth and new global roles, the United States mainly led in these developments and was undoubtedly the biggest in most respects. It was American colleges and universities where subjects on International Relations were taught. Separate international relations schools emerged, such as the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia (founded in 1946), the School of International Service at American University (1957) and a similar school at Denver (a graduate school of International Studies in 1964). Similar institutional expansions took place elsewhere, albeit mainly in the Anglosphere, and places such as Scandinavia where English was strong as a second language. In Western Europe, 19 International Relations think tanks were formed, in the United States another 18, and in Japan, 3 (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 143). In general, at the stage of the “second founding” occurs a massive expansion of institutionalization in terms of teaching, research and

publications, especially in the core, a notable shift from being a broader intellectual and political subject to being a more professionalised, theorised and academic one (Ashworth, 2014, p. 256) and the beginnings of recognition in the core for International Relations thinking from the periphery.

But the discipline remained overwhelmingly dominated by the West (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 178) because of the predominance of core power and core concerns about bipolarity and nuclear weapons, as well as a host of other factors such as limited resources, lack of interest in theory and method, and the large policy and empirical orientation of scholars in the periphery. There were the beginnings of engagement between International Relations in the core and the periphery. By the 1980s Realism, Liberalism, and their variants were already beginning to encounter challenges from Feminism, Post-colonialism and other Critical Theories. International Relations theory was basically geared to constructing the Western experience in universalist terms. Although decolonization was a significant change in it, seen from the core, it looked vastly less important than the huge zero-sum game of the Cold War's ideological and nuclear rivalries. Yet some International Relations from the periphery was beginning to register in the core, and this trend was to pick up significantly during the 1990s. The academic study of International Relations in the periphery has not had sufficient coherence or scale to follow the institutionalization pattern in the core yet. Academic International Relations associations were scarce, although a notable exception was the formation of the Mexican International Studies Association.

World and International Relations after 1989:

“unipolarity”, globalization and the rise of the rest

Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan and their followers consider modern international relations in the chronological framework of 1989–1991 through the prism of several perspectives: US hegemony, the powerful influence of globalization on international relations, the rise of the rest and post-Western world order towards global international relations.

The main result of the previous Cold War era was the defeat and the collapse of the USSR and the Communist bloc. The United States remained the only superpower in the post-bipolar world. This point of view has found a comprehensive justification in academic and political circles, in the works of supporters of neorealism and neoliberalism, who occupied leading positions among scientific trends in the study of International Relations (S. Huntington, E. Kapstein, M. Mastanduno, W. Wohlforth) (Huntington, 1999; Kapstein, Mastanduno, 1999; Wohlforth, 2009). Western scholars identify seven key structural features of global international relations: global economy, distribution of power, the nature of great powers, scientific knowledge and technology, common destinies, regulatory structures, and conflict and violence (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 266–278).

Due to the collapse of bipolarity and the success of decolonization, the inclusion of Eastern European states, as well as China and the vast periphery into the global processes, globalization has accelerated significantly. Figuratively speaking, the great shrinkage of the planet has been accelerating into unprecedented levels of global interdependence (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 261). Transnationalization and transnational challenges, while strengthening the role of economic relations on a global scale, lead to the blurring of borders of traditional world politics and the undermining of the classical, exceptional value of state sovereignty. Substantial changes are taking place in the relationship between the centre and the periphery. In fact, against the background of strengthening the US hegemonic positions in the 1990s, the rise of the rest took place in the following decades, primarily in China, Russia, Japan, India, Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico. At the same time, the financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, Brexit, the foreign policy of the Trump administration, the migration challenge for the European Union, the undermining of the foundations of international law by Russia were evidence of a general crisis of liberal democracy and capitalism in general. Hence, globalization, the crisis in the system of liberal democracy and capitalism, the rise of the rest are increasingly causing several important changes in the post-bipolar/post-Westphalian world order. First, international relations are becoming increasingly pluralistic, and connections between actors in world politics are becoming

networked. Second, the role of non-state international actors is growing, and the internal structure of modern international relations is being modernized. Third, the active involvement of the great periphery into international relations transforms the world into a global society, and international relations take on the character of global international relations. Fourth, given the above, the post-Western world order is generally evolving in the direction of global international relations. Of course, such changes within the Post-Westphalian world order are far from complete and, according to researchers, will occur over the next few decades.

At the same time, the corresponding processes in international relations after 1989 contributed to the active development of the disciplinary subject field and theoretical and applied research in this scientific field. Already, the previous stage – 1945–1989 – gave a powerful development of the institutionalization of International Relations, the expansion of the territorial sphere and the subject field of research. The post-Westphalian period is characterized by the further rapid development of the discipline of International Relations. In this case, we note the fact of maintaining the leading positions of the United States and Western Europe, which is the key scientific importance of neo-realists (Z. Brzeziński, F. Fukuyama, S. Huntington, K. Waltz), neoliberals (R. Keohane, J. Nye), postmodernists (J. Baylis, S. Dalby, R. Walker). The point of view that IR needs to break out not just from the “prison of Political Science” but also from the ghetto of its Eurocentric view of history retains its relevance (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 319; Rosenberg, 2016).

However, in the disciplinary sphere of International Relations of the Post-Westphalian period, further substantial changes are also taking place. On the one hand, they are associated with the active involvement of peripheral countries in the study of International Relations; Western trends continue to dominate the scientific discourse, though. On the other hand, new schools and directions of International Relations research are actively developing, such as neoclassical realism (G. Rose, J. Mearsheimer, W. Wohlforth, F. Zakaria), constructivism (R. Jackson, J. Ruggie, G. Sørensen, A. Wendt), postcolonialism (H. Bhabha, E. Said, G. Spivak), feminism (C. Hooper, C. Reus-Smit) etc. Thus, global international relations aspires to level the

playing field and to develop a genuinely inclusive and universal discipline that truly reflects the growing diversity of its International Relations scholars and their intellectual concerns.

Conclusions

In summary, the conceptual analysis of the evolution of International Relations and the sciences of International Relations during the XX–XXI centuries based on fundamental research by Western scientists allows us to state their essential changes under the influence of two world wars, revolutions, globalization, decolonization and changes in the ratio of forces between the centre and the periphery. The result was the gradual modernization of the Westphalian world order and its transition to the post-Westphalian world and post-bipolar international relations after 1989. At the same time, over the last century, the discipline of International Relations has been established and developed. Its organizational and institutional development is mainly related to the Western tradition and with less involvement of non-Western scientists. As analysis of the work of Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan shows, Further scientific understanding of these processes is a particular challenge for representatives of various scientific schools and trends in the study of the origins, nature, and features of modern international relations.

CHAPTER 4.

THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR: BASIC PRECONDITIONS AND CAUSES

Introduction

Statement of the problem terms and their relation to important scientific or practical tasks. The modern world order of the 21st century is increasingly under the serious influence of regional and global multifaceted challenges. Climate, food, nuclear threats have been supplemented by the Covid-19 pandemic and asymmetric or hybrid threats and wars in different regions of the world. It is evident that the international institutions and powerful global actors called to maintain stability and peace proved unable to effectively cope with such a duty. Only during the last decade, North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan, East Asia, as well as Eastern Europe, where the Russian Federation launched a hybrid war against Ukraine in February 2014, became the arena of tension, revolutions, and wars.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation treacherously launched a large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, moving from a covert hybrid to an open conventional total war. Ukraine “found itself at the epicenter of one, and perhaps the largest and most extreme, socio-cultural rift of the modern global world” (Смолій, 2022). More than eight years of heroic standoff by the Ukrainian people to the occupying state, the second military force of the modern world, are behind us. The scientific analysis of current events in relation to the component of the period of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war (since February 2014) allows us to make important theoretical and methodological generalizations about its origins and nature.

Analysis of recent studies and publications that have begun to address this problem and on which the authors rely. Scientific research, analytical and expert – Western (A. Acharya, B. Badie, B. Buzan, J. Elsea, Y. Felshtinsky, R. Glenn, F. Hoffman, M. van Herpen, T. Kuzio, J. Mearsheimer, etc.) and Ukrainian (P. Guy-Nyzhnyk, V. Gorbulin, M. Doroshko, M. Lazarovych, R. Ofitsynsky, M. Stanchev, etc.) – conclusions in the context of the problems raised have recently appeared

(Hoffman, 2007; Zakaria, 2008, 2021; Glenn, 2009; Elsea, 2014; Buzan, Lawson, 2015; Магда, 2015; Перепелиця, 2015; Турченко Ф., Турченко Г., 2015; Herpen, 2016; Брехуненко, 2016; Ploky, 2017; Гай-Нижник, 2017; Горбулін, 2017; Дацюк, 2017; Лазарович, 2017; Mearsheimer, 2018, 2022; Дорошко, Балюк, 2018; Офіцинський, 2018; Acharya, Buzan, 2019; Парахонський, Яворська, 2019; Troyan, Kyrydon, 2020; Ferguson, 2021; Киридон, 2021; Felshtinsky, Stanczew, 2015, 2022; Green, 2022; Смолій, 2022). Based on different approaches (historical, geopolitical, war theory, window of opportunity, clash of civilizations, deferred war, etc.) researchers have attempted to substantiate different aspects of Russia's war against Ukraine (both hybrid war and the modern phase of total conventional war).

Highlighting the previously unresolved parts of the general problem to which the article is devoted. The authors are aware that the proposed theoretical-conceptual historical scientific exploration, which is actually pioneering in terms of the study of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025, its preconditions, causes, nature, etc. only outlines the raised problem, and requires further in-depth study and understanding.

Formulation of the goals of the research (problem statement). The purpose of the research is to study, analyze and summarize the causal chain and conceptualize the understanding of the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the chronological range of 2014–2025. At the same time, we consider it necessary to condition the possible change of the determined upper limit of the chronology (2025), being aware of the incompleteness of the process.

The research methodology involves a departure from the so-called “tunnel thinking” / “tunnel vision” (when there is a certain pattern, typical ways of solving the problem, embedded in the mind, activated according to the situation) in favor of generalizing and fitting the content-events facet of the Russian-Ukrainian war into the national (Ukrainian), regional (European) and global (world) historical context. The conducted research is based on dialectical, comparative, international-legal and systemic approaches. The basic methods include analysis and synthesis, synchronic and diachronic, comparative-historical, historical-legal, structural-functional, etc.

Preconditions of Russia's war against Ukraine

Preconditions of Russian aggression against independent Ukraine, resulting first in a hybrid and then full-scale conventional Russian-Ukrainian war, have been put forward since the collapse of the USSR and the first years of modern independent Ukraine. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the communist bloc at the end of the twentieth century was a test for many people in the conditions of the collapse of bipolarity, the completion of the decolonization process, the expansion of the circle of international actors and an unprecedented level of global interdependence (Acharya, Buzan, 2019, p. 261).

There are notable analogies between the reactions of Russian society to the outcome of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR and German society a century ago to defeat in World War I. Researchers have noted the presence of the so-called “Versailles syndrome” (the term appeared to refer to the painful reaction of Germans to the trauma of the military fiasco and the harsh conditions of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 (Корнієвський, Филипенко, 2021) among a significant part of Russians. Common and typical for both cases are “the trauma of the Great War” (Trojan, Kyrydon, 2021, p. 110), the “loser complex” (“we were defeated, but we are still the best”), an exaggeration of the “catastrophic nature” of defeat and the desire to restore great power status (“to rise from the knees”) and recover lost territories.

After the change of power in the Russian Federation in 1999–2000 these ideas actually became part of the official ideology and political rhetoric: V. Putin's statements about the collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century”(April 2005) and “unjust” inclusion of “originally Russian territories” into Soviet Ukraine (December 2019); statement of a State Duma deputy from the pro-government party “United Russia” Y. Fedorov (November 2015) on the need to restore the Russian state to the borders of the USSR of 1945, etc. It is pretty typical that in post-Soviet Russia, as in its time and in post-Soviet Germany, the mythologies of “conspiracy” and “stab in the back” became widespread as attempts to explain the defeat not so much by objective reasons, as by subversive activities of “hostile elements” inside the country, “in the rear”. Whereas in the German case the culprits

were predominantly Jews and socialists, in the Russian case it was the traitors in the state apparatus and the cosmopolitan intellectuals.

Consequently, in order to restore historical justice, it was proposed to give a proper assessment of the activities of the destroyers of the USSR. At the same time, there are calls to “deal resolutely with modern 'enemies' to avoid the mistakes of the past”. Most often, these are people who are potentially disloyal to the current government and the neo-imperialist ideology (Корнієвський, Филипенко, 2021). Such views are actively promoted by a number of pro-governmental intellectuals, primarily representatives of the so-called “Izborsk Club” (A. Dugin, L. Ivashov, A. Platonov, O. Prokhanov, A. Fursov).

In fact, from his statement during the annual address to the Federal Assembly (2005) about the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not abandon the idea of restoring the imperial structure, in particular by returning Ukraine to Kremlin control. Let us consider a fairly clear characterization of the analysis of the Kremlin's policy in the former Soviet Union, which in the book “The Dawn of Peace in Europe” (1996) was given by M. Mandelbaum (former adviser to U.S. President B. Clinton): “Today the most dangerous place on the continent is the border between Russia and Ukraine... Russia's efforts to absorb all or part of Ukraine, or to disintegrate that country, which would result from a deliberate policy of restoring a great Russian state, whether by any combination of the two factors... will have serious consequences for all of Europe. They could substantially damage, and probably even completely destroy, the jointly produced sense of security at the end of the Cold War. After the successful takeover of Ukraine Russia could once again become an international power that pursues a policy of expansion into the West and poses a serious threat to all of Europe” (Mandelbaum, 1996, p. 112). The origins of Russia's current policy toward Kyiv were based on just such a strategy, as evidenced by the realities of Ukrainian-Russian relations between 1991 and 2013 (Задорожній, 2014).

The first stumbling block was the attitude of Ukraine and Russia to the newly created association, whose founding states they were (along with Belarus) – the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Ukraine did not sign the Decision on the CIS Charter and ratified the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States with comments. Ukraine's comments concerned the excessive influence of central coordinating bodies on the policies of independent states, ambiguous interpretation of some provisions of the Agreement and its general direction by official circles of the signatory parties. The question was directly about the purpose of the Agreement as a basis for the creation of a new union state (Agreements establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991). Ukraine remained only a founder of the CIS, participated in realization of mutually beneficial projects, but nevertheless did not become a member of this union. Of course, such a position by Ukraine could not please Russia.

Subsequently, serious collisions in Ukrainian-Russian relations arose in connection with the preparation and signing of the interstate treaty of friendship and cooperation. For example, such an equal treaty was signed by Ukraine with Hungary on December 19, 1991, and with Poland on May 18, 1992. With Russia, as early as May 31, 1997 (Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, 1997) (it was this high level interstate document, in which both sides recognized each other's independence and borders, that the Russian Federation brutally trampled in February 2014 and continued to do so, which prompted Ukraine to officially terminate the treaty in fall 2018). Problems concerned many important issues: the recognition of borders (borders were recognized, but Russia refused to implement their full delimitation and demarcation, particularly in the Sea of Azov); the future status of Crimea, Sevastopol (the Russian State Duma even adopted anti-Ukrainian decisions on the status of Sevastopol); the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet (under frantic pressure from official Moscow it was eventually divided in a ratio of about 80:20 in favor of Russia, with the Russian Navy base in Sevastopol retained until 2017).

The Agreement on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border was concluded in 2003 between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The line of the state border, which the Russian side undertook to respect, was finally determined and legalized on the maps.

However, in the following years, Russia hampered the process of demarcation of the state border with Ukraine in every possible way.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Ukrainian-Russian relations became particularly tense due to the differing attitudes of Kyiv and Moscow towards European, Eurasian, and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as tensions in the security field of bilateral relations. For example, the Russian Federation attempted to directly alienate the island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait from Ukraine, which caused military and political tension and a threat of war in October 2003.

At the same time, Kyiv's integration vectors did not develop in the direction desired by Moscow. Thus, despite signing the agreement on the formation of the common economic space by Ukraine on September 19, 2003 (the law on ratification of the agreement by Ukraine contained a reservation: "Ukraine shall take part in the establishment and operation of the Single Economic Space within the limits that accord with the Ukrainian Constitution" (Agreement on the Establishment of the Common Economic Zone, 2003), Ukraine did not join the Eurasian integration in the format of participation in the economic or customs union.

The turning point in Russian-Ukrainian relations was the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004. The President of the Russian Federation V. Putin perceived it as his personal defeat. It was then that the scenarios used against Ukraine 10 years later were worked out. In particular, in 2004, Russia played the card of "Eastern Ukrainian" separatism for the first time. On November 26, 2004, the Luhansk Regional Council voted for the creation of the South-Eastern Republic. On November 28, 2004, a congress of deputies of all levels from 17 regions of Ukraine (mainly eastern and southern) was held in the city of Severodonetsk, Luhansk region. A representative delegation from the Russian Federation headed by Y. Luzhkov (the Mayor of Moscow) took part in it. At the congress, the creation of a South-Eastern federal state with Kharkiv as its capital was discussed, but this idea was not implemented.

The Ukrainian society and state leadership were increasingly convinced of the need for close cooperation with NATO (Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and the Charter on Special Partnership in 2007) and accession to the European Union

(Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and aspiration for a new agreement with the prospect of EU membership for Ukraine). Russia put political and diplomatic pressure on the North-Atlantic Alliance, which at the Bucharest Summit (April 2008) rejected Ukraine's NATO Membership Action Plan, although it confirmed that Ukraine would definitely become part of the Euro-Atlantic community (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008) in the future.

Ukraine also reacted sharply negatively to Russia's war against Georgia on August 8–13, 2008 and showed solidarity with the state leadership and people of Georgia (Киридон, Троян, 2009). It was then that the question “Today Georgia – tomorrow Ukraine?”, “Will Ukraine become the next target of Putin's doctrine?”, “Is Kyiv next on the Kremlin's list?” and the like (Кузьо, 2008, с. 5) become topical.

Azarov's government's statement about postponing the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in November 2013 (which was exactly what Russia sought to prevent Ukraine's integration into the European economic and political space) catalyzed the processes of the Revolution of Dignity and changes of the political regime in Ukraine after the escape of the then president V. Yanukovych. It was these circumstances, which created a powerful turbulent field in Ukrainian-Russian relations, that Russia actually used as an occasion for aggression against Ukraine. Russia's aggression since February 2014 has found expression in a hybrid war, accompanied by Russia's occupation and direct annexation of parts of Ukrainian territory.

The direct reason for the total conventional war, which Russia began against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, can be seen in the Kremlin's desire to revive Russian influence in the post-Soviet space by proclaiming a modern Russian neo-imperium through an interstate association under the aegis of Moscow in the year of the centenary of the formation (December 30, 1922) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). According to Putin, Ukraine should become a mandatory component, without control over which Russia does not see its future as a full-fledged empire state. It is indicative that the same ideas were actually duplicated in the text of one of the pro-Kremlin ideologists, P. Akopov, “The Attack of Russia and the New World” published

(although this document disappeared from the website very quickly) on the website of the Russian state agency RIA Novosti on February 26, 2022 (the blitzkrieg was planned to be completed on that date) almost immediately after the beginning of military operations. The text frankly outlined the goals of the Russian leadership, declaring in particular that “Russia is restoring its historical completeness by gathering the Russian world, the Russian people together – in its totality of Great Russians, Belarusians and Little Russians”, Russia launched a special operation to “finally resolve the Ukrainian question”, “there will be no more Ukraine as anti-Russia” (Акопов, 2022), etc.

Causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war

The form of Russia’s war against Ukraine – first in the form of a hybrid, and then total – is not formally determined by the complex of reasons that created the basis for such a war. In modern conditions, in very many cases, states fight without prior declaration of war, using various methods (including covert and open) to achieve success. So, in particular, the USA last declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on June 5, 1942, that is, during the Second World War (Elsea, 2014). In February 2014, Russia generally denied its participation in the annexation of the territory of Ukraine for some time, and on February 24, 2022, it announced the beginning of a “Special Military Operation” (Russian Federation Announces “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine, 2022). However, regardless of these circumstances, every war – the modern Russian-Ukrainian one only confirms this rule – has deep roots that find expression in the fundamental causes of war.

Among the main reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war, we will distinguish the following.

Civilizational. The war of the Russian Eurasian civilization against the local Ukrainian civilization in order to implement its own civilization-imperial plans (Дугин, 1997; Мчедлов, 2001; Михальченко, 2013; Троян, 2016; Залізняк, 2017; Кононов, 2018).

It is about values and inter-civilizational differences of societies of different mentality, ethnic being, cultural orientation, collective memory, traditions, etc.

Concretely, they form essential semantic rifts in the understanding of the state and prospects of development. Throughout its history, Ukraine has been an organic part of European civilization. Its ties with Eurasian Russia are not natural, long-standing and objectively conditioned by Ukraine's geopolitical position on the map of Europe. Its forced reorientation from the European West to the Eurasian East has occurred over the past centuries during the era of Moscow imperialism's greatest expansion (Залізняк, 2017, с. 10).

The Russian side views Ukrainianism as a threat to the position of the Russian Federation as a global actor and to the position of the “Russian world” as the ideological pillar of contemporary Russian society and Russian statehood. The situation in Russian-Ukrainian relations has worsened significantly following the activation of Ukraine’s European integration plans and the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union, along with its terms and deadline. Ukraine’s unwillingness to fit into the Russian civilizational paradigm of development, orientation on pan-European and Euro-Atlantic democratic values became the determining motive of the modern Russian “crusade” against Ukraine both in political, social, cultural, informational and ideological, hybrid, and, ultimately, armed ways. From the side of Ukraine, this is “a war for a chance for a new civilization of mankind” (Дацюк, 2022).

Imperial: for world domination. The imperial idea in the historical dimension has always been and continues to be a propaganda construct and justification for the expansionist Russian policy in order to expand its own sphere of influence and to weaken the positions of its opponents as much as possible (Гунчак, 2010; Коровин, 2016). Hence, the Russian-Ukrainian war is motivated, from the point of view of official Moscow, by the need to fight on Ukrainian territory against the United States and its NATO allies (against the Anglo-Saxons).

In order to implement the imperial plans, Russian propaganda tried to actively use appeals to the historical unity between Russia and, first of all, the eastern, southeastern and southern regions of Ukraine. For this, the idea of reviving Novorossiia in these territories and its inclusion in the Russian Federation was carried

out (Турченко Ф., Турченко Г., 2015). After 2004, Russian special services formed an extensive network of anti-Ukrainian organizations in the southeastern regions and Crimea. It was controlled or even led by Russian agents. This anti-Ukrainian network included the structures of the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, the "Rodyna" and "Russian Unity" parties, various Orthodox groups focused on the idea of a "Russian world", separatist political groups ("Donetsk Republic"), criminalized paramilitary formations (Cossack formations, fighting clubs, the "Oplot" organization, security structures that were actively used during the Revolution of Dignity, the so-called "titushki"). The vast majority of these groups did not have broad public support, while at the same time they actively interacted with law enforcement agencies during the regime of V. Yanukovich.

Thus, the Russian state leadership explains the coercion of Ukraine to peace as a necessary step to protect its regional and global interests. It is a question of satisfying expansionist imperial ambitions for regional and global domination. The war against Ukraine is only one of the tools to achieve it, to realize its goals (along with energy, the arms race, the information war, etc.) In fact, the imperial facet was outlined in V. Putin's speech at the Munich Security Forum on February 10, 2007 (Putin, 2007), which became the starting point of the new "cold war" between the East (the Russian Federation and its allies) and the West (NATO member states, above all, the United States) and the EU.) As the Ukrainian historian J. Grytsak noted, it is quite an objective understanding that the fate of the whole world is being decided in modern Ukraine (Грицак, 2022).

Geopolitical: for space, expansion as the quintessence of imperialism. Russia as a telurocratic state, i.e. a "land" state, builds its power on the basis of control over a vast continental Eurasian space (Дністрянський, 2021; Дугин, 1997). In this sense, it relies on three subspaces, which are the "whales" of Russian imperialism: Eastern European, Caucasian and Central Asian. Russia as an empire has always considered Ukraine to be the key zone of East European space. Accordingly, the subordination of the Ukrainian space – territorially the largest state formation in Europe, the axial state

of the Middle-Eastern European macro-region, a large market in terms of labour force, services, capitals, and economic potential – filled the notion of Russian imperialism with full content. It allowed the control of the Black Sea, the determining influence on the Balkans and Central Europe.

The Russian leadership led by V. Putin already in the second half of the “zero” years of the 21st century, as noted by Academician V. Gorbulin, moved to the direct implementation of its revanchist strategy in combination with geopolitical plans (Горбулін, 2016). First of all, the task was determined to find out the reaction of the USA and its allies. For this purpose, Russia resorted to the use of force against Ukraine (October 2003 – the crisis around Kosa Tuzla Island, January 2006 and January 2009 – “gas wars”) and Georgia (August 8–13, 2008 war). After these events, the Kremlin formed a persistent idea that the elites of Western countries, primarily European ones, have the “Munich syndrome” – readiness to make concessions to the aggressor at the expense of the states of the Baltic–Black Sea–Caspian region. The passive reaction of Western states to Russian provocations significantly contributed to the formation of the Russian leadership's belief in impunity, actually encouraged the Kremlin to take aggressive actions against the states of the former USSR and the “socialist camp”.

Existential: aimed at the destruction of Ukraine as a state and Ukrainianism / Ukrainian people / Ukrainian nation as a bearer of a worldview and collective memory different from the Russian and “Russian world”. The adjective “existential” (i.e., “vital”) was recognized by the online Dictionary as the word of the year 2019 in the world (at least, the meaning of this very term was searched most frequently by Internet users during the year) (“Existential” is Dictionary.com’s Word Of the Year, 2019). For Ukraine and Ukrainians this concept has taken on special significance since 2014, when it became clear that for the sake of historical perspective we have nothing else but to fight for our existential meanings, for our existence, for the right to be Ukrainians and to have our own independent state. At the core of this struggle is the assertion of freedom as a human right of free choice (Sartre, 1945–1949). At the same time, Putin views everything Ukrainian from a position of great-power chauvinism as an existential threat to Russia. We are talking about the absolute rejection by the Russians

of Ukraine as something original and separate from Russia.

So, as S. Plokhyi, a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, who at one time comprehensively researched the past and present of Russian nationalism (Plokhy, 2017), reasonably noted, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian statehood is being reformatted on the basis of a political nation, and Ukraine is fighting a war not only for its right to independent existence, but also for the whole of Europe (Плохій, 2022). At the same time the well-known representative of neorealism J. Mearsheimer believes that one should not underestimate the threats from modern authoritarian-nationalist regimes (he includes the Russian one) and considers the chances of nationalism to win in the historical perspective quite significant (Mearsheimer, 2018, p. 82).

Personal and psychological as a meaningful projection of the worldview anti-Ukrainian complexes-constructions of the Russian President V. Putin (Мухин, 2015; Зайпель, 2016; Kuzio, 2017). They endorsed his indignation at Ukraine's unwillingness to join the pro-Russian common economic space, and then the cultural trauma of the Ukrainian revolutions, which were based on the main Ukrainian values – independence, freedom, will, dignity, Europeanness – that were unacceptable for the authoritarian Russian president. Accordingly, the Russian president declares his attitude towards Ukraine not as a modern independent state, but as a rebellious province seeking to get rid of Russian tutelage. Speaking to U. S. President Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest (2008), he said that there was no such state as Ukraine because “part of its territory is Eastern Europe, and part, and a significant one, given by us (Russia – auth.)” (Волович, 2014, с. 20). This connection of semantic judgments and motivations determines the behavioral characteristics of V. Putin's being: he does not allow the existence of Ukrainian in any manifestations, and above all, he fundamentally denies Ukrainian statehood (not only at the level of being, but also at the level of idea). These worldview matrixes directed the actions of the Russian leader in relation to the unleashed Russian-Ukrainian war.

As noted by the domestic philosopher S. Datsyuk: “The cause of the war between Russia and Belarus against Ukraine is formed by the results of the defeat of the USSR

in World War III (Cold War) paranoid sentimental psychosis of Putin, induced by the masses of Russian subjects due to infodemic Russian media up to the level of creating a paranoia that is completely detached from reality and accompanied by anti-western sentimentality and aggression towards the world” (Дацюк, 2022).

But even well-known American international political scientist J. Mearsheimer believes that it was Vladimir Putin who started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. The prevailing view in the West is that he is an irrational, outright aggressor who wants to create a great Russia in the image of the former Soviet Union. “Thus, J. Mearsheimer concludes, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis” (Mearsheimer, 2022).

In general, such a complex of reasons against the background of “the consolidation of neo-Soviet authoritarianism” (Kuźniar, 2022, s. 239) in Russia prompted its leadership to take active actions in the space of the former USSR. This was reflected in the aggression against Ukraine, in particular, in the form of a hybrid war (since the beginning of 2014), which, after eight years, turned into a total war. One of the most important military-political factors of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war is the impact on the situation of relations between limited war, nuclear deterrence, information operations and conventional capabilities. Therefore, the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia is the main critical component of modern warfare, which creates serious problems for Ukraine, Europe and the whole world.

The nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war

In our view, the outlined cause-and-effect series allows us to understand the anatomy of the emergence of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as its nature. Since February 2014, Russia began an imperialist, invasive war for the destruction of Ukraine or existential war against Ukraine and everything Ukrainian. We agree with Ukrainian historian Y. Ophizinsky that at this stage the concept of “hybrid war” (“unconventional”, “irregular”, “mixed” war) and the model of “farewell to the empire” are very productive for different levels of verbal connotations and creation of narratives (Офіцинський, 2018, сс. 77, 86). The paradigm of this war as an aggression

of neo-imperial Russia against its main post-Soviet rival, Ukraine, as an outpost of Western civilization has actually been established (Resolution 2132, 2016).

In the temporal dimension, the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea, the DNR and LNR are successive stages of Russia's covert armed struggle against Ukraine. At the same time, in the system of international legal norms and values, the main actors are antipodes – the aggressor of Russia and the victim of Ukraine. Here it is important to emphasize that some Western and Central European scientists even consider Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century, and then the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war with Ukraine, as a manifestation of the firm Realpolitik of modern Russia, which seeks to take leading positions in the future “post-American world” (Zakaria, 2008; Sherr, 2013, p. 61–64; Bieleń, 2021, s. 239). The anti-Western orientation of the Russian foreign policy line, which has strong support in society, was noted. Popular mistrust of “the West” has become a defining feature of political life in Putin’s Russia, where it is encouraged and amplified via state television and numerous other media platforms (Szostek, 2017, p. 195).

At the first stage (February 26, 2014 – February 23, 2022), the Russian-Ukrainian war was of a hybrid nature – hybrid technologies were used by the Kremlin to occupy Ukrainian territories. The methods and direction of such a war generally fit well into the conceptual field of Western (Hoffman, 2007; Glenn, 2009; Kuzio, 2017) and Ukrainian approaches (Горбулін, 2017; Магда, 2015; Дорошко, Балюк, 2018) to its understanding. In particular, F. Hoffman, notes that hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, etc. They are operationally and tactically synchronized and coordinated within an area of operation to achieve “synergistic effects” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 14). A similar vision of a hybrid war, which combines conventional, unconventional, information and cyber operations into a particularly effective set of actions, is held by American military analysts: “The idea of hybrid warfare germinated in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, but came into its own during the Russo-Ukrainian War, of which the annexation of Crimea and the seizure of the Donbas are the two most visible campaigns. Hybrid warfare, as demonstrated by Russia in Ukraine, is a

powerful tool for an era of limited war, and is arguably the modern Russian way of warfare” (Fox, 2017, p. 14).

One of the main ideologues of the Russian hybrid aggression against Ukraine, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, actively uses a hybrid approach to conduct modern warfare. He believes that in contemporary conflicts, the emphasis is increasingly shifting towards the integrated use of political, economic, informational and other non-military measures implemented with a reliance on military force. The combination of traditional and hybrid methods is already a characteristic feature of any armed conflict. At the same time, if hybrids can be used without the open use of military force, then classic combat operations without hybrids are no longer possible (Gerasimov, 2016, pp. 33–34). This is the nature of the war that Russia has been waging against Ukraine from the very beginning.

The force component of the war, which brought death and material destruction, since 2014 operated in spatially limited, local dimensions. At the same time, the limited scale of military activity was accompanied by an unrestricted dissemination of the discourse of war. There was a struggle for the dominance of certain ideas about the world and events in the social and individual environment and the simultaneous destruction of opposing, “hostile” approaches and points of view, for cognitive and communicative control, power over people's minds, their emotions, thinking, behavior, and attempts to destroy their identities (Mink, Neumayer, 2007; Якубова, 2018). In this sense, the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war is informational and semantic in nature. In the information war, unreliable facts or opposite realities are used, while in the semantic war, interpretations are used; for example, the actions of the army can be presented as “anti-terrorist” or “punitive” actions. According to the Ukrainian scholar and expert on information policy and communication technologies G. Pocheptsov, we are talking in general about the First war of Meanings in the world (Почепцов, 2016), when “brother nations” (according to Soviet ideology) turned into “enemy nations” in the post-Soviet space.

Since February 24, 2022, there has been a stage of treacherous, aggressive conventional war on the part of Russia. At the same time, Russia's vision of the war is

fundamentally different from Ukraine's. If for official Moscow it is a war for the complete destruction of all Ukrainian state and society, for Ukraine the main content of modern war is really existential: it is a struggle in the form of the National Liberation War for the Ukrainian State, for the Ukrainian People, for Freedom, for Dignity. It is these meanings of life that Russia wants to destroy, and we strive to defend, protect and affirm them with all our might.

Without exaggeration, the whole Ukrainian nation rose up for the war against Russia, without regard to ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc. differences of its individual representatives or groups. Ukrainians became at the same time the biggest victims of the treacherous and destructive war unleashed by the Russian Federation: thousands of children and women killed, tens of thousands of civilians killed, and millions of people who left their places of residence, including those who went abroad. All of them are innocent citizens of Ukraine, absolutely groundless in terms of morality and law, subjected to terrible ordeals, including rape, torture, and abuse by Russian occupants. The tragedy of Bucha became the embodiment and symbol of Russia's modern policy of genocide of the Ukrainian people. American historian O. Motyl, in particular known for the book "Imperial Ends: The Decline, Collapse, and Revival of Empires" (Motyl, 2001) called such actions "an exceptional act of savagery" (Мотиль, 2022).

On April 14, the Verkhovna Rada Ukraine recognized the genocide of the Ukrainian people by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as well as Russia's political and military leadership of Russia under the veil of a full-scale war against Ukraine. The Rada also called on the UN, the European Parliament, PACE, the OSCE, NATO, and the world Parliaments of foreign to recognize the genocide committed by Russia against the Ukrainian people, as well as the crimes against humanity and war crimes on the territory of Ukraine (Постанова Верховної Ради України, 2022).

At the same time, during the war there was a rapid and powerful crystallization of the Ukrainian people into a political nation. The above factors in conjunction with the goals and aspirations of the Ukrainian people in the war define its character as national liberation, anti-Russian, anti-imperialist, existential, and civilizational.

However, as noted by Taras Kuzio (Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson

Society, London, and Professor of Political Science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy), it is very important to bring this understanding to the Western public consciousness. In particular, he analyzes five aspects in Russian studies following the 2014 European crisis and Russian-Ukrainian war that prevent Western historians and political scientists from looking at these events impartially (Kuzio, 2020). The first is how Western historians continue to include Ukrainians within an imperial history of “Russia” which denies Ukrainians a separate history. The second perspective is to counter the common narrative of Crimea as “always” having been “Russian” which denies that Tatars are the indigenous people of Crimea – not Russians. The third perspective focuses on academic orientalist approaches to writing about Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian war. The fourth perspective downplays Russian nationalism (imperialism) in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and completely ignores the revival of Tsarist and White émigré Russian nationalism that denies the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Meanwhile, academic orientalism exaggerates the influence of Ukrainian nationalism in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. The fifth perspective counters the claim of Putinverstehers (Putin-Understanders) scholars of a “civil war” taking place in Ukraine through extensive evidence of Russian military aggression and imperialism. Finally, these five factors taken together show Russian studies will be unable to escape its crisis if it cannot come to understand how the source of the Russian-Ukrainian war lies in Russian national identity and its attitudes towards Ukraine and Ukrainians and why therefore the chances for peace are slim.

An example of the vision of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of a rational explanation and even justification of aggression on the part of Russia by the previous actions of NATO is the point of view of the well-known neorealist J. Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2022). The recently published article “The West bears the main responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis” reveals the researcher's view of modernity. He believes that the reckless expansion of NATO provoked Russia (Mearsheimer, 2022). At the same time, a real “war of letters” unfolded around the Russian aggression and Ukraine’s response to it. On June 29, 2022, German intellectuals published an open letter entitled “A Ceasefire now!”. In response, experts

on the problems of Eastern Europe, on the initiative of Andreas Umland (National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academia), published their statement “Heavy weapons now!” on July 22, 2022. They stated that the signatories of the Zeit appeal entitled “A Ceasefire Now!” misjudge the nature of Putin’s internal regime and foreign policy doctrine, and propose the opposite of the measures needed to deter the Kremlin: namely, heavy weapons delivered to Ukraine now and maximum sanctions on Russia (Krytyka, 2022).

The newest period of Ukraine’s independence has become, on the one hand, a powerful challenge and test of strength and historical perspective, and on the other hand, it has turned it into a subject of current European (regional) and world (global) history. The war of aggression unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has lasted more than eight years, since February 26, 2014. It has passed through two phases: I – hybrid war from February 26, 2014 to February 23, 2022; II – total large-scale conventional war, lasting from February 24, 2022. For the West (primarily NATO and EU member states), this war can be seen as a hybrid World War III, which has lasted for over eight years (Felshtinsky, Stanczew, 2022). It was preceded by Russia’s “cold war” of the 21st century against NATO and the EU (it was started by Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Forum on February 10, 2007).

At the same time, for Ukraine in the context of its national, European and global historical development, the war initiated by Russia is the National Liberation War of the XXI century. In this war, Ukraine is defending not only its independence and the main existential values of democratic choice, but also pan-European principles, rights and freedoms, and the international legal foundations of the modern world order.

Conclusions

Russian aggression against Ukraine – initially hybrid, and then large-scale – is the result of a whole complex of geopolitical, civilizational, existential, imperial and even personal (behavioral) reasons. It is based on Russia's desire to spread its influence and dominance over the entire space of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is considered as a central link of the Eastern European geopolitical space in the context of

strengthening the international positions of the modern Russian state. Situationally, the official Kremlin sought to use the century since the formation of the USSR as an additional ideological tool and a reason to speed up the process of solving the “Ukrainian question” through an open war of aggression. For Ukraine, this war objectively became a national liberation, anti-imperialist and civilizational war.

Being in the zone of objective reaction, in the conditions of turbulent and momentous events for Ukraine, Europe and the world, it seems difficult to make deep generalizations (as applied to the essential processes, chronological framework, etc.). At the same time, the internal cause-and-effect meanings of events relevant to contemporaries, peculiarities of perception of the eventful plot and character of the war need their proper understanding for further generalizations and theoretical constructions. We are talking about the indispensable for the researcher “experience of direct observation” during the war: existing meanings, unlike material artifacts, are transient and variable. The sets of meanings associated with the war will further undergo modifications and turn into stable narratives (the latter ensure the heredity of collective memory and are aimed at maintaining community identities). Consequently, disagreements between the understanding of the meaning of events by those who write history and the perceptions of those who make it are inevitable. This has a direct bearing on the National Liberation War of the 21st century for Ukraine, which it wages against Russian neo-imperialism to preserve and defend both its sovereignty and international subjectivity, as well as universal rights and values, fulfilling a high civilizational mission.

However, what is already obvious is that the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 occupies a prominent place in the spectrum of powerful challenges and threats that Europe and the world faced during the last decade. They demonstrate the weakness and unwillingness of global and regional international actors to give them a quick and effective response. Moreover, multifaceted conventional and hybrid threats and wars tend to proliferate. An example could be the growing tension in the China-Taiwan-USA triangle, the escalation of the situation in the Greater Caucasus, or, ultimately, the provocation of the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo in the Balkans. Hence, Europe

and the world faced the obvious need for a broad international dialogue to reduce the degree of conventional and hybrid threats in the area of development and legitimization of a new security architecture based on clear compliance with international legal norms.

The threat of further turbulence and chaos in modern international relations is obvious. The world community faces a very urgent dual task. First, a comprehensive transformation of the system of governance of world politics while maintaining effective mechanisms for regulating international life. Second, an immediate reduction in the level of confrontation and conflict in the international arena, including between powerful global actors. Of course, an effective political and diplomatic negotiation process and a successful dialogue around the problem of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the cessation of Russian aggression against the sovereign Ukrainian state would create a serious prerequisite for lasting peace and strengthening trust and security in Europe and the world.

CHAPTER 5.

SAVING RUSSIA. NEOREALIST THEORISTS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE KREMLIN'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY ACCORDING TO THE ACTOR-NETWORK CONCEPT

Introduction

Statement and relevance of the problem. The Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 is multifaceted and multidimensional in understanding. In one way or another, it affects the regional and global aspects of the life of peoples and states. Russia's initially hybrid (from February 26, 2014), and then full-scale (from February 24, 2022) aggression against Ukraine has as its consequence the dismantling of the entire post-bipolar (post-Westphalian) structure of international relations. It directly led to the need to take into account the special danger of chaos in the field of world politics by the great powers of today. The superimposition of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, and in addition to this, the new powerful migration challenge outlined a trend towards deglobalization and fragmentation of international relations.

On the basis of such contradictory and obviously threatening trends, which are expressed on the radars of the Russian-Ukrainian war, we will try to realize the main goal of the study – to explain the effectiveness and role of influential international players in the events of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war in the field of actor-network theory. Actually, the actor-network theoretical construction itself, and even more so from the point of view of its influence on the sphere of international relations, as evidenced by *the analysis of the literature*, was only fragmentarily considered in the works of foreign and Ukrainian scientists. They emphasized the main attention on the theoretical aspects of modern international relations (A. Acharya, B. Badie, B. Buzan, T. Herasymchuk, J. Mearsheimer, M. Pietras, S. Tolstov); contents and challenges, regional and global aspects of post-bipolarity (Y. Bartosiak, S. Belen, N. Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, R. Kuzniar, V. Fisanov, F. Zakaria); prerequisites, reasons and characteristics of Russia's modern aggression against Ukraine (M. von Herpen,

S. Fedunyak, Y. Felshtinsky, A. Kyrydon, S. Troyan, M. Stanczew, S. Vidnyans'kyy).

The research methodology is based on the principles of scientificity, objectivity, historicism and two conceptual and theoretical positions of the study of world politics and international relations. The first is about the causality of the evolution of the modern post-Westphalian period of international relations and its transition to the Neo-Postbipolar stage, which is characterized by a return to the new Cold War and the outbreak of a major war in Europe, which threatens the entire modern international system with dangerous chaos. The second is about the social construction of world politics under the influence, first of all, of the vigorous activity of influential international players on behalf of great powers and flexible interstate coalitions. According to the conclusions of Western scientists D. Nouk and J. Kuklinski, actors are divided into “centers” that form the poles of networks, and so-called “cliques” – communication formations characterized by the highest degree of intensity of internal interactions. At the same time, relations between participants are determined by the network itself and are characterized by intensity (frequency and volumes of distribution and transfer of various resources) and directionality (directions of resource movement within the structure of network interactions) (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent & Tsujinaka, 1996). These ideas make it possible to address the actual problem of the influence of powerful international players on changes in the core of the security domain in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 based on the involvement of middle-level theoretical developments, in particular Actor-Network Theory.

Basic principles of the Actor-Network Theory

The answer to the question of why Russia cannot lose (and especially completely) in its unjustly and groundlessly launched war against Ukraine, why it is necessary to “save Putin’s face”, etc. to a large extent are in the plane of the actor-network approach to the analysis of social processes.

The actor-network theory was first presented in an expanded form by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour in the second half of the 1980s (Callon, Law & Rip, 1986;

Latour, 2005). Later, it was actualized first in the scientific field of sociology of science and technology, and later in sociology and social philosophy (Akulov, 2021; Deyneka, 2017, vol. 1 (32), pp. 60–77; Deyneka, 2019; Solod'ko, 2014, vol. 4, pp. 156–170). In its essence, as emphasized by the Ukrainian researcher A. M. Kyrydon, “the actor-network theory is a social-constructivist model, the main principle of which is the concept of a heterogeneous network, where the latter acts as an actor of interactions. That is, an actor is a network that is quite dynamic, and any object is thought of as an effect of a network of relations” (Kyrydon, 2019).

At the same time, what is important, all elements of this network are equally important. Interaction takes place in it through the mediation of actants, that is, agents. There is no global, instead there is only a chain of interconnected localities. There are also no concept of a large or a small object: one cannot say, for example, that one association is larger than another, but some are clearly superior to others due to a greater number of reliable connections with various participants of the relevant network of actors under consideration (Latour, 2005, pp. 173, 193, 199, 213–214).

In the sense of application to the subject field of international relations and world politics, the international-actor theoretical construction is based on the understanding of the determinability of the influence, first of all, of the scope of interactions of the most powerful modern centers of power on the stability of the international system. Within the framework of this theory, Russia is certainly considered as one of the most influential international players or, according to B. Latour, a kind of “core of localities” that interact (Bieleń, 2021; Mearsheimer, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2018; Zakaria, 2008).

The main principles of the actor-network theory, when applied to the analysis of international relations are reduced to the following provisions:

- in international politics, they are major actors, primarily great powers, who occupy the main positions and play the main role;
- influential international players in the regional and global dimensions create powerful nodes and networks of interactions, on which the current course and development prospects of both the world and individual regions largely depend;
- a violation of the balance of relations with a great power threatens the entire

system of international relations, causing destabilization and turbulence;

– hence, even in the situation of an obvious violation by a great power of the existing international legal regime, other influential players seek first of all to “appease” the violator (or an outright aggressor, as the situation looks like in the case of Russia, which unleashed first a hybrid, and then a full-scale war against of Ukraine).

So, from the standpoint of the actor-network paradigm in the event of Russia's aggression and war against Ukraine, the actions and main efforts of the international community in the person of major international actors, like states and organizations, are aimed primarily at achieving a compromise, the desire to “save Russia” and prevent a threatening destabilization of the situation as a result, for example, of the complete military defeat of official Moscow.

Such an understanding is influenced by a number of factors, among which those that affect a significant number of Russia’s ties in the network of current international relations stand out: the place of a permanent member in the UN Security Council with the right to a decisive vote; one of the two (one of which is the USA) most powerful nuclear potentials of our time; the second world military power as of 2022; huge raw (primarily, energy) resources; the largest territory on the planet with more than 140 million (albeit unevenly distributed) demographic potential; one of the twenty most powerful economies in the world in terms of total GDP in 2022, etc. (Military Strength Ranking, 2023; VVP, VVP stran mira, 2022).

In a formal sense, Ukraine loses the competition in all indicators of actor-network connections and relations. Until the beginning of 2022, it was not objectively considered an influential regional state. Ukraine took 74th place in the UN global ranking according to the overall index of the Human Development Index, 58th place in the world economic ranking according to the total GDP and 15th place according to the indicator of military potential in the world in 2022 (Military Strength Ranking, 2023; VVP, VVP stran mira, 2022). Hence, the difficulty of making a firm, consistent, unequivocal choice in favor of supporting Ukraine as a weak link in the network of global interactions is quite obvious. At the same time, there is an urgent need to counteract Russia, one of the most influential (“core state”) in the complex of

connections that in the international field create chains of interconnected localities in a common network.

Russian aggression against Ukraine and anti-Russian sanctions of the West

After the start of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine in 2014, the anti-Russian sanctions introduced by Western countries and their partners (since the beginning of March 2014) turned out to be too weak and inconsistent to stop the aggressor state. Only after the transition of the war into a full-scale one (from February 24, 2022) did the collective West begin to get rid of its illusions about Russia, and Ukraine, finally, gradually began to receive unprecedented political and diplomatic support, informational, logistical and (which is extremely important for a successful warfare) military-technical assistance. However, the problems of the complexity and inconsistency of the complex reaction, primarily of the Western countries and their partners, to the annexationist policy of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine remain relevant. In general, this fits into the basic principles of actor-network theory in the context of studying the role and influence of various international actors/agents in the modern world political network of connections and interactions.

The pressure of the powerful complex of sanctions of the Western countries and their allies on the Russian Federation has covered almost all its vital spheres – politics, economy, finance, military, science, and technology, etc. During the spring of 2022 – the winter of 2023, Ukraine gradually began to receive increasingly powerful and qualitatively and quantitatively large or significant amounts of weapons. Military assistance (primarily from NATO and EU countries) became an important factor, together with the motivation and success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for the transition of the initiative in the conduct of the war to the Ukrainian side (summer-autumn 2022). In general, from the beginning of the full-scale invasion as of the end of February 2022, the amount of international aid exceeded 38 billion dollars. Thanks to the inflow of international financial assistance, international reserves have been growing since October 2022, reaching \$ 29.9 billion as of the end of January 2023. In addition, if from February 24 to November 20, 2022, international partners pledged to

provide Ukraine with 113.1 billion euros, according to the calculations of the Kiel Institute of the World Economy, as of January 2023, this figure has increased to more than 141 billion euros. During the period from January 24, 2022 to January 15, 2023, the largest military aid was sent by the USA – 44.3 billion dollars (Horodyns'ka, 2023).

A powerful factor in supporting Ukraine was the creation of a new international coalition in support of Ukraine. On April 26, 2022, the first meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, or a meeting in the Ramstein format (named after the American military base in Germany), took place. Meetings in the Ramstein format are a series of diplomatic meetings of ministers of defense and representatives of the top military leadership of several dozen countries of the world to coordinate the provision of military assistance to Ukraine. Ten meetings have been held so far. The upward dynamics of the number of participating countries (as of March 2023, it unites 54 states of the world) (Reznikov, 2023) and the nature of the decisions made show that the coalition is gradually turning from a military one to a political one.

For the first time after December 14, 1939 (when the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations for direct aggression against Finland), Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, began to be excluded from membership and work in international associations and organizations. Yes, it was excluded from the G 8 group of great powers, in which it has been since 1997; it was deprived of the right to membership in PACE; excluded from the UN Human Rights Council. Finally, in March and October 2022 and in February 2023, the UN General Assembly condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine with the demand for its immediate ending and the restoration of Ukraine's full sovereignty within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 (each of the resolutions received support with 141–144 votes “for” from 193 member states of the UN) (Henasambleya OON, 2023).

Russian aggression had opposite consequences for the Kremlin in terms of strengthening Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration plans. In almost four months, Ukraine quickly overcame the path from submitting an application for membership to being accepted as a candidate for EU membership on June 23, 2022 (Ukraina, 2022). A few months later (September 30, 2022), Ukraine filed an

application to be admitted to the NATO bloc under an accelerated procedure (Ukraina, 2022). The significance of these steps becomes clear and weighty on the background of the fact that the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine signed in 2014 (came into effect in full after the completion of the ratification process by all European entities, as of September 1, 2017) did not contain membership prospects for our country. As for NATO, the Bucharest Summit (April 2008) after the rejection of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) left a possibility for Ukraine's membership in the Alliance, but it was not supported by any real prospects, even with the beginning of full-scale Russian aggression.

However, it is quite evident that during the eight years of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, the West pursued a kind of policy of “pacification” of the Russian aggressor, which also enabled the escalation of the conflict. Yes, Crimea was recognized by Western countries and the world community as illegally annexed. However, this issue was not actually the subject of international negotiations. It was the fault of the Ukrainian side too, which de facto agreed to withdraw the issue of the unmotivated and contrary to international legal obligations of the Russian annexation of Crimea from the agenda of the Normandy format negotiations (a political-diplomatic process in which the Russian occupant was not a criminal, but an equal partner with the ability to impose its position and demands on Ukraine and Western states (primarily, Germany and France). Despite the sanctions introduced against Russia since March 2014, the EU states continued to increase economic cooperation with it. It developed especially actively in the energy sector. The second line of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline was even built, however, did not have a chance to be put into operation prior to the full-scale phase of Russia's war against Ukraine.

Western states also fulfilled their obligations to the Russian Federation under contracts, including those in the field of military weapons and technologies, which were concluded prior to February 2014. Even after a year of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine and a powerful anti-Russian sanctions policy, as evidenced by the materials of the Atlantic Council online discussions of March 29, 2023, Western technological components continue to be used in Russian weapons (Danylenko, 2022).

And most often it happens through Hong Kong, Turkey and neighboring countries and regions.

Such a policy of “double standards” and “cautious steps” of the West in relation to Russia is partially preserved despite the mentioned cardinal changes after February 24, 2022. One gets the impression, fully motivated and verified by facts, that the Western allies and other partners of Ukraine sometimes act or with excessive caution, trying too not to provoke the Russian nuclear monster, or to some extent delaying or limiting actions with various conditions (“we cannot weaken our defense capability”, “there are no weapons and equipment ready for transfer”, “it takes several months of training of Ukrainians to work with the relevant complexes and systems”, etc.) the urgent and needed military and military-technical assistance for our country. Even the indisputable successes of Ukraine not only in countering Russian aggression, but also in liberating its temporarily occupied territories and protecting universal human values and principles of international law, along with clear nuclear blackmail by Russia, its perfidious, unmotivated aggressive, genocidal war, do not encourage the Western partners and allies to decide on unambiguously more decisive steps and measures with the aim of immediately stopping Russian aggression and restoring Ukraine’s full sovereignty over its territories temporarily occupied by Russia.

Theoretical and conceptual explanations of this phenomenon are found, including in the plane of actor-network theory in the sense of its application to the explanation of processes and phenomena of international life and world politics. In particular, they are clearly traced in the approaches of supporters of various paradigmatic directions, like neorealism, neomarxism, and constructivism. We will demonstrate this on the example of influential Western representatives of neorealism in international relations – John Mearsheimer, Farid Zakaria and Henry Kissinger. These authors (like many other representatives of the Western neorealist paradigm of international relations) remain supporters of the determining influence of leading state actors and influential interstate coalitions on world politics. They aim not so much at an objective study of international reality as at subordinating this reality to the theoretical concepts created by them. The interpretations offered by them of the full-

scale conventional Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the ways to resolve the crisis in modern international relations demonstrate, first and foremost, the orientation of their theoretical concepts toward preserving the status quo of the international system, rather than conducting an objective analysis of its changes.

**Western realist / neorealist paradigm in the context
of actor-network theory: the Russia case**

a) Russia's interests in the context of “offensive realism” by John Mearsheimer. The theoretical and conceptual approach of the famous American political scientist-internationalist, professor at the University of Chicago, representative of “Offensive Realism” John Mearsheimer is indicative in the sense of taking into account the influence of an international actor on networks and nodes of interactions. The basic principles of his approach expand the scope of neo-realist theory, provide a theoretical justification for the behavior of revisionist states, including the modern Russian Federation (Mearsheimer, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2018). The main provisions of offensive realism include the following: first, states are rarely satisfied with the level of influence on the world stage and always try to gain an advantage over others in order to achieve complete security; secondly, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony “now”, thus eliminating any possibility of challenge by another great power; thirdly, the best strategy for a state to increase its relative strength before achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics (Nechaieva-Yuriichuk & Troyan, 2022, No. 1 (5), pp. 93–94).

J. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism models a pessimistic picture of international politics. It is characterized by dangerous interstate security competition, which can lead to conflict and war. According to the Western scientist, the conflict between the great powers is eternal. Therefore, the main subject of interest of J. Mearsheimer within the framework of the theory of offensive realism is the actions of great powers that shape international politics. The American international political scientist believes that the fate of all countries, both large and small, largely depends on the actions of players with the greatest potential, primarily military one.

In the spring of 2022, after the start of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the influential British magazine *The Economist* published a discussion article by J. Mearsheimer on the topic of why "the West bears the main responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis" (Mearsheimer, 2022). An American scientist believes that the reckless expansion of NATO provoked Russia. He examines the war waged by the Russian Federation against independent Ukraine through the prism of the most dangerous international conflict since the Caribbean missile crisis of 1962. Understanding the root causes of modern warfare is crucial if we want to prevent the situation from worsening and find a way to overcome armed conflict. An American researcher believes that the reckless expansion of NATO provoked Russia. According to J. Mearsheimer, the decisive factor is that Russia perceives NATO as a threat. And it doesn't matter if this perception has any basis. That is why the USA was wrong to support the eastward expansion of NATO, and therefore, they are to blame for the war and its terrible consequences.

"It is certain", writes J. Mearsheimer, "that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for the way it is conducted. But why he did so is another matter. The main opinion in the West is that he is an irrational, outright aggressor who wants to create a great Russia like the former Soviet Union was. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis" (Mearsheimer, 2022). The American researcher believes that this point of view primitives the existing state of affairs, which requires a deep analysis both in terms of understanding the causes of war and ways to stop it and prevent it in the future. This approach by J. Mearsheimer attracts attention from the perspective of understanding modern international security, particularly in the context of combining the structural theory of offensive realism with actor-network theory, and its possible implications for Ukraine. In particular, in the publication of the American political scientist-internationalist there are only calls to take into account the interests of major international actors, in particular Russia, but there is no place for the desire of a huge number of Ukrainians to escape from the influence of official Moscow. However, J. Mearsheimer's statement that the state's security level depends on the extent to which it is able to convince potential adversaries of its strength is of great importance

for Ukraine. That is, in carrying out interactions with influential actors of world politics, it is important for Ukraine to use the actual advantages of the actor-network approach, in particular, emphasizing the nature of relations and the quality of contacts with allied states and strategic partners.

b) Farid Zakaria on the appropriateness of the Russian-Ukrainian compromise. Another well-known American political scientist and journalist, Farid Zakaria, spoke in a similar way, doubting the possibility of a complete victory for Ukraine and the need to take into account the interests of Russia. The author of the “The Post-American World of the Future” (Zakaria, 2008) and “10 Lessons for the World After the Pandemic” (Zakaria, 2021) bestsellers emphasized in his interview in the fall of 2019 that “in the short term, the danger is coming from Russia. This is an embittered country that wants to be a predator, wants to show that it is still powerful” (Y. Panyushkina, 2019). At the same time, considering the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic for the world, he did not take into account the fact that the coronavirus danger was imposed on the course of Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, which had serious global consequences. The Ukrainian researcher N. Nechaieva-Yuriychuk aptly drew attention to this limitation of the American author: “In our opinion, the proposed scheme looks incomplete due to the absence in it of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which was a blatant unilateral disregard for the norms of international law and proved the existing international system's unpreparedness for an adequate response to modern challenges and threats to its own stability. We believe that if the author as an international political scientist had paid attention to this crisis, the analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the further development of humanity would have been more thorough and comprehensive in the context of the very title of the work: “10 Lessons for the World After the Pandemic”, and not for the USA or individual states” (Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, 2023, vol. 9, No 1, p. 213).

In general, F. Zakaria considered the actions of Russia and V. Putin personally in relation to Ukraine completely predictable and emphasized that this was an attempt

by a former superpower, humiliated by its condition (“a declining state”, as H. Kissinger also called Russia), but clinging to “some symbol of greatness”, to subjugate Ukraine (Zakaria, 2022). At the same time, the political journalist is convinced that the West should have made much more efforts to help Russia and restore its positions. Although in general he did not deny the fact that the USA and Western Europe really provided Moscow with huge aid packages and even created a new G 8 forum in 1997. However, to his credit, F. Zakaria quite reasonably pointed out the biggest problem of the West in its attitude to Russia's war in Ukraine primarily through the prism of the politics of the great powers, while imperialism was a more suitable basis.

Later, F. Zakaria, in the spirit of a compromise position of curtsies both towards taking into account the interests of a great power – Russia, and Ukraine, which resolutely fights for the right to be free and independent, expresses the point of view that “the goal should be an independent Ukraine that controls at least the territory , which she had until February 24, and with some obligations in the field of security from the West” (Zakaria, 2022). An American political scientist asserts that now “none of the parties is strong enough to win the war, and neither is weak enough to seek peace” (Zakaria, 2022). Accordingly, from his point of view, the overall prospect of a total victory for Ukraine seems doubtful, although its allies and partners should provide more ammunition, weapons, and finances to counter Russian aggression, so that Ukraine has “enough success and momentum on the battlefield” and enters into negotiations, “having very strong positions” (Zakaria, 2022).

F. Zakaria, in fact and reasonably, very much doubts the complete victory of Ukraine, having two main reasons for this. First of all, Ukraine’s allies and partners have been fulfilling its needs for weapons, ammunition and military equipment for too long and not always consistently, which limits the Ukrainian side’s capabilities primarily in terms of de-occupying its own territory. Second of all, Ukraine and Russia are in different weight categories as state entities: the Russian Federation is more than three times larger than Ukraine in terms of population, almost 15 times larger in terms of GDP, has 10 times more defense budget, and prevailed by an order of magnitude in

terms of quantitative indicators of almost all types of weapons. In addition, the war is taking place on Ukrainian land, which is accompanied by the destruction of settlements, industrial and agricultural enterprises, infrastructure facilities, and the impoverishment of people. Millions of Ukrainians have left their homes, lost them or gone abroad. Emphasizing how destructive this war is for our country, F. Zakaria offers a solution of territorial concessions in exchange for peace, which is unacceptable for Ukraine.

Finally, on February 28, 2023, in a column on his author's website he wrote a kind of conclusion and proposal: "One can imagine a ceasefire that will return to Ukraine all the lands captured since February 2022. Those seized before, as Crimea in 2014, will be subject to international arbitration, including local referendums, conducted by international groups, not Moscow. In addition, Kyiv will receive security guarantees from NATO, although they will not extend to these disputed territories. This compromise, simply put, Crimea and part of Donbas for de facto membership in NATO and the EU, can be sold to Ukrainians, because they will achieve their long-standing goal of becoming part of the West. This may be acceptable for Russia, because it can claim that it is protecting some Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine" (Zakaria, 2022).

Of course, this proposal of the American international political scientist is far from the classic policy of "Finlandization of Ukraine", but it does not take into account Ukraine's legitimate desire to restore the territorial integrity of the state. At the same time, within the framework of the actor-network approach, it is proposed that Russia, as an influential subject of international relations and which illegally seized Ukrainian territories, keeps it, and this is presented as a compromise way out of a difficult situation that threatens the entire international order with chaos and unpredictable turbulence.

c) Henry Kissinger's pro-Russian Realpolitik. In the context of the problem raised by us, the idea of exchanging territories for peace as the main result of the Russian-Ukrainian war is conceptually inherent in the worldview of the former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to the US President, H. Kissinger. This does not contradict the fact that the elder of American diplomacy emphasizes that

there are no justifications for the actions of Russia, which seeks by all means to return Ukraine to an absolutely dependent and subordinate position. Back in 2016, the elder of American diplomacy came out in support of “Russian domination in the former Soviet republics, starting from Belarus and Ukraine and ending with Georgia and Kazakhstan”, as well as the development of “a plan for the political and economic development of Ukraine”. The main idea of H. Kissinger was that Russia “guarantees the security of the east of Ukraine and gradually withdraws from there”, while the West, for its part, closes its eyes to the “Crimean issue”. In practice, this meant that the occupation of Crimea would not be officially recognized, but would cease to be a topic between the US and Russia. The concept was even called “constructive cooperation” and “normalization of relations” (Roloff & Tiedev, 2016).

In the conditions of full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, on May 24, 2022, during the World Economic Forum in Davos, H. Kissinger expressed the opinion that as a result of the Russian war in Ukraine, the international community will need to seek agreements with Russia. He suggested concluding a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, which should provide for a return to the situation before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, to avoid a war against Russia itself, the West should allow it to keep Crimea, which Russia took from Ukraine in 2014 (Matviychuk, 2022).

This caused serious criticism in political, scientific and expert circles. We will give only one demonstrative example of such a critical approach to the position of “the last of the Mohicans”. Alexander Motyl, an American historian and professor of Political Science at Rutgers University in Newark (New Jersey), rightly noted: “Kissinger’s recent speech at the World Economic Forum perfectly illustrates how out of touch he is with today’s realities – on the international scene, in Russia and, of course, in Ukraine. Like Metternich, Kissinger makes a fatal mistake, believing that a few wise politicians can impose their will on the world. Worse, he believes they can stop internal change and the power of nationalism. Many years ago, Senator William Fulbright called it the “arrogance of power” (we add that with elements of immorality and cynicism – authors” (Motyl, 2023).

At the end of 2022, in a column entitled “How to Avoid a New World War” for the British *The Spectator Weekly*, H. Kissinger again expressed a view similar to the previous one. “I have repeatedly expressed my support for the military efforts of the allies aimed at stopping Russia's aggression in Ukraine. But the time is approaching to rely on the strategic changes that have already been made and integrate them into a new structure for achieving peace through negotiations” (Kissinger, 2022) – emphasized the authoritative American practitioner and theoretician in the field of international relations. He called for peace and dialogue based on the cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a demarcation line as of February 24, 2022, and only after that discuss on the return of occupied Crimea to Ukraine. In the case of the impossibility of implementing this plan, referendums can be held on “especially disputed territories that have repeatedly changed hands over the centuries” (Kissinger, 2022).

Another thesis of the former US Secretary of State is deep, but quite controversial in the context of the current stage of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war: “The desire for peace and order consists of two components, which are sometimes considered contradictory: the desire for security elements and the demand for acts of reconciliation. If we cannot achieve both (we are talking about security and peace with the actual legalization of Ukrainian territories seized by Russia as a result of the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014 – authors), we will not be able to achieve either” (Kissinger, 2022).

However, H. Kissinger nevertheless considers the new balance of power in favor of Ukraine, noting that the peace process should connect Ukraine with NATO, since Kyiv's neutrality no longer makes sense, especially after joining the Alliance by Finland and Sweden. Such a position was voiced by him in January 2023 too, during a speech at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos. At the same time, the peace process can pursue a double goal – to confirm the freedom of Ukraine and to define a new international structure in which Russia should find a place, since, despite its “propensity for violence”, it “makes a decisive contribution to the global balance and balance of power” (Kissinger, 2022). In fact, the outlined approach, on the

one hand, will only confirm the war as a tool for changing borders, and, on the other hand, it is aimed at satisfying the interests of a powerful international actor, which is contrary to the UN Charter.

Such a vision of the situation fits perfectly into the meaningful composition of the actor-network theory, which primarily prefers a more powerful international player. It is aimed at ending the war while preserving, at least partially, the interests and gains of Russia, without taking into account the completely legitimate desire of Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity and sovereignty within the internationally recognized borders of 1991. At the same time, for Ukraine, this means that in the long term, it is necessary to strengthen its potential as a regional and global state in order to effectively ensure its national interests.

Conclusions

In general, actor-network theory was introduced in the second half of the 1980s. This theory gives the network priority in relations between participants, which depend on the intensity of interactions. In the sense of international relations and world politics, this means that they are under the strong or even decisive influence of powerful international actors (big states and flexible interstate coalitions) that interact in the sphere of regional and global politics. Russia is seen as one of the most influential international players or “core localities” interacting. Accordingly, other influential international actors are very cautious about the complete break in relations with Russia, they do not consider the possibility of its complete defeat in an aggressive war against Ukraine. Such a position was reflected and substantiated in various theoretical approaches, examples of which are the ideas of Western representatives of neorealism (John Mearsheimer, Farid Zakaria, Henry Kissinger and others).

The primary subject of scientific interest to representatives of the modern neorealist approach in international relations is precisely the actions of the great powers. This is caused by the fact that primarily the most influential and powerful states shape the agenda and rules of the game on the world stage. Therefore, the proper scientific explanation by neorealists of the current state of affairs on the international

arena analyzed above, understanding the reasons for growth and ways to overcome modern tensions in the field of international relations is very important. It is characteristic of J. Mearsheimer, G. Kissinger, F. Zakaria and other Western representatives of neorealism that such an understanding lies precisely in the plane of actor-network theory. According to it, the international actor structure of modern global and regional relations is characterized by traditionality and stability. It is based on the understanding of the determining influence on them, first of all, of the complex of interactions of the most powerful modern centers of power. Such priority interactions between major international actors were characteristic and defining for previous international eras – Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles-Washington and Yalta-Potsdam.

In other words, J. Mearsheimer, F. Zakaria, G. Kissinger and other representatives of the Western neorealist paradigm in international relations, although they are forced to respond to serious challenges faced by the modern system of international relations, are largely captive to their traditional approaches about determining the influence of powerful state international actors and coalitions on the nature and course of the world political process. The analysis of their texts, carried out in the article, indicates that these authors aim not so much at an objective exploration of international reality as at subordinating this reality to the theoretical concepts they have created. Their proposed interpretations of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and ways of resolving the crisis further demonstrate that their theoretical concepts are aimed at maintaining the status quo of the international system rather than objectively analyzing its changes.

Within the framework of this theory, Russia is definitely considered as one of the most influential international players / actors, the destabilization, defeat or destruction of which threatens the stability of the entire system of international relations. That is why certain allies and partners of Ukraine are still trying to find a “soft” option for defeating Russia in the conditions of war and providing aid to Ukraine, seeking to avoid domestic and foreign political turbulence as much as possible, and even more so the collapse of the modern Russian state. At the same time,

the current course and incompleteness of the armed Russian-Ukrainian conflict prompt the following: first, a careful analysis of both its individual variables and the general impact on the transformation trends of the modern system of international relations; secondly, clarification of the role in this system of individual actors who, to one degree or another, seek to fit into the new world order, preserve or strengthen their positions in the new international architecture.

In this sense, the war against Ukraine has turned into an existential threat for Russia. This threat is caused by the danger of defeat, the loss of leading positions in global and regional actor-network interactions, as well as the growth of turbulence within the Russian state and society. At the same time, for Ukraine and most of its allies and partners, victory in the war also has no less existential weight. Its meaning lies in strengthening democratic positions, openness, integration and security imperatives of development, returning, ultimately, to stability and key international legal foundations and rules of functioning of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. At the same time, according to Western neorealists, such as J. Mearsheimer, G. Kissinger, and F. Zakaria, turbulence and conflict in modern international relations can be overcome only on the basis of taking into account the interests of all the most powerful international players. The Russian Federation occupies a prominent place among them in view of its potential, intensity and depth of actor-network interactions. From here, it is through the “rescue of Russia” that the representatives of the Western neorealist approach in international relations see an effective way to overcome the conflict-causing anarchy in international relations of the era of the “twilight of democracy” and transition to a stable polyarchic world order.

CHAPTER 6.

THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation treacherously launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. Russia transitioned from a covert hybrid war (since February 20, 2014) to an open, all-out war. Ukraine found itself at the epicenter of one of the largest and most extreme socio-cultural rifts in the contemporary global world. At the same time, scientists, analysts, and researchers, primarily from Ukraine, find themselves in the immediate reaction zone amidst turbulent and fateful events for Ukraine, Europe, and the world. For researchers, this is an irreplaceable experience of direct observation, especially during wartime, when events, meanings, and even material artefacts change or disappear rapidly. The approaches and meanings associated with the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014 will continue to evolve and transform into enduring narratives. Differences in the understanding of events by those who write history and those who create it are inevitable.

Over the past decade, a number of scholarly studies, analytical conclusions, and expert opinions have appeared on the causes and course of the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian war (Felshtinsky & Stanchev, 2022; Gorbulin, 2017; Herpen, 2015; Kuzio, 2017; Magda, 2017; Parahonsky & Yavorska, 2019; Perepelycia, 2015). Drawing on various approaches (historical, geopolitical, theory of war, window of opportunity, clash of civilizations, delayed war, etc.), scholars have attempted to justify various aspects of Russia's hybrid war and full-scale war against Ukraine. However, the general analysis of Russian aggression since 2014 and its significance for Ukraine, Europe, and the world remains relevant. Therefore, this theoretical and conceptual historical study is truly pioneering in its comprehensive examination of the 2014–2025 Russian-Ukrainian War. This scholarly article merely outlines the issue at hand and requires further in-depth study and understanding.

The presented work aims to examine and generalize the causal chain, characteristics, fundamental controversies, and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian War in the chronological period 2014–2025. At the same time, we are clearly aware of the incompleteness of the process and the possible flexibility of the established upper limit of the chronology (2025). The research is based on a dialectical, comparative, international legal, and systemic approach. The work was prepared in accordance with the principles of scientificity, objectivity, dialectics, historicism, systematicity, and multifactorialism. The research methodology involves a departure from the so-called tunnel vision (when a certain pattern, typical ways of solving a problem, is embedded in the mind, which are activated depending on the situation) in favor of generalizations, and integrating the content and events of the Russian-Ukrainian war into the local (Ukrainian), regional (European), and global (world) historical context.

Regional and global systemic changes in the international arena following the collapse of the communist bloc not only led to a new quality of the international system but also caused turmoil in relations between the main players, especially in the context of the confrontation between liberal democracy and authoritarianism (Bieleń, 2021; Kuźniar, 2022). This situation was reflected in the intensification of the Russian Federation's international policy. In particular, the Kremlin sought to exert complete control and subjugation over the post-Soviet space. Ukraine was of particular importance in Russian foreign policy plans, as it should have primarily entered Russia's geopolitical sphere of influence.

The prerequisites for Russia's aggression against independent Ukraine between 2014 and 2025 had been developing since the collapse of the USSR and the first years of modern Ukrainian independence. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the communist bloc at the end of the 20th century became a test of independence for many nations. Researchers claim that a significant portion of Russians suffer from the so-called “Versailles syndrome” (a term that seemed to denote the Germans’ painful reaction to the trauma of military defeat and the harsh terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles). Common to both cases is a “defeated complex”, exaggerating the “catastrophic” defeat, and the desire to restore great power status and return lost

territories. Following the change of power in the Russian Federation in 1999–2000, these ideas became practically part of the official ideology and political rhetoric. Examples of this were V. Putin’s statements about the collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” (April 2005) and about the “unjust” incorporation of “originally Russian territories” into Soviet Ukraine (December 2019); State Duma deputy E. Fyodorov, from the pro-government “United Russia” party, stated in November 2015 that the Russian state should be rebuilt within the borders of the USSR in 1945, etc. To “restore historical justice”, it is necessary to punish domestic opponents of Russia's neo-imperial ideology, end the liberal-democratic influence of Western states on Ukraine, and return it to the sphere of full geopolitical subordination to Ukraine. Such views are actively promoted by pro-government intellectuals, scientists, and propagandists (O. Dugin, A. Fursov, L. Ivashov, V. Nikonov, O. Platonov, O. Prokhanov).

The situation in Russian-Ukrainian relations has deteriorated due to Ukraine's reluctance to directly participate in Russian-led Eurasian integration, its active development of Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU and NATO, and the generally successful progress of democratization processes in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity confirmed Ukraine's course toward democratization, European integration, and Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia viewed all of this as a threat to its dominance in the post-Soviet space and used it as a pretext for aggression against Ukraine. Initially, from February 20, 2014, it unfolded as a hybrid war, accompanied by Russia's occupation and direct annexation of Ukrainian territory – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. The immediate cause of Russia’s full-scale war with Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, can be attributed to the Kremlin’s desire to revive Russian influence in the post-Soviet space by declaring a modern Russian neo-empire in the form of an interstate union under Moscow’s auspices. Ukraine had to become an obligatory part, without control over which Russia sees no future as a full-fledged state-imperial power.

In light of these observations, we present a theoretical and conceptual analysis of the origins, characteristics, and local, regional, and global consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 through the lens of the security dimension.

Basic Characteristics of the Russian-Ukrainian War

The authors of this text are aware of the importance of historical perspective and retrospect. Historians typically work with factual material from a distance, a period of time when emotions have subsided and the “painful past” can be considered relatively calmly (Mink & Neumayer, 2007). At the same time, immersing oneself in the immediate whirlwind of events, viewing them “from the inside”, allows for momentary reflection, reconstructing everyday life, and updating it. Focusing on the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 allows us to distinguish several of its fundamental characteristics. The main ones are the hybrid and, later, the full-scale nature of the war, which for Ukraine has the significance of a civilizational, existential, and national liberation struggle.

On November 30, 2013, the Revolution of Dignity began in Ukraine under the slogans of European choice and the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU, democracy, freedom, and dignity. The shooting of the revolutionary Maidan in Kyiv and the flight of then-President V. Yanukovych resulted in a shift in state power in Ukraine. The primary geopolitical consequence of the Revolution of Dignity for Ukraine was the decision to prioritize European integration as its primary development vector. This meant a shift away from a pro-Russian foreign policy course and a reduction in dependence on the Russian Federation in almost all spheres of life. All of this provoked an extremely adverse reaction from the Kremlin and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in the form of a hybrid war. Russia annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, conducted a secret military invasion of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, and comprehensively supported illegal pro-Russian quasi-formations in the Ukrainian Donbas in the form of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. On February 20, 2014, the Russian Federation launched a hybrid war against Ukraine

(combining “hard” and “soft” military and informational means), which later evolved into a modern war of national liberation for Ukraine.

At the same time, Russia had already launched a war to destroy Ukraine, or an existential war, against Ukraine and all things Ukrainian. In the first stage (February 20, 2014 – February 23, 2022), the Russian-Ukrainian war was hybrid in nature – hybrid technologies (covert and overt aggression, paramilitary activity, information operations, etc.) were used by the Kremlin to occupy Ukrainian territories. Since 2014, the force component of the war, which brought death and material destruction, operated within a limited space, locally in parts of Ukraine’s eastern regions. At the same time, the limited scale of Russian military activity was accompanied by the unrestricted spread of war discourse. A struggle for dominance of certain political and religious views began, primarily through the dissemination and establishment of the idea of a “Russian world”. Simultaneously, information warfare and propaganda campaigns were underway to influence public consciousness, control cognitive and communicative processes, and exert control over people's thoughts, emotions, and perceptions. In occupied Ukrainian territories, Russia sought to control the behavior and consciousness of Ukrainians, seeking to destroy and alter their national identity fundamentally. In response, Ukraine launched large-scale efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities, renounced its non-aligned status, signed and ratified an Association Agreement with the EU in March-September 2014, and on January 27, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a declaration recognizing the Russian Federation as an aggressor state.

The term “hybrid warfare” does not exist in international legal documents. It originated in the 1990s as part of American discourse and gained widespread attention thanks to F. Hoffman’s work, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare” (Hoffman, 2007). In the works of American scholars (Fox, 2017; Hoffman, 2007), and in Polish and Ukrainian discourse (Asymmetry and Hybridity, 2011; Doroshko & Baliuk, 2018; Gorbulin, 2017; Magda, 2015, 2017; Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego: Wojna Hybridowa, 2015), it has been emphasized that hybrid warfare has military, diplomatic, political, legal, psychological, financial,

economic, social, ideological, and informational dimensions. Polish researcher A. Krzak rightly notes: “This diversity of elements involved in this form of destructive activity has become an extremely popular topic of political and journalistic discourse and has been contemporarily defined as hybrid actions or hybrid warfare” (Krzak, 2018, 11). Typically, these directions of hybrid warfare are combined in various combinations, used for military purposes. Hybrid warfare is based on the principle of a single coordination center that manages regular and irregular forces (information, terrorist, criminal). The primary instrument of hybrid warfare is the initiation and maintenance of internal contradictions and conflicts within a target state that has been selected for aggression by the aggressor state. At the same time, the aggressor side usually publicly denies its involvement in the resolved conflict and carefully conceals its proper course and initiators.

The components and varieties of hybrid warfare include information warfare, cyber warfare, humanitarian warfare, trade warfare, guerrilla warfare, paramilitary combat operations, terrorist actions or attacks, inter-ethnic clashes, and, finally, asymmetric warfare. In this context, asymmetric warfare involves the use of unconventional forms and predominantly irregular military formations against superior enemy forces. The concept of asymmetric warfare is used when there is a significant difference in the combat potential or capabilities of the opposing sides in an armed conflict. Examples of such forms of asymmetric warfare include ambushes, sniper attacks, the use of improvised explosive devices, and so on. The importance of asymmetric warfare lies primarily in reducing the opponent’s psychological readiness to conduct military operations. This is achieved by destroying various important objects, particularly high-threat targets, symbolic objects, and places where significant civilian populations gather, among other objectives.

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched the aggressive phase of a full-scale war against Ukraine. The full-scale armed invasion confirmed that hybrid warfare can be waged to find weaknesses in an opponent's defenses, leading to further open military occupation of the territory of a sovereign state. At the same time, elements of hybrid warfare continue to be employed, as evidenced by the Russian Federation’s

leadership's attempt to blur the lines between war and peace under the guise of a "special military operation" (Russian Federation Announces "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, 2022).

Since then, the Russian-Ukrainian war has finally transformed into an existential war for Ukrainians. In the literal sense, the existential war is a war for existence and life. The authoritarian Russian imperial machine, through all means, including armed military aggression and genocidal practices, is attempting to deprive Ukraine and Ukrainians of their own history, memory, identity, culture, and so on. In this way, the ground is being prepared for the destruction of Ukraine as the state bearer of the true centuries-old history and state traditions of Rus'-Ukraine (Portnov, 2009; Prokhanov, 2016; Yakubova, 2018). The Russian Federation's contemporary treacherous war of aggression against Ukraine is another attempt to erase everything Ukrainian from the European and global civilizational space. Russia seeks to appropriate Ukrainian historical discourse in its broadest sense. Because Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, through their very existence and struggle for independence, prevent Russian imperialist apologists from doing so, the entire state machine of the Russian Leviathan, with the support of three-quarters of Russian society, is waging total war against independent Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation.

At the same time, the Russian occupiers do not shy away from even the most cynical means of aggressive warfare. These include, in particular, the genocide of Ukrainians, numerous instances of which have been recorded in various places across Ukraine, and Bucha, a small town in the Kyiv Oblast, has become a truly tragic symbol. The war has become a tragedy and trauma for millions of Ukrainians. The Russians committed genocide against the civilian population of Ukraine: murder, torture, sexual violence, executions, abductions and deportations of children, shelling of critical infrastructure, and the destruction of hospitals, schools, kindergartens, museums, churches, residential buildings, and more by war criminals. Over 81,000 civilian facilities were destroyed or damaged within a year of the full-scale invasion. This includes over 62,000 residential buildings, over 2,300 educational institutions, and over 450 medical facilities. Approximately 4,040 km of infrastructure networks—

encompassing gas pipelines, water pipelines, and electricity grids—were damaged or destroyed. The Russian Federation's aggression has caused long-term environmental damage. According to the Ukrainian government, the war has caused \$ 46 billion in damage to the country's ecology. Since October 2022, the enemy has been deliberately destroying critical civilian infrastructure, particularly energy infrastructure. Two hundred fifty-five attacks were carried out on 112 facilities using missiles, aircraft, or military drones, with over 77 % of these attacks occurring from October to February (197) (Kostin, 2023). These attacks were aimed at deliberately creating unlivable conditions, which corresponds to one of the hallmarks of genocide as defined by the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Another manifestation of Russia's betrayal was nuclear terrorism. This was manifested by the seizure of the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants by Russian occupation forces. The very act of Russian aggression against independent Ukraine, the genocidal practices of the Russian occupiers, and nuclear terrorism contradict applicable international norms and legal acts. Moreover, the treacherous nature of the Russian Federation's actions is particularly underlined by the fact that it is being undertaken by a nuclear state, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine (according to the memorandum of December 5, 1994 (Memorandum on security, 1994).

In the broad sense of the term “existential”, we have entirely different Russian and Ukrainian visions of the Russian-Ukrainian war. For official Moscow, it is a war for the absolute destruction of the modern Ukrainian state and society. For Ukraine, the main content of the existential war is the struggle for national liberation, for the restoration and reconstruction of Ukraine within the borders recognized by the applicable international instruments of 1991, and for the defense of Ukrainian and pan-European values – freedom, dignity, democracy, human rights, equality, and the rule of law. It is precisely these meanings of life, along with Ukraine and Ukrainians, that Russia seeks to destroy, while Ukrainian society is striving with all its might to defend, protect, and establish. In January 2017, Mykola Ryabchuk, a Ukrainian intellectual, publicist, and Vice President of the Ukrainian International Centre of the PEN Club, in

a report on the changing identity of Ukrainians at the Royal Institute of International Relations (Chatham House) in London, clearly expressed the now-obvious opinion: “Ukrainians differ from Russians in their love of freedom” (Ryabchuk, 2022).

The war imposed by Russia, on the one hand, repeats certain standards of classic 20th-century wars. However, on the other hand, it is entirely new or different in terms of the application of technological components of modern civilization. The modern Russian-Ukrainian war, as a “new generation war” (Wojnowski, 2015), is a type of “internet war”. This war is the first in human history to take place in an era marked by social networking sites, mobile phones that can control satellites, satellites themselves that can see everything on Earth, the active use of combat drones, and more. Thus, the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian war bears all the hallmarks of “fourth-generation warfare” or “network-centric warfare”: it is characterized by the use of highly accurate “intelligent” weapons, the organization and conduct of warfare using information and computer networks, the implementation of information-psychological operations and cyber attacks, the blurring of the boundaries between war and peace, front and rear, military and civilian, etc. In the future, and in a short time, this will give rise to another situation of “non-contact warfare” or “sixth-generation warfare” (Wojnowski, 2015, 34), which is already partially visible in the events of the current Russian-Ukrainian war. For the first time, a major war became available in real-time to millions of viewers, thanks to television channels like CNN, CBS, NBC, Fox, BBC, ABC, mass media, and social media (Kuleba, 2019). The provision of state-of-the-art Western weapons and ammunition, as well as ongoing financial assistance from Ukrainian allies and partners, was made possible by the fact that citizens of the free world were well-informed about the crimes and atrocities committed by Russian terrorist forces in Ukraine (Snyder, 2022). This influenced public opinion in many leading countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This is why Ukraine managed to secure such unprecedented support from our Western allies.

Effective Western military aid, along with the consolidation of Ukrainian society and the victory of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, is key to Ukraine’s overall success –

victory in the war against a modern neo-imperial Rashistan, the expulsion of occupiers from Ukrainian territory, the protection of common European values, and a return to current international norms and legal principles. For example, overall, US military aid to Ukraine under the Joe Biden administration amounts to nearly \$ 27.5 billion, and the total EU contribution to Ukraine under the European Peace Fund (EPF) has increased to € 3.6 billion. According to research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), against the backdrop of a full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, Ukraine has become the world's third-largest arms importer (Surgeinarms, 2023). Increasing and accelerating comprehensive military assistance to Ukraine from allies and partners will significantly accelerate the deoccupation of Ukrainian territory, bring Ukraine closer to victory, and avoid further human tragedies, destruction of civilian facilities, infrastructure, cultural values, and more.

From February 2014 to October 2025, Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, with the military-technical, political-diplomatic, and humanitarian assistance of their allies and partners, heroically held back the initially hybrid and now full-scale military aggression of the Russian nuclear Leviathan, protecting Ukraine, Europe, and the world. Ukraine has become a Rubicon separating peace from war, light from darkness, democratic dignity from totalitarian despotism, and, ultimately, civilization from barbarism. Ukraine has demonstrated to the entire world the steadfastness and indomitable nature of the Ukrainian character, as well as Ukrainians' faith in freedom and will, their right to a dignified life, and their pursuit of state independence and democratic development. Ukraine has already won this just and liberating, yet bloody and destructive, war against modern imperialist Russia. The final end to the modern Russian-Ukrainian war is only a matter of time and the measure of human suffering and tragedy.

The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War (2014–2025) on the Contemporary World Order

The contemporary world order is a complex system of international relations characterized by multipolarity, globalization, regionalization, and the increasing role

of non-state actors. It is the result of a long historical evolution, the formation of which began after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system. The contemporary world order can be described as a dynamic and complex system in a state of constant flux. Understanding these features is crucial for developing effective international policies and promoting peace and security worldwide.

The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2025 exerts a profound impact on the contemporary world order. This is manifested, in particular, in the following ways:

- it has intensified tensions in relations between Russia and the West;
- it has stimulated the growth of military expenditures and the militarization of international relations;
- it has reinforced the role of NATO as a military alliance;
- it has triggered a humanitarian crisis and mass migration;
- it has disrupted global supply chains and undermined energy security.

The war demonstrates that Europe and the world have exhausted the “peace dividends” gained after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and are entering a new era, one that has not yet been conceptually or terminologically defined. Thus, under the direct influence of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a new world order is being shaped. This conflict has become not only a regional tragedy but also a turning point for the global system of international relations, prompting a revision of fundamental principles of security, geopolitical balance, and economic interdependence.

First and foremost, the war has revealed the critical vulnerability of existing mechanisms of global governance. Institutions tasked with ensuring international stability – particularly the UN and the OSCE – proved incapable of preventing the aggression or effectively containing its escalation. This has called into question the effectiveness of the universalist model of world order and has brought to the forefront the search for new security formats, including regional alliances.

Secondly, in the security dimension, the war has prompted a fundamental reassessment of the role of military-political alliances and strategic deterrence. NATO has accelerated its enlargement and modernization, while revising its approaches to collective defense and reinforcing its eastern flank. At the same time, the importance

of smaller security coalitions – such as the Lublin Triangle, the Quadriga, or Baltic-Black Sea initiatives – has grown. Ukraine has emerged as a crucial partner in shaping a new security doctrine centred on resilience, technological superiority, and close coordination among allies.

Thirdly, the war has intensified processes of geopolitical polarization, deepening the confrontation between democratic states and authoritarian regimes. This has led to a reevaluation of strategic priorities in both Europe and Asia, with stronger cooperation within the EU, NATO, and among the states of Eastern Europe, as they strive to establish a common security platform.

A *fourth* significant dimension is economic. The war has caused energy and food instability, ruptured supply chains, and accelerated the transition toward new models of autonomy – both energy and technological. As a result, the importance of states that can ensure their own resilience and independence from aggressive global actors has increased.

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 has become a catalyst for fundamental changes in the global system – both institutional and value-political. Its consequences are shaping a new paradigm of world order grounded in resilience, responsibility, and a reassessment of the role of power in international relations.

The Russian-Ukrainian war is a crucial factor influencing the contemporary world order, and its consequences have yet to be fully comprehended. A thorough understanding of the war's impact on the reconfiguration of post-bipolarity and the emergence of a new world order, amid the sharp rise in turbulence in international relations, will determine the optimal resolution of institutional and security transformations in the modern world.

Institutional Transformations of the Global World Order

The current situation of heightened conflict potential, growing turbulence, and increasing disorder in international relations has led to transformations within the institutional framework of the contemporary world order. These changes have been most evident in several important dimensions.

First: The weakening role of the UN and the crisis of international law. The Russian-Ukrainian war has highlighted the limitations of the United Nations in effectively responding to global conflicts. Several key problems have become evident:

1. The paralysis of the UN Security Council due to Russia's veto power, which has prevented the adoption of effective decisions concerning aggression.

2. The insufficient effectiveness of international law: despite Russia's blatant violations of Ukraine's sovereignty, international legal mechanisms (including resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council, and rulings of the International Court of Justice) have failed to prevent the aggression or bring about its cessation.

Second: The growing importance of international tribunals. The war has acted as a catalyst for processes aimed at holding war criminals accountable, including initiatives to establish a special tribunal to prosecute Russian leaders as perpetrators of aggression.

Third: Strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU and NATO. The war has prompted a rethinking of the role of the European Union and NATO in the global security environment.

The EU has significantly reinforced its defense dimension by adopting a new strategic concept — the *Strategic Compass* (2022), launching the European Defense Fund, and deciding to increase military expenditures of its member states. A fundamental shift in European energy policy has also occurred. In particular, the EU implemented a significant rupture of its energy ties with Russia, leading to the formation of a new European energy architecture focused on supplier diversification.

Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has also led to NATO's enlargement. The accession of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has altered the balance of power in Northern Europe, substantially increasing NATO's overall border with Russia.

Fourth: The formation of new alliances and coalitions. Against the backdrop of the war, new military, political, and economic blocs have been formed.

On September 15 2021, the establishment of the trilateral defense pact *AUKUS* (Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States) was officially announced. Following the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the bloc intensified cooperation in defense and deterrence of authoritarian regimes.

On April 22 2022, a series of diplomatic meetings began between defence ministers from over 50 countries worldwide — the *Ukraine Defense Contact Group*. Its purpose was to synchronize and accelerate the provision of military assistance to Ukraine in its resistance to Russia's full-scale invasion, as well as to discuss Ukraine's post-war reconstruction and security. The *Ramstein Coalition*, as this format became known, has emerged as a symbol of the transformation of military cooperation in contemporary conflicts.

Another example of a modern alliance is BRICS+, which unites Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. The BRICS bloc brings together developing countries for geopolitical and economic cooperation. Over time, it has evolved into a geopolitical formation often described as a competitor to the G7 and other Western-dominated alliances. BRICS focuses on economic cooperation, the expansion of multilateral trade, and development initiatives. Russia has sought to use the bloc's enlargement to reduce Western influence; however, most member states, including China and India, have maintained a neutral position regarding the war.

Security Aspects of the Transformation of the World Order (The Role of the United States, the West, and China)

The Russian-Ukrainian war has become the epicenter of the most significant security crisis in Europe since World War II. It has not only destabilized the balance of power established after the Cold War but has also raised fundamental questions about the role of leading global actors – the United States, Western states, and China – in shaping the contemporary world order. The security, political, and economic consequences of this conflict are shaping a new structure of international relations, in

which these three actors function not only as participants but as primary architects of global architecture.

The United States: the return to global security leadership. From the onset of the conflict, the US has acted as the principal driver of the international response to Russian aggression. Within NATO as well as through bilateral frameworks, Washington has provided Ukraine with substantial military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic assistance. The war in Ukraine has enabled the US to reaffirm its credibility as a guarantor of security and stability, particularly after a decade of European debates over “strategic autonomy”. Through coordination of military support, leadership in sanctions policy against Russia, and global diplomatic pressure, the US has consolidated its role as the core of a crisis-response coalition of democratic states. Moreover, the conflict has catalyzed a reassessment of US defense doctrine, with an emphasis on simultaneously deterring two major rivals – Russia and China – in both Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.

The Collective West: consolidation and strategic rearmament. The European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and other US partners have demonstrated unprecedented unity in supporting Ukraine and countering Russian revisionism. A key manifestation of this consolidation has been the decisive shift away from energy dependence on Russia, the increase in defense budgets, the rearmament of armed forces, and active participation in shaping new security initiatives. Notably, the states of Central and Eastern Europe have assumed new roles – not only as transport and logistical hubs but also as political initiators of new alliances, such as the Bucharest Nine, the Lublin Triangle, and the “Quadriga” initiative. The war has prompted a rethinking of collective security, including NATO enlargement and enhanced strategic cooperation between the EU and the Alliance. As a result, the West has shifted away from a reactive posture and is increasingly pursuing a proactive deterrence policy.

China: Strategic Caution and Geopolitical Balancing. China has maintained a cautious stance on the war, avoiding direct support for either side, while skillfully exploiting the situation to expand its global influence. On the one hand, Beijing has preserved its strategic partnership with Russia, particularly in the energy and

technology sectors, while jointly opposing what it portrays as “U.S. hegemony”. On the other hand, China has refrained from directly violating sanctions regimes and has not provided lethal assistance to Moscow, seeking to maintain the image of a neutral actor. Simultaneously, Beijing has promoted its own security initiatives – most notably the *Global Security Initiative* – positioning itself as an alternative center of power capable of offering new models of conflict resolution distinct from Western approaches. Nevertheless, this balancing strategy is increasingly perceived in the West as a cover for tacit support of Moscow's revisionist practices.

The role of each of these actors in the war in Ukraine highlights a broader trend toward fragmentation and regionalization of international security. This tendency became particularly evident in the first months after the new US presidential administration under D. Trump took office. What is emerging is a fundamental reassessment of the very foundations of the global order: the principle of the inviolability of borders, the universality of international law, and the role of intergovernmental organizations. At the same time, there is a de facto return to bloc-based thinking in the context of increasing disorder in international relations.

The Security Transformation of the World Order:

Between Multipolarity and Bloc Competition

The current form of bloc-building and the corresponding type of thinking manifests itself not in the format of the Cold War, but primarily through the competition of strategic alliances, regional coalitions, and security architectures. The United States and the West are intensifying the creation of flexible alliances to address emerging threats. At the same time, China offers an alternative model of multipolarity, in which regional interests prevail over global commitments (Авер'янов, 2021). At the same time, existing security structures play a significant role, particularly NATO and the OSCE, as well as various regional groups and alliances.

NATO and the Security Aspects of World Order Transformation in the impact of the Russia–Ukraine War. The Russia–Ukraine war, especially after February 24, 2022, not only exposed the vulnerability of the existing international security system

but also reoriented the strategic priorities of leading global actors, including the influential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

As the key security institution of the Euro-Atlantic space, NATO faced the necessity of quickly adapting to a new reality – the reality of open war in Europe, where the basic principles of international law, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, were violated. In response, the Alliance undertook a comprehensive modernization of its military strategy, strengthened the defensive capabilities of its eastern flank, expanded its military presence in the Baltic states and Central and Eastern Europe, and revived the concept of deterrence, which once again became relevant.

The war in Ukraine also contributed to NATO's enlargement – the accession of Sweden and Finland marked a new stage in the understanding of security guarantees and confirmed growing trust in the Alliance as an effective mechanism of collective defense. At the same time, NATO intensified cooperation with partners, including Ukraine, reinforcing interaction formats that bear the features of a strategic partnership, even without formal membership.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, NATO has significantly increased its support for Ukraine. This involves not only coordinating arms and ammunition deliveries through member-state mechanisms but also building the institutional resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A number of programs were launched in the fields of technical, logistical, and medical support, as well as the training of Ukrainian servicemen to NATO standards. The Alliance plays a key role in implementing defense sector reforms, contributing to the interoperability of the Ukrainian army with the forces of member states.

Ukraine's membership in NATO remains a complex and politically sensitive issue. Despite significant support from certain member states and a high level of public backing within Ukraine itself, full accession is blocked by risks of escalation and the lack of consensus. At the same time, recent years have demonstrated that Ukraine's integration into NATO's security space is occurring *de facto* – through standardization, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and expanded institutional dialogue. In the longer term, given the development of the situation on the battlefield and changes in Europe's

political landscape, Ukraine's membership in NATO is no longer a matter of "if" but of "when and how".

Thus, from 2014 to 2025, NATO has evolved from an organization searching for a new role after the end of the Cold War into the key guarantor of security in the process of world order transformation. The Russia–Ukraine war has become the catalyst of this transformation, and the further deepening of NATO–Ukraine relations is one of the defining vectors for the future security architecture in Europe.

The OSCE, the Russia–Ukraine War, and the Changing World Order. The Russia–Ukraine war of 2014–2025 has become a critical challenge for the entire European and global security system. At the same time, this conflict revealed a deep crisis in the functioning of international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which, until recently, was considered one of the central mechanisms for collective responses to threats to peace on the continent.

The OSCE, which emerged as the successor of the Helsinki process, based its activities on the principles of the inviolability of borders, non-interference in states' internal affairs, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. However, Russia's aggression against Ukraine demonstrated the institution's actual inability to respond effectively to violations of its own principles. Despite numerous monitoring missions, calls for dialogue, and diplomatic initiatives, the OSCE failed to prevent the escalation of the war, and its mechanisms were blocked by Russia's veto power.

After 2022, the situation became even more complicated: the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine was shut down, and the organization effectively lost the ability to act as an arbiter or mediator in conflict resolution. This raised questions not only about the OSCE's operational capacity but also about its legitimacy as a universal security forum in the face of armed aggression from a member state.

In the context of world order transformation, the war in Ukraine has sharpened debates about the effectiveness and viability of multilateral institutions that operate based on consensus – a system easily blocked by aggressor states. Thus, the OSCE crisis has become part of a broader crisis of global governance, requiring either deep

reform of existing structures or the creation of new, more capable security formats – flexible, regionally oriented, and politically accountable.

Given this, the Russia–Ukraine war not only shattered illusions about the stability of the post-Helsinki order but also highlighted the need to rethink the role of the OSCE in the new European security architecture. The future of the organization will depend on its ability to transform, reduce dependence on aggressors, and once again become a platform for defending the fundamental principles of international law.

New small-scale security alliances as alternatives to universal mechanisms.

Russian aggression against Ukraine has been a key factor in stimulating the formation of new security cooperation formats, such as small security alliances or blocs. The inefficiency of universal mechanisms of international security, particularly the UN, has compelled states to seek more flexible and effective forms of interaction capable of both deterring aggressors and providing genuine assistance to countries affected by war.

One example of such new structures is the Lublin Triangle (Ukraine–Poland–Lithuania), which initially had a cultural and historical foundation but, after 2022, transformed into a tool of regional political-security coordination. Another important format is the “Kyiv Initiative”, through which Ukraine collaborates with Eastern European countries to counter hybrid threats. Another example is the strengthening of military-technical cooperation among Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Poland. The “Quadriga” (Ukraine–Turkey format) has evolved into an effective political-security instrument, enhancing bilateral cooperation in defense, intelligence, the military-industrial complex, and regional stability. Military-political cooperation between Kyiv and Ankara within the Quadriga format, along with the implementation of large-scale economic projects, strengthens not only Ukraine and Turkey but also the security of the entire Black Sea region. An important element has also been the revitalization of the Weimar Triangle (Germany – France – Poland), which has begun to be viewed as the foundation of a new security balance in Europe with the participation of NATO’s Eastern flank states.

These alliances lack a full-fledged statutory character, but they offer flexibility, rapid decision-making, and high adaptability to threats, enabling them to respond effectively to a changing security environment. Thus, small-scale security groupings are emerging as alternatives to large institutions, demonstrating the potential for deeper regionalization of international security. In the long run, such alliances may play a key role in the new European security architecture, where priority is given to horizontal interaction, practical coordination of efforts, and a realistic approach to defense and deterrence.

Against the backdrop of the escalating Russia–Ukraine conflict, proposals are increasingly being voiced for the creation of new alliances that would either complement or partially replace the classical NATO model. In particular, the idea of establishing a European defense union without the obligatory involvement of the United States is being discussed, as well as the possibility of coalition formats based on Central and Eastern European countries that share common threats and strategic interests.

Thus, the war in Ukraine has become a catalyst for the formation of a new security paradigm, in which preference is given to flexible, regionally oriented structures that can quickly adapt to environmental changes. These new alliances not only complement existing institutions but also create the potential for an alternative security architecture – one that is more effective, realistic, and able to act proactively.

Global Consequences of the War

Russia's aggression against Ukraine is not merely a conflict between two states, but also a profound systemic challenge to the architecture of international security, the rule of law, and the balance of geopolitical influence in the world. The Russian-Ukrainian war, which escalated into a full-scale confrontation in February 2022, has significant global consequences that reach far beyond Eastern Europe.

First and foremost, the war in Ukraine has become a watershed moment for the entire system of international law. The open violation of the UN Charter, the Budapest Memorandum, and other international agreements demonstrated that the fundamental

principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of aggression no longer guarantee security on their own. This has called into question the effectiveness of international institutions that are unable to hold an aggressor state accountable.

Secondly, the conflict marked a turning point in rethinking the international security order, casting doubt on the effectiveness of traditional institutions of collective security, particularly the UN, the OSCE, and, to some extent, NATO. Global security structures have proven incapable of responding swiftly and effectively to blatant violations of international law, which has accelerated the formation of alternative or supplementary security alliances. Regional security initiatives reflect the fragmentation and multipolarity of the modern world. A new generation of alliances is emerging, operating in parallel with or outside traditional structures such as the UN or OSCE.

The third key consequence is geoeconomic destabilization. The war triggered an energy crisis in Europe, disruptions in food supply, rising prices for grain, oil, and gas, as well as a surge in global inflation. Countries of the Global South were particularly vulnerable to these challenges, intensifying debates about global justice and the need for reform of international economic institutions. Western sanctions against Russia have transformed global supply chains, energy security, and financial stability. In response, Moscow deepened its integration with China and other authoritarian regimes, contributing to the formation of an alternative economic zone outside the Western orbit.

A fourth important aspect is the ideological confrontation between democracies and autocracies. The war has become a point of polarization, forcing states to clearly define their stance on fundamental values: sovereignty, the rule of law, and freedom. At the same time, Europe's drive toward strategic autonomy in defense has intensified, reshaping the balance of influence within the transatlantic partnership. Ukraine has become a symbol of the struggle for freedom, sovereignty, and the right to self-determination, while its resistance to Russian aggression serves as a test of the free world's ability to defend the foundations of international law and order. The success or failure of Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences for future conflicts worldwide – from Taiwan to the Middle East.

Overall, the Russian-Ukrainian war has become a trigger for:

- a) intensifying competition between democracies and authoritarian regimes;
- b) deepening regional conflicts due to the weakening influence of the UN;
- c) transforming the institutional and security configuration of the global order;
- d) shaping a new world order in which the West and China strengthen their positions, while Russia gradually loses its status as a significant global player.

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian war is not only a regional European conflict, but also a global challenge that is transforming international relations, geoeconomic processes, the institutional dimensions of the modern world order, and the architecture of global security. It is a global conflict with systemic consequences for the 21st century. These consequences are already defining the contours of a new world order, one built on principles of effectiveness, solidarity, and resilience in the face of threats.

Conclusions

We conclude that the events in Ukraine at the turn of 2013 and 2014, in particular the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and its sudden rejection by Ukrainian society and partners, the European Revolution, the new Ukrainian Maidan, and the Revolution of Dignity, triggered a mechanism for resetting power and had colossal value. The prospect of Ukraine's real withdrawal from Russia's integration orbit triggered a powerful and complex reaction from the Kremlin. This was reflected in Russia's hybrid intervention, the annexation of Crimea, and the creation of a real threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. In defiance of this challenge, Ukraine began strengthening its defense capabilities, renounced its non-aligned status, and recognized Russia as an aggressor state.

Russia's aggressive and annexationist policy towards Ukraine since 2014 clearly demonstrated its desire to strengthen its position in the dynamic system of international relations at the beginning of the 21st century. "Putin's Wars" (Herpen, 2015), and especially the "Battle for Ukraine" (Felshtinsky & Stanchev, 2015), were intended to contribute to the rebirth of the Russian Federation's regional and global leadership in the post-bipolar international system. This led to the activation of Russia's foreign

policy in all directions, especially in the sphere of restoring influence in the post-Soviet space. The hybrid and unconventional methods of implementing such a policy, followed by the transition to full-blown aggression against Ukraine, led official Moscow to a dead end. At the same time, Russia's openly expansionist policy towards Ukraine should serve as a profound lesson for the Ukrainian state and society for the future.

Ukraine's current period of independence has become, on the one hand, a powerful challenge and a test of its strength and historical perspective. On the other hand, it has become a player in both European (regional) and global (world) history. The aggressive war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has been ongoing for over nine years, since February 20, 2014. It has undergone two phases: I – a hybrid war from February 20, 2014, to February 23, 2022; and II – a full-scale war, which has been ongoing since February 24, 2022. For the West (primarily NATO and EU member states), this war can be considered a hybrid World War III that has been ongoing for over nine years (Gorbulin, 2017). It was preceded by Russia's contemporary Cold War against NATO and the EU (initiated by Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Forum on February 10, 2007). At the same time, for Ukraine, the war unleashed by Russia is a 21 st-century war of national liberation. In this war, Ukraine defends not only its independence, core existential values, and democratic choice, but also pan-European principles, rights, and freedoms, as well as the current international legal foundations of the modern world order.

The Russian Federation's hybrid aggression against Ukraine (since February 20, 2014) and its subsequent transformation into a large-scale war (since February 24, 2022) have effectively marked the beginning of a major transformation of the post-bipolar system of international relations, which took shape in its main features after the collapse of the USSR and the global socialist system in 1991. Russia unilaterally threatened not only Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity but also began dismantling the entire international legal structure of the modern world order. Consequently, its aggressive actions provoked a reaction of resistance not only from the Ukrainian state and society but also led to sanctions from most of the world

community. This is evidenced by the individual and sectoral sanctions against Russia, Russian companies, legal entities, and individuals introduced in 2014 (and particularly since the end of February 2022). Between 2014 and 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted 14 resolutions on the restoration of Ukraine's full territorial integrity and sovereignty within the borders recognized by the 1991 international law.

It can be argued that a powerful international coalition was gradually emerging, intended to aid Ukraine and ensure its victory in the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian war. EU and NATO member states formed the basis of this coalition, with the USA, Poland, and the United Kingdom occupying leading positions, along with significant assistance from France, Germany, Turkey, Italy, Lithuania, Estonia, Canada, and Australia. Victory over Russian militarism requires further consolidation of military, informational, economic, diplomatic, and legal actions. This applies to both Ukraine and its allies and partners worldwide. Only such a "collective Ramstein" will guarantee Ukraine's victory, the punishment of those responsible for Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its crimes (Bunyak, 2023), the deoccupation of all Ukrainian territories, the reconstruction of Ukraine, and the creation of a new international (European and global) security configuration. Summarizing the general outline and analysis of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, we will outline its significance for the development prospects of Ukraine, Europe, and the world. The Ukrainian perspective envisions the complete deoccupation of territory, the achievement of security guarantees through full membership in NATO and the EU, and the transformation of Ukraine into a powerful regional player. The European perspective should be based on the awareness of all European actors of the primacy of security principles and the foundations for the development of mutually beneficial vertical and horizontal relations in the economic, financial, scientific, and technological spheres. The global perspective should envision the further comprehensive development of an interdependent world based on precise adherence to international law and interstate interactions as the foundation of a new architecture of the world order.

A Ukrainian victory in the war against Russia thus opens the way to achieving peace at local, regional, and global levels. A Ukrainian victory would halt Russian

aggression, massacres, and the destruction of infrastructure and civilian facilities, and create a basis for negotiations at all levels. At the same time, as Ukrainian scholars rightly note, “achieving lasting peace is possible either by destroying the enemy as an effective force or by incorporating it into one's system of power through subjugation or enslavement. In this case, the subject of action loses its identity and will” (Parakhonskyy & Yavorska, 2022). The realities of Kyiv-Moscow relations require the development and practical implementation of radically different conceptual, tactical, and strategic approaches to coexistence with modern Russia. At the same time, the goal is not only to achieve a Russian-Ukrainian understanding but also to conclude and sign comprehensive peace and security agreements within the framework of establishing a new international and global legal system that guarantees reliable protection against aggression for all members of global society. This means that Ukraine’s victory in the Russian-Ukrainian war will have a direct consequence in expanding the space of democratic peace and strengthening regional and global security.

CHAPTER 7.

THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS A FACTOR FOR RECONFIGURING NEO-POST-BIPOLARITY

Introduction

On February 20, 2014, the Russian Federation launched a war against Ukraine, disrupting the international security system in Europe and posing a real threat of further Russian expansion into the continent. This is the first major continental war on the European continent since World War II. The realities of the “hybrid war”, demonstrated by Russia since 2014, have revealed the radically different nature of modern warfare – a combination of sabotage and diversionary actions, “proxy wars”, large-scale armed conflicts, and so on. February 24, 2022, marked the beginning not only of a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war but also of a new geopolitical reality.

In this context, the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2024 should be considered a postponed Great European War, marking the final transition to a new-neo-postbipolar system of international relations. This war has already become the most significant and devastating armed conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. It triggered a political, diplomatic, military, and socio-economic tsunami, significantly reconfiguring the post-bipolar international order that existed after the end of the Cold War, the decline of bipolarity, and the collapse of the communist bloc. It is currently impossible to precisely outline the changes in the international arena that the contemporary Russian-Ukrainian war will bring about; however, it should be recognized as a turning point in terms of triggering such transformations.

At the same time, theorists and practitioners of international relations are paying particular attention to the confrontation and escalation of interactions, as exemplified by the emergence of hybrid war between Russia and Ukraine, which subsequently transformed into a full-scale war, as well as the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism in the contemporary world. Western European researcher Marcel von Herpen analyzes “Putin's wars” in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine as a manifestation of the Russian Federation's expansionist policy and a significant factor contributing to

instability in Europe (Marcel H. Van Herpen, 2014). Polish international professor Stanisław Belen writes directly about the growing turmoil in the contemporary world, influenced by the confrontation between the leading actors in the global political arena (Bieleń, 2021). A number of scholars, including Ukrainian, Polish, and American, have drawn attention to the emergence of a “Ukrainian hybrid front” (Gorbulin, 2017; Małkiewicz & Szymaniec 2023) and the threat of its transformation into a new armed world war (Felshtinsky & Stanczew, 2022; Bartosiak & Zychowicz, 2023). Under these conditions, the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism has significantly intensified. Moreover, the risks and threats to liberal-democratic progress have become so great that, for example, Polish diplomat Professor Roman Kuźniar speaks of the “twilight of liberal democracy” (Kuźniar, 2022). This new deterioration was directly influenced by the outbreak of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. Scholars, mainly Ukrainian, Polish, and German scholars, define it as a modern war against the Russian expansionist Leviathan, in which the victory of the pro-Ukrainian forces of Democracy and Freedom requires their consolidation (Rüdiger von Fritsch, 2022; Bruszewski & Kozubel & Szopa, 2023; Przebinda, 2023; Troyan, 2023; Wojczal, 2023).

In this regard, direct Russian armed aggression against Ukraine has become a new challenge for Ukrainian and European society, given the ineffectiveness of institutional and legal mechanisms for influencing the aggressor country in the form of the nuclear-military Russian state. At the same time, the 2014-2024 Russian-Ukrainian war significantly exacerbated not only regional (European) but also global international relations. Thus, it directly caused turmoil and transformed the entire international system of the post-bipolar era. This research aims to examine the impact of more than a decade of Russian aggression against Ukraine on the reconfiguration of neo-post-bipolar international relations.

The Concept of Post-Bipolarity

In today's circumstances, Russia's hybrid and armed aggression against Ukraine has become a turning point in terms of actor-network relations in the international

arena: firstly, the expansion of the Russian Federation has disrupted existing international legal norms; secondly, NATO has expanded and the European Community has consolidated, based on the creation of the European Political Community, which includes both EU members and non-EU countries; thirdly, Ukraine, as the main target of Russia's treacherous expansion, has been given the prospect of European and Euro-Atlantic integration by becoming a candidate for EU membership and applying for NATO membership; fourth, the war exposed the ineffectiveness of international institutions (including the UN and OSCE) and existing regional and global security instruments, and the initiative is now shifting to informal or specially established groups and associations – the G7, G20, AUKUS (Australia, Great Britain, and the USA Security Union), QSD/QUAD (Strategic Dialogue on Security Issues in the Indo-Pacific Region between Australia, India, Japan, and the USA), I2U2 or West Asian QUAD or QUAD 2.0 (Platform for Cooperation between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the USA in the areas of economy, transport, food, healthcare, security, and space), and finally – UDCG Ramshteyn – the Ukrainian Defense Contact Group.

The destruction of one international system inevitably leads to the emergence of another, formed through a long process of historical development; they never arise or disappear at once. The destruction and collapse of international systems is a rather long and complex process. This is due to the differentiation of power, which gradually “shifts” from higher hierarchical levels of the system to lower ones. With each new cycle of international system evolution, the interdependence of states and the strengthening of their bonds increased, the influence of global centers grew, the importance of structural opportunities and constraints increased, and various parameters of the system's functioning were qualitatively defined.

The transition from Yalta-Potsdam to the post-bipolar system of international relations was quite ambiguous and, in this sense, is characterized by the term “unfinished deconstruction” (Shapovalova, 2014, 94–107). The conditions of the transition to post-bipolarity did not provide a clear understanding of the likely political configuration of the new international system. It was difficult, if not futile, to focus on

the deployment of strong potential. In the new, complex context, there was no perceived single systematic resource capable of determining the subjective capabilities of actors in the almost automatic manner that military forces had performed in previous eras. This is primarily due to a lack of clarity regarding the objects around which and based on which new relational complexes will be created, structuring the global system of international relations.

The Western community's possession of material attributes of power has not yet granted it the status of a unique global hegemon and has not transformed the global system into a monopoly structure. Moreover, the West, led by the USA, must make considerable efforts to build and repair stable international structures. Instead, this situational “moment of monopoly” (Krauthammer, 1991) lies in the fact that the West had significant opportunities to build such structures, primarily due to the presence of an effective, extensive, and institutionalized mechanism of cooperation. The liberal order in Western society not only stabilized its internal organization but also served as an effort to justify and legitimize its dominant position in the global system. Therefore, the project, affirmation, and consolidation of its own dominance in the global system becomes a key motivating factor for the United States and its Western European allies. The primary tool for implementing these aspirations was the dissemination of the basic principles of the liberal order on a global scale (Ikenberry, 2010, 536).

Two terms are most often used to generally describe the interconnectedness and interdependence of processes occurring in world politics after the fall of the Iron Curtain: “post-bipolar international system” or international relations “after the end of the Cold War”. The first term, “post-bipolar international system”, emphasizes the decline of dualism in international politics after the collapse of the USSR as a superpower. The United States remains the sole superpower, although certain elements of superpower characterize influential actors in contemporary international relations. Primarily, we are talking about the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the European Union. In his article “One Superpower” (Huntington, 1999), the renowned American international scholar S. Huntington even proposed considering the “post-Cold War” international system (Kuźniar, 2011; Trojan, 2014) as a model

combined in the format of a “unipolar-multipolar world”, in which US dominance borders on a polycentric conglomeration of other countries. In the second case – the system of international relations “after the end of the Cold War” – the key to assessing the current state of international relations is to emphasize the disappearance of key dividing lines in the arena of global politics: between socialism and capitalism, between state regulation and the market economy, and finally between the USSR and the USA. Hence, according to R. Haas, president of the US Council on Foreign Relations, the contemporary world can be interpreted as “non-polar”, in which power is distributed among numerous but “relatively equal” centers of power (Haass, 2008). Over time, after the end of the Cold War, at least four such competing centers distinguished themselves from bloc confrontation by taking into account political, economic, military, and resource influence – the USA, China, the EU, and Russia.

It is easy to see that both concepts – the post-bipolar international system and international relations “after the end of the Cold War” – share common points of contact. This generally allows them to be used as synonyms and makes them the most popular when choosing a general, comprehensive definition of the contemporary system of international relations. However, as Ukrainian researcher A. Shapovalova rightly points out, the nature and structure of the international relations system after the collapse of bipolarity have generated considerable scholarly debate. The uncertainty of the basic distributional features of the modern system, the inability to fit it into any typical models of international systems, the lack of a clear hierarchy of actors, and ultimately the presence of many specific, somewhat unique, trends seriously complicate the study of the post-bipolar system, requiring qualitatively different theoretical and methodological tools of scientific analysis (Trojan & Kyrydon, 2021). Furthermore, the empirical material for scientific research is expanding over time, revealing previously hidden trends that, in many cases, extend beyond established analytical frameworks and even directly contradict them (Shapovalova, 2014, p. 34). However, in our opinion, the more than thirty-year period of international relations after the global systemic transformations of 1989–1991, the fall of communism, and

the destruction of the USSR is not uniform. It clearly proceeds through several fundamental stages.

Stages of Post-Bipolarity and the Transition to Neo-Post-Bipolarity

The first stage – the years 1991–2005 – can be conceptually and terminologically defined as post-bipolar. It was characterized by a shift away from the confrontational bipolar world toward the creation of a consensus-based, systemic international model based on cooperation while maintaining the influence of the superpower represented by the United States. Following the collapse of the USSR and the global communist system, this space was integrated into the modern globalization processes. Regional integration processes, including in Europe, gained new impetus, leading to the creation and strengthening of the European Union. In 2004, the first eastward enlargement of NATO and the EU occurred at the expense of the former Eastern Bloc. The measurement of security cooperation and coordination of joint actions was characterized by the creation of a global anti-terrorist coalition involving the United States and Russia after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

The second stage – from 2005 to 2014 – saw intensified confrontation, the transition to a new Cold War, and the “rise of the others”. This period was characterized by a transition to a crisis in the multipolar world of international politics, consisting of, first, the strengthening of the role of several international actors – the European Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian Federation; second, the increase in security threats and challenges related in particular to the outbreak of the revolutionary events of the Arab Spring in the countries of the Greater Middle East in 2010–2013 and their diverse consequences; Third, the erosion of the existing international legal order as a result of Russia's imperialist expansionist policy, which found expression in the wars with Georgia (2008) (Kyrydon & Troyan, 2009; Marcel H. Van Herpen, 2014) and Ukraine (since 2014) (Felshtinsky & Stanczew, 2015; Bartosiak & Zychowicz, 2023; Troyan, 2023).

The third stage has been ongoing since 2014 and can be described as neo-postbipolar. It is characterized by a further increase in the conflict-proneness of the

international system, a crisis in global and regional security systems, the chaos of international relations, and the eventual transition to a new or second Cold War, which some researchers even call a “global hybrid war” (V. Horbulin, M. Stanchev, Yu. Felshtynskiy) (Gorbulin, 2017; Felshtinsky & Stanchev, 2022).

In accordance with various paradigms of international relations, a number of attempts have been made to develop a conceptual model of the international system, taking into account both material and ideological factors. The most promising among them is the constructivist model of G. Sorensen, who, in his publications, explores the role of material, ideological, and institutional factors in the transformation of the world order in the post-bipolar period through the prism of their impact on the nature of statehood and the differentiation of states based on the nature of their statehood. Based on these considerations, G. Sorensen in his article “What Kind of International Order?” (Sørensen, 2006) proposes considering the modern international system as a combination of four aspects: the military-political balance of power between states, the architecture of international institutions, the sphere of ideas and ideology, and the economic sphere of production, finance, and the redistribution of benefits. However, having isolated and considered these aspects independently, G. Sorensen has not developed a clear model for their synthesis into a holistic vision. Furthermore, he views the dominance of the Western liberal project in the global system as a fact. However, he also recognizes that building a stable world order based on the principles of liberal democracy requires completing a number of complex tasks and reconciling material, ideological, and institutional factors (Sørensen, 2006, 359).

The Russian Federation's hybrid aggression against Ukraine (since February 20, 2014) and its subsequent transformation into a large-scale war (since February 24, 2022) effectively marked the beginning of a significant transformation of the post-bipolar system of power. International relations, which fundamentally took shape after the collapse of the USSR and the global socialist system (1991), have been shaped by Russia's single-handed approach, not only threatening Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity but also beginning to dismantle the entire international legal structure of the contemporary world order. Its aggressive actions have provoked a

corresponding reaction of resistance not only from the Ukrainian state and society but also triggered sanctions pressure from the democratic part of the world community. This is evidenced by the individual and sectoral sanctions introduced since 2014 (and especially since the end of February 2022) against Russia, Russian companies, legal entities, and individuals, as well as the support for 14 resolutions (adopted between 2014 and 2023) by the UN General Council (GA) on the restoration of Ukraine's complete territorial integrity and sovereignty within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 (Sullivan & Bowman, 2023).

The entire historical evolution of international relations vividly illustrates the transformative power of major armed conflicts, which inevitably contribute to the formation of a new international order and its security dimension. At the same time, the terms of peace and the vectors of development of the new world order are dictated by the victorious states. The Russian-Ukrainian war has every chance of going down in history as a significant factor in the transformation of the contemporary world order. It has become the most devastating conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. Professor Gi-Wook Shin notes that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has triggered “a geopolitical storm that is triggering seismic shifts in the international order”. It is difficult to predict all aspects of this war's impact on the international legal order. However, it is highly likely that “the Russia-Ukraine war will become a major turning point, just as the Cold War began in 1945 and the era of globalization began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991” (Gi-Wook Shin, 2022).

Contemporary neo-postbipolar relations, characterized by a fragile equilibrium, clearly emphasize the transformation of the global international order into a “post-American world” (as defined by American political scientist F. Zakaria). In his work of the same title, he highlighted the critical dynamics of relations between old and new actors at the global level (Zakaria, 2008). In this context, the question of how other states might react to the reduction or even a fundamental overhaul of the United States' role and influence in the international arena remains open. This implies nothing less than relative instability and further shifts in the restructuring of the entire contemporary system of international relations under the influence of transformative evolution and

changes in the world of “post-international politics” (according to J. Rosenau) (Rosenau, 1990).

The consequence of this, at the contemporary stage of international relations' evolution “after the Cold War”, was the so-called Second Cold War. The term has been used since 2010 to describe the political, economic, military, and other confrontations between the European Union and the United States on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. Yu. Ryzhov, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes that the fundamental difference in the contemporary Cold War is that it is taking place in the context of a new type of war – hybrid warfare. In August 2015, he pointed out that the Russian authorities, by launching aggression against Ukraine, had led Russia into a historical and strategic trap, and Cold War II was approaching its climax (Trojan & Kyrydon, 2020, 81). At the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, the “season of competition” between the West and Russia for influence began again, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The further evolution of the entire system of international relations in the neo-postbipolar world and the directions of its transformation from a system of confrontation to one of cooperation remain open. We consider the forward-looking approach of French political scientist B. Badie to understanding the future world order (Badie, 2019) to be crucial. In particular, the “power game” that is the Russian-Ukrainian war is hopeless and destructive. The contemporary international order can no longer be governed by a small club of influential global players who exclude the weaker, ignore their demands, and disregard the need for justice and compliance with international law norms.

Conclusions

Fundamentally, post-bipolar international relations have shifted from a monopolistic configuration to a gradual construction of neo-post-bipolar multipolarity over the course of three decades of evolution. At the same time, the contemporary international system provided powerful preconditions for both geopolitical polarization and a transition to more balanced mechanisms of global governance. However, by the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, the fact that the transformational tendencies

of the neo-post-bipolar international relations system were clearly changing due to the escalation of conflicts, particularly under the influence of the destructive force of the 2014–2025 Russian-Ukrainian war, found its expression in the course of international processes in the transformation of contemporary international relations from the post-bipolar, consensual, and cooperative character of the post-World War II era. The Cold War (1991–2005), which was increasingly conflict-prone, led to a return to the New Cold War (2006–2014), and then to a neo-post-bipolar one amidst growing chaos in the international arena, especially under the decisive influence of Russian aggression against Ukraine, especially after it entered the phase of full-scale war on February 24, 2022. The Russian-Ukrainian war exposed the inefficiency, phantom nature, and excessive bureaucratization of the current international system.

In the contemporary context of the “twilight of liberal democracy” confronted with authoritarian regimes, crises, and wars of the neo-post-bipolar era, this signifies nothing less than relative instability and further restructuring of the entire system of international relations. This trend has perspectives rooted in historical experience, which indicates not only the mandatory multiplicity of real political entities and the alternative nature of the global political process, but also the short-lived nature of overt domination. According to I. Wallerstein's analysis, the ability of a hegemonic state to impose its will on other major states is limited to 25–50 years (Vallerstayn, 2003). Today, other centers of globalization are emerging and gradually gaining strength, particularly the People's Republic of China and the EU, while Russia, faced with a sharp armed conflict and sanctions, is striving to create an anti-American/anti-Western coalition. All this suggests that, from a strategic perspective (15–20 years), the transformation of the contemporary system of international relations will proceed toward the formation of polycentrism, while maintaining conflict-generating potential at the global, regional, and peripheral levels. This will be coupled with the desire of some influential players – entities in the international system – to dominate in the event of a possible decline or diminution in the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of other international actors.

CHAPTER 8.

THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR 2014–2025: INTERFERENCE FACTORS OF THE WAR

Introduction

The Russian Federation's hybrid aggression against Ukraine (since 20 February 2014) and its subsequent escalation into a large-scale war (since 24 February 2022) have factually marked the beginning of a major transformation of the post-bipolar system of international relations, which was formed in the main after the collapse of the USSR and the world system of socialism (1991). Russia has single-handedly endangered not only Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity but has also begun to dismantle the entire international legal structure of the modern world order. Its aggressive steps provoked a response of resistance not only from the Ukrainian state and society, but also led to sanctions pressure from the vast majority of the international community. This is evidenced by the individual and sectoral sanctions imposed since 2014 (and especially since the end of February 2022) against Russia, Russian companies, legal entities and individuals, and the support of the UN General Assembly for 14 resolutions (adopted in 2014–2023) on the restoration of Ukraine's full territorial integrity and sovereignty within the internationally recognised borders of 1991 (Sullivan & Bowman, 2023). Understanding the role and significance of the Ukrainian struggle against Russian aggression (and especially at the stage of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war) brings the issue to the forefront and leads to many important consequences for Ukraine and the world.

Being in the zone of objective response, amid tumultuous and life-changing events for Ukraine, Europe, and the world, it is clear that it is still difficult to make in-depth generalisations. At the same time, the specific features of war perception that are relevant to our time need to be adequately identified and recorded for further comprehension and theoretical construction. Existent meanings, unlike material artefacts, are fleeting and changeable. Therefore, the "experience of direct observation" during the war appears to be indispensable for the researcher. The sets of meanings

associated with the war will continue to be modified and transformed into sustainable narratives (the latter ensure the continuity of collective memory and are aimed at maintaining the identity of communities). Therefore, it is inevitable that the understanding of the meaning of events by those who write history and the perceptions of those who create it will differ. Given these observations, we offer a few reflections.

Due to the incompleteness of the war and the current course of events, as well as their impact on regional and global processes, the declared issues have found only partial or situational reflection in the scientific discourse. This is also evidenced by the historiography of the problem. Dutch political scientist and expert on Eastern European security, M.H. Van Herpen (2016), and Ukrainian historian and political scientist Ye. Mahda (2017) considered the factors of Russian President V. Putin's wars in general and specifically the Russian-Ukrainian war only in relation to the initial stage of Russia's hybrid aggression against Ukraine. The well-known American political scientist and journalist F. Zakaria (2021), who devoted his investigation to the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic, which chronologically coincided with the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, however, does not directly interconnect these events. At the same time, a comprehensive approach to understanding the impact of global and regional crises, including the Russian-Ukrainian war, on the current world order is of great practical and scientific importance in the future. The analysis of the aspects of the full-scale stage of Russian aggression by Ukrainian and foreign authors is marked by a list of individual lessons, brevity of presentation and argumentation (Korsunskyy, 2022; Sasse, 2022; Volt, 2023). The global and regional dimensions of Russia's war against Ukraine have been partially addressed by foreign and Ukrainian scholars in collective monographs (Bodak *et al.*, 2022; Bocancea, 2023). The authors of the proposed article have also revealed a range of meanings of the Russian-Ukrainian war in their publication in the book "The Turning Point" (Kyrydon & Troyan, 2023). Thus, while the historiographical base is growing, as noted by T. Sydoruk (2023), a researcher of Eastern European integration and security issues, not all factors of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine have been considered.

The purpose of this study was to systematise and summarise the main factors of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and to highlight their significance from the Ukrainian, European, and global perspectives. The scientific originality of this study lies in the comprehension and systematisation of the basic factors of the full-scale stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war with the emphasis and analysis of military-historical, state-identity, integration and security, and historical and prospective aspects.

The complexity of the problem under study necessitates the use of a wide range of methodological research tools. The principle of the methodology of understanding (according to M. Weber) was chosen as the basic methodological tool for understanding the experience and nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the main cognitive strategy. To understand the complex and multifaceted processes of Russia's war against Ukraine, the methodology of interpretive research was chosen. Using the method of historiographical analysis, the author examines the vision of the problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the modern scientific discourse for 1991–2025. The method of historiographical synthesis is used to systematise the position of different points of view, to identify current trends in the understanding of political scientists, historians, sociologists, and researchers of other scientific fields of the current political situation in Eastern Europe. The use of the historical-comparative method in its two modules (synchronous and asynchronous) made it possible to compare the policies, rhetoric, and peacekeeping initiatives of different countries during the hybrid and full-scale stages of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The historical and genetic method helped to analyse the origins of the modern attitude towards the events of the Ukrainian-Russian war in the world, its development and impact on Ukrainian and European society. To systematise and structure the main aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025 at the national and supranational levels, the author's uses the systemic and structural-functional methods. The use of such a complex of scientific research methods contributed to a comprehensive disclosure of the problem of scientific research.

Military and historical factors

The full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war confirms the fact that the era of great wars is not a thing of the past. The official Kremlin's attempts to defeat Ukraine with lightning speed and impose capitulation under the guise of "peace" on Russia's terms have failed completely. The substantial advantage in artillery, armoured vehicles, military aircraft and helicopters, warships and submarines, as well as in manpower, did not give Moscow the desired effect or advantage. The steadfast and heroic resistance of Ukrainians has substantially weakened the military potential/number of Russian troops. As of 2025, the Ukrainian army has virtually destroyed the personnel of the Russian military, which is one and a half times the number of almost 200,000 at the beginning of the full-scale aggression on February 24, 2022. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – the General Staff of the AFU) (as of 20. 10. 2023), over 292 thousand Russian occupiers were killed, which is almost a third of the personnel that the Russian army had at the beginning of the full-scale aggression. More than 5,000 tanks and 9,500 armoured combat vehicles, over 7,000 artillery systems, and almost 5,500 air defence systems, as well as nearly 650 combat aircraft and attack helicopters, were also destroyed by the enemy (Smutok, 2023). The Armed Forces of Ukraine are much more powerful in all respects than they were a year ago, thanks specifically to the support of Ukraine's foreign allies and partners. This conclusion is also based on the latest data from the Global Firepower military power rankings: Ukraine rose from 22 nd place in 2022 to 15 th in 2023 (Global Firepower, 2023).

The war imposed by Russia combines elements of traditional conflicts of the 20th century, but at the same time is completely new due to the use of modern digital technologies that broadcast "war online". Modern warfare at the stage of hybrid aggression, and then the full-scale phase of hostilities, has all the hallmarks of the so-called fourth generation or network-centric wars. Its characteristics include the use of high precision "smart" weapons, organisation and conduct of hostilities through information and computer networks, psychological operations and cyberattacks, the disappearance of boundaries between the categories of war and peace, front and rear,

armed forces and paramilitary formations, etc. Thus, scholars have even defined the Russian-Ukrainian war as “the first world war of the Internet age” (Bocancea, 2023). Russia is waging a war of words against Ukraine to destroy the vital functions of the Ukrainian state and society.

For the first time in history, a large-scale war became available in real time to millions of viewers through television channels and social media (Kuleba, 2019). The American historian T. Snyder (2022) noted that “the provision of the latest Western weapons, ammunition, and constant financial aid from Ukrainian allies and partners became possible because citizens of the free world were well informed about the crimes... committed by Russian terrorist forces on Ukrainian territory”. This has influenced public opinion in many leading countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and South Korea. That is why Ukraine has been able to receive such unprecedented support from both Western allies and partner states from virtually all parts of the world.

The asymmetry of the potentials (including military) of the parties should be considered a feature of the current Russian-Ukrainian war as a fourth-generation war, already at the stage of hybrid warfare, and then a full-scale armed conflict. However, such asymmetry does not necessarily mean directly proportional consequences. Economically powerful and militarily stronger international actors do not always win in a war of conquest. In this sense, the “special military operation” organised by the Russian president turned out to be a strategic failure in almost all respects.

Despite the lack of sufficient weapons at the first stage of the war, Ukrainian defenders have demonstrated high morale and professionalism since the first days of the full-scale aggression. Relying exclusively on hard power and appropriate rhetoric in the information sphere, nuclear blackmail and the use of terrorist methods, unjustified killings of civilians, and destruction of civilian infrastructure did not help Russia gain an advantage. The military invasion of Ukraine, which was planned by the Russian state and political leadership and military commanders as a lightning-fast triumphal march, turned into a threat of total defeat for them, especially in the context of the growth of Western military aid to Ukraine. At the same time, only joint further

comprehensive (military, political, diplomatic, sanctions) actions by Ukraine and its allies and partners in the anti-Putin coalition can help defeat the Russian aggressor, facilitate the complete de-occupation of Ukrainian territory, and avert the threat of an expanding armed conflict, including its escalation into a nuclear one.

The policy of appeasement of the aggressor, as in previous times (specifically on the eve of the Second World War), is wrong and ineffective. During its confrontation with Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated to the international community its disregard for international law and the laws of war. That is why any agreement with the Russian dictatorship is unacceptable: it must be defeated. To establish a just and sustainable peace, it is necessary to ensure Ukraine's victory in the war and the support of the democratic international community, aimed at developing comprehensive national, regional, and global security guarantees and preventing the escalation of armed conflicts of varying intensity, such as those that pose an existential threat to peace.

The Director of the Rafik Hariri Centre, V.F. Veksler (2022), noted in August 2022 that “six months of genocide against the people of Ukraine, years of occupation of Ukrainian lands, and a hybrid war against the West have clearly shown that any agreements with the Putin regime are unviable and counterproductive”. Therewith, Russia's leadership openly disregards the existing norms of international law and agreements at the interstate level. Russia is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, violating the basic principle of freedom of navigation, weaponizing food and refugees, and pursuing a policy of energy and nuclear blackmail. Thus, the existential threat created by the Putin regime is of an international nature.

The democratic world's response should be to impose harsh, restrictive sanctions. The main point is to take corresponding actions in relation to the entire (without limitation) Russian energy sector, the Russian nuclear agency, transport, logistics, and financial relations with Russia. Ukraine's allies and partners should finally stop contemplating the so-called “red lines” invented by the Kremlin and maximise both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by supplying more modern air defence systems, long-range weapons systems, and

F - 16 aircraft, among other necessary equipment. This will seriously enhance the prospect of Ukraine regaining control over its temporarily occupied territories much sooner.

State-identity factors

The Russian-Ukrainian war is an expression of the confrontation between the Russian discourse of war and the Ukrainian discourse of peace, based on the direct analogy of “friend-or-foe”. The Russian war paradigm is based not only on the desire to implement the modern neo-imperial idea of geopolitical spatial expansion and return Russia to the status of the USSR during the Cold War. The strategy of Russian military and political thinking is also based on the ideology of the “Russian world” and the complete subordination of Ukraine, without which any “European” Russia is unthinkable. Considering this, as noted by Ukrainian researchers at the National Institute for Strategic Studies B. Parakhonskyi & G. Yavorska (2022), “since 2004, the ruling elite of the Russian Federation has identified its strategic priorities for restoring dominance in the post-Soviet space and began intensively preparing for war with Ukraine and other states: it has been deploying programmes to rearm and modernise its armed forces, while testing the international community’s reaction to possible aggressive actions against neighbouring states”.

However, within the Ukrainian paradigm of peaceful coexistence in the post-establishment world, the very possibility of any considerable conflict with a neighbouring state was excluded. Even before the outbreak of a full-scale war, Russia was not considered as an existential threat. It was only after February 24, 2022 that a paradigm shift in the Ukrainian peace discourse occurred: the war against Russia acquired the national liberation and existential character of an armed struggle for victory on the battlefield, de-occupation of Ukrainian territories, punishment of the aggressor, and Ukraine’s future within the European and Euro-Atlantic integration and security alliances. Russia’s main strategic goal in this war is the destruction of the Ukrainian ethnos and Ukrainian statehood. The impunity of those who started the war leads to negative consequences both for the direct target of the aggression – Ukraine –

and for the entire international legal order of the functioning of the entire system of world politics.

For millions of Ukrainians, the war was a trauma and a collective tragedy. Russian aggression has caused Ukraine enormous losses, as highlighted by Prosecutor General A. Kostin (2023). During the year of armed conflict, over 81,000 civilian objects were damaged and destroyed, including residential buildings (62,000), educational (2,300) and medical (over 450) institutions (2,300); over 4,000 gas and water pipelines and electricity networks were damaged and destroyed. The environmental damage caused by the ongoing war is estimated at 46 billion USD. Since October 2022, Russia has been attacking the energy infrastructure. The war has also affected the private sector of the economy, with a decrease in the number of entrepreneurs in Ukraine (Audretsch *et al.*, 2023). These actions are aimed at deliberately creating unfit living conditions in Ukraine, which is one of the signs of genocide under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.

An essential factor in successfully resisting the Russian invaders is the national unity and consolidation of Ukrainians. This refers to the cohesion of the people, both at the political and psycho-emotional levels (Khraban, 2022), to counteract full-scale aggression and defend state independence and the return of Ukraine's territorial integrity. "The latest Ukrainian history ... will reflect the panorama of cementing the nation and creating a powerful national idea right in the middle of a brutal, bloody war. From Crimea, Ilovaisk, and Donetsk airport to Bucha and Mariupol with unyielding Azovstal, the distance in years appears to be small, but the panorama of confrontation with the enemy is impressive", as Ukrainian scholars V. Gorbulin & V. Badrak (2022) rightly emphasised.

The influence of information and semantic levers, the power of the "propaganda machine" of authoritarian regimes, should not be underestimated. The war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine and Ukrainians is a permanent war of cynically distorted meanings and contents inherent in Orwellian dystopia. For more than two decades of Putin's rule, the influence of the Kremlin's official anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propaganda has led to dramatic changes in the worldview of the majority of Russian

citizens. As a result, it was this that became the decisive moment for Russians to support first a hybrid and then a full-scale war against Ukraine.

One of the important goals of the war unleashed by Russia was to establish comprehensive (total) control over Ukraine, as well as to turn Europe and the entire world into a dystopia. The danger of replacing concepts with contradictory brands and symbols is that this will allow the Russian authoritarian regime to justify its aggressive motives and actions. The Russian leadership has given itself the right to occupy Ukraine, declaring the war a “special military operation”. The Kremlin uses anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric to justify its illegal actions in direct violation of international law and interstate treaties. The government claims that the war it unleashed was a legitimate act of preventive self-defence against neighbours who, by seeking to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, were demonstrating allegedly hostile intentions towards Russia.

Integration and security factors

The Russian-Ukrainian war has radically changed the relations between Ukraine and the European Union and NATO, as well as the prospects for Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration (Sologoub, 2022; Genschel, 2023). The main content of the transformation is the transition from cooperation under the terms of the Association Agreement without the possibility of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union to the official status of a candidate for EU membership on 23 June 2022. Therewith, on 30 September 2022, Ukraine submitted an official application signed by the country’s top political leadership for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation under an accelerated procedure (Report on implementation..., 2022; Kyrydon & Troyan, 2023).

As of 2023, 87 % of Ukrainian citizens supported joining the European Union, and 86% supported joining NATO (Barsukova, 2023). As of mid-2025, 74 % of citizens support Ukraine joining the EU, with the highest levels of support being demonstrated by residents of Kyiv – 82 %, western regions – 80 %, northern regions – 78 %, and central regions – 76 % (Кричковська, 2025). 62 % of Ukrainian citizens are

ready to support joining NATO (Пєрун, 2025). Among the Alliance's real steps in terms of military and political assistance, it is worth noting political support, energy support, funding for medical care for soldiers, rehabilitation of the wounded, etc. In February 2023, at the Ukraine-EU summit in Kyiv, EU leaders confirmed the irreversibility of Ukraine's European integration. At that time, the Ukrainian authorities announced their main expectations regarding the European integration course, including immediate negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU, strengthening of sanctions against the aggressor state, and provision of urgent military assistance to Ukraine, including modern air defence systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, etc.

Although more than a year and a half of full-scale war has united the Western world, it has not eliminated the differences that still exist in it. Specifically, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has actually turned into a kind of Kremlin's fifth column in the EU and NATO, constantly makes statements and strongly supports Russia in its intentions to achieve "peace" on Russia's terms. In fact, this "peace" means not only retaining 20 % of the illegally occupied Ukrainian territories, but also providing Russia with further opportunities to manipulate international law in its interests and disregard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of not only Ukraine but also other neighbouring states. However, despite this position of Orban's Hungary, no substantial sanctions have been imposed on it by the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Kyrydon & Troyan, 2023).

Europe and the world must "mature" to understand the inevitability and necessity of Russia's unconditional defeat in its groundless and treacherous war against Ukraine and abandon the Russia-centric view of Eastern Europe that prevailed until 2022 (Vorburgg & Bluwstein, 2022). The West should be more resolute in its support of the Ukrainian state and make bold strategic decisions in its favour, rather than providing military aid in small increments. Substantial progress in this regard is being made thanks to the activities of the Coalition in Support of Ukraine to Counter Russian Aggression, known as Ramstein Meetings, which currently unites 54 countries. It has become "a true coalition of the free world in support of Ukraine" (Reznikov, 2023).

The powerful security community of more than 140 states that support Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity, with a consolidated West at its core, still does not see a clear prospect of a new global security architecture. What scares it the most (given both the statements of the French president and the rhythms of military cooperation with Ukraine) is the future without Russia as an influential actor in international relations, despite its open act of aggression against Ukraine (Kyrydon & Troyan, 2023).

Ukraine's post-war security is guaranteed by its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Despite the development of cooperation with NATO and the conclusion of the Association Agreement with the EU, Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic and European integration prospects were limited (Report on implementation..., 2022). The explanation was that Ukraine had no prospect of EU membership and only general declarative assurances from NATO of such a possibility in the vaguely distant future. This ambiguity in the position of NATO and EU member states finally convinced the Russian president that in case of a military invasion of Ukraine, the collective West would not provide it with the necessary military, technical, and other assistance. The situation has changed dramatically since Ukraine was granted EU candidate status and applied to join NATO. There is a realistic prospect that after Ukraine's victory in the war, Western countries will continue to pursue an enlargement policy and that Ukraine will be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and the European integration community as soon as possible. As a result, Ukrainian diplomats made every effort, but without success, to receive an invitation to join NATO at the Vilnius Summit in 2023 and at the NATO Summit in Washington (2024) for the 75th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

During the Russian-Ukrainian war, some international organisations, including the UN, proved incapable of acting. The preservation of the UN Security Council in its current form, the Kremlin's veto power and even the presidency of the Russian Federation give official Moscow many opportunities to block many steps of the international community aimed at countering Russia's aggression and war crimes. The Russian-Ukrainian war clearly underscores the need for reforming the UN and its

structures to transform it into a genuine and effective guarantor of peace and security in both regional and global contexts.

An essential factor in a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war is a clear understanding of the threat and danger of nuclear blackmail. This is the first war where a nuclear power has seized through occupation and is holding nuclear facilities – nuclear power plants – of another state. The international community and international institutions designed to guarantee security, including in the field of nuclear energy – the UN, OSCE, and IAEA – were unprepared for Russia's illegal actions. As a result of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine and the Kremlin's threats to use nuclear weapons, it has become clear that nuclear status provokes dictators like Putin to irresponsible steps in the international arena, aggression, and war. This is done both to intimidate other states and to achieve its annexationist goals, specifically with regard to Ukraine. Therefore, the problem of comprehensive control in the nuclear sphere (peaceful and military), denuclearisation of Russia, and possible deprivation of its right to nuclear weapons requires urgent expert, scientific, and theoretical analysis and practical solution.

Historical and prospective factors

Effective and efficient military support and consolidation of the Ukrainian society and the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the key to victory in the war against the Russian occupiers. This will play a key role in expelling them from the territory of Ukraine, protecting European values and returning to the current international legal norms. In total, for example, the US military and economic aid to Ukraine during the term of the Joe Biden Administration exceeded \$ 66 billion (Sokolenko, 2023), and the EU's total contribution to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility (EPF) increased to € 3.6 billion. According to an analysis by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Ukraine ranked third in arms imports in 2022 (Surge in arms..., 2023). This assistance continued in the following years, although there were occasional delays and restrictions. The steady growth of comprehensive military assistance from allies and partners has fundamentally strengthened both Ukraine's

defensive positions and its offensive capabilities to fully de-occupy Ukrainian territory. In the long run, this will not only bring Ukraine's victory in the war closer but will also allow it to preserve its invaluable human resources, as well as material objects and cultural values.

To defeat Russian militarism, it is important to consolidate measures in various areas: military, information, sanctions, cultural, diplomatic, legal, and religious (Kolodnyi & Fylypovych, 2022; Kyrydon & Troyan, 2023; Reznikov, 2023). Consolidation of efforts in this regard became particularly effective after the outbreak of a full-scale Russian war against Ukraine. Notably, Ukraine receives support not only from Western countries, primarily EU and NATO members. Countries and peoples from all continents have become Ukraine's partners in organising a comprehensive response to the Russian invasion and restoring full territorial integrity and sovereignty. According to experts, only such a "collective Ramstein" can be the key to Ukraine's victory, de-occupation, punishment of those responsible for the act of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the crimes it caused" (Bunyak, 2023), rebuilding Ukraine, and creating a new international – European and global – security configuration.

Therewith, as noted by V. Fisanov (2022), the European idea and practices of democracy should be inextricably linked in the Ukrainian state. The researcher draws on the opinion of Denis de Rougemont on the role of medium and small states: "The small state exists to provide a green corner in the world where as many inhabitants as possible can enjoy the status of a citizen. The small state has nothing but true and real freedom, which ideally compensates for the power of the great powers." But now, as the Ukrainian historian very appropriately notes, independence and sovereignty must be reliably protected, and "Ukraine and Ukrainians must be a kind of model for their neighbours, abandoning the shackles of neocolonialism and Machiavellianism and paving their own difficult path to European democracy".

The historical perspective of the democratic component for Ukraine, Europe, and the world should be emphasised. This is particularly important in the context of the overall liberal-democratic development trend. Ukraine's struggle against Russia at the

stage of countering full-scale aggression is becoming crucial for the future pattern in the national (Ukrainian), regional (European), and global dimensions. Ukraine's successes on the battlefield and ultimate victory in the war strengthen democratic forces and their ability to effectively counter the rise of authoritarian manifestations in all spheres of life in the past two decades in both individual countries and regions.

Ukraine's victory on the battlefield also paves the way for peace in both the regional and global dimensions. The Ukrainian victory will not only stop Russian aggression, killings, destruction of infrastructure and civilian objects, but will also lay the foundation for negotiations at all levels. This refers not only to reaching a Russian-Ukrainian understanding, but also to concluding and signing comprehensive peace and security arrangements and agreements within the framework of establishing a new international and global legal order that would guarantee reliable protection against aggression for all members of the international community. Therewith, the violation of the prohibition of war is still the basis of both the current and future international system. This approach concerns not only Russia and counteracting its aggressive policy towards Ukraine but is also aimed at preventing any other state from pursuing its foreign policy goals through expansion and annexation of foreign territories. It is also intended for any state that plans to follow in Russia's footsteps in the future. This means that a decisive rebuff to Russian aggression in Ukraine and Russia's defeat in the illegal war will force states that would consider a similar invasion of another country in the future not to attempt to implement plans that contradict the norms and principles of the current international legal order.

As Ukrainian scholars rightly point out, "achieving sustainable peace is possible either by destroying the enemy as a capable force or by incorporating it into one's system of power, through its subjugation or enslavement. Then the subject of the action is deprived of identity and free will" (Parakhonskyy & Yavorska, 2022). In other words, Ukraine's victory in the Russian-Ukrainian war will have a direct impact on the expansion of the space of democratic peace and strengthening of regional and global security.

International consequences of full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine

In general, Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine was the result of a slow and ineffective response of the guarantor states of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, international institutions, primarily the UN and the OSCE, to Russia's hybrid aggression and annexation of part of Ukrainian territory in February-March 2014. Even then and later, Ukrainian and foreign scholars addressed the Russian Federation's comprehensive violation of international law, including the UN Charter and existing treaties and agreements concluded with Ukraine on a bilateral or multilateral basis in 1991–2013 (Van Herpen, 2016; Mahda, 2017; Felshtinsky & Stanczew, 2022). The sanctions imposed by Western powers were limited and partial and did not affect the main industries and sectors of the Russian economy, primarily the energy and military-technical sectors. Moreover, in the context of military-technical cooperation with Russia, Western states and companies fulfilled their commitments made before February 2014 (Kyrydon & Troyan, 2023).

The negotiation process within the so-called Normandy format involving France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia also proved to be ineffective. The latter actually took part in it on an equal footing with other states, using it to exert direct pressure on Ukraine. Western partners limited themselves to diplomatic attempts to influence the Kremlin but did not discuss the illegality of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, as historians and experts point out, in parallel to the ineffective negotiation process, which eventually reached a deadlock, large-scale programmes of economic cooperation with Russia were implemented (Gorbulin & Badrak, 2022; Kyrydon & Troyan, 2022; Watling *et al.*, 2023). An example of this is the construction of a new branch of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which was supposed to connect Russia and Germany. Its implementation was completed by early 2022, and only the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine led to the veto of the Nord Stream 2 project.

First the hybrid, and then the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine has grave international legal consequences. Scholars have focused primarily on Russia's destruction of the European architecture of international relations, which emerged after

the dismantling of the global socialist system and the collapse of the USSR (Akande, 2022; Bellinger III, 2022; Dib, 2022). At the same time, they point out the strengths and weaknesses of the international legal order that have emerged under the influence of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. “The modern legal order is based on the prohibition of war, even if it is not always fully respected,” emphasises international law judge S. Breyer. “When Putin launched his war, he put this basic principle at risk. But the test of a legal norm, whether national or international, is not only determined by whether it has been violated. It is also determined by the response to its violation... Accordingly, legal consequences are not only aimed at punishing the perpetrator, but also at deterring others from engaging in future violations” (Hathaway, 2023). Therewith, the war unleashed by Russia has also affected a range of other areas, specifically, researchers note the increase in oil prices for the population of not only Europe but also the United States of America (Appiah-Otoo, 2023), the beginning of an artificial food and energy crisis (Behnassi & El Haiba, 2022; Orhan, 2022), a decline in the GDP of EU countries (Liadze, 2023), and the risk of complex vulnerability for the global financial system (Qureshi *et al.*, 2022).

Russia’s conventional full-scale war aimed at destroying Ukraine’s state independence and destroying the material and value foundations of Ukrainian society has also created a powerful existential threat to Europe and the international order. There was even discussion of the end of the “modern global legal order” (Hathaway, 2023). This resulted in a change in the Western paradigm of countering Russian aggression, especially under the influence of national consolidation and the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people. The consolidated fight against Russian aggression was based on four types of response from the Ukrainian and international community. These should include condemnation of the Kremlin’s illegal war, expulsion of Russia from international institutions and sanctions against it, arming Ukraine, and legal and material liability of Russia and its citizens, including the president and other high-ranking officials.

As a result, it was after 24 February 2022 that Ukraine began to receive powerful, comprehensive Western military, technical, humanitarian, financial, and diplomatic

support to successfully fight against Russia. It was for this purpose that the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which includes more than 50 countries, was created. The fundamental result of the full-scale phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine was the general understanding at its initial stage of the necessity of Russia's defeat in the war, as evidenced by the explanations of the American historian T. Snyder and the statement of NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg (Snyder, 2023; Stoltenberg, 2023). Specifically, they addressed Ukraine's crucial role at the present stage in the struggle to preserve democratic human values, overcome authoritarian tendencies, prevent genocidal practices, reduce the risk of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation, eliminate the threat of a slide into chaos in international relations, and restore the basic principles and foundations of the international legal order. In this context, T. Snyder (2023) emphasised: "Ukrainians have given us a chance to turn this century around, a chance for freedom and security that we could not have achieved on our own, no matter who we are. All we must do is help them win". However, the events of the second half of 2023–2025 led to the transition of Russian aggression against Ukraine into a phase of a protracted war of attrition.

Conclusions

To summarise the analysis of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, we will highlight four main aspects: military-historical, state-identity, integration, security, and historical and prospective. In the military-historical context, the key conclusion is that it is both necessary and possible to successfully counteract aggression by a powerful state, namely Russia, within the framework of modern, fourth-generation, asymmetric, network-centric warfare. The focus of the state-identity dimension is on the fact that national unity and the consolidation of Ukrainian society are key factors in successfully countering Russian aggression to preserve Ukraine's independence and full sovereignty within its 1991 borders. The integration and security aspect determines three basic characteristics of Ukraine's current situation and future development: comprehensive assistance from Western countries to wage a successful war against Russia, and Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic perspective, i.e., its

membership in the EU and NATO. Ultimately, the fundamental historical perspective of the full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war is Ukraine's victory and its return to current international legal norms.

The prospective plane of analysing the nature and essence of full-scale Russian aggression from the standpoint of Ukrainian, European, and global development prospects deserves further research. Ukraine's perspective envisages the complete de-occupation of its territory, security guarantees as a result of full membership in NATO and the EU, and Ukraine's transformation into a powerful regional player. The European perspective should be based on the awareness of all European actors of the primacy of security principles and foundations for building vertical and horizontal mutually beneficial relations in the economic, financial, scientific and technical, and other spheres. The global perspective should envisage the development of the world's profound interdependence based on strict adherence to the international legal framework of interstate interactions as the basis for a new architecture of the world order.

Comprehension and generalisation of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine opens a scientific, theoretical, and applied perspective for a comprehensive investigation and development of ways and means to minimise the risks of increasing conflict potential in the system of modern international relations at the interstate, regional, and global levels. Further results of such studies will be based on a broader empirical and theoretical framework but will certainly consider the experience already gained in the field of historical research and understanding of the key factors of the full-scale stage of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS (afterword)

TURBULENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE TWILIGHT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Most often, two terms are used to generally describe the historical course and interdependence of processes in the sphere of world politics after the fall of the “Iron Curtain”: “post-bipolar international system” or international relations “after the end of the Cold War”. In the first case – “post-bipolar international system” – they seek to emphasize the disappearance of dualism in the arena of international politics after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a superpower. The United States remained the only superpower, although some aspects of superpower hood are inherent in influential subjects of modern international relations. Firstly, we are discussing the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the European Union. The famous American researcher and internationalist S. Huntington, in his article “The Single Superpower” (1999), even proposed to consider the international system “after the Cold War” as a combined model in the format of a “uni-multipolar world”, in which the dominance of the USA borders on the polycentric conglomerate of the rest of the countries.

In the second case – the system of international relations “after the end of the Cold War” – the key to assessing the current state of international relations is to focus on the disappearance of the key dividing lines in the arena of world politics: between socialism and capitalism, between state regulation and the market economy, and finally between the USSR and the USA. Hence, according to the president of the US Council on Foreign Relations R. Haas, the modern world can be interpreted as “polarless”, where power is distributed between numerous, but “relatively equal” centers.

It is easy to see that both terms – the post-bipolar international system and international relations “after the end of the Cold War” – have common points of contact. This, as a rule, allows them to be used as synonyms and makes them the most

popular choices when selecting a general, comprehensive definition for the modern system of international relations. However, in our opinion, the more than thirty-year period of functioning of international relations following the global systemic transformations of 1989–1991, the fall of communism, and the dissolution of the USSR is not homogeneous. It clearly traces two basic stages and one transitional stage (or segment).

The first stage – 1991–2005: in a conceptual and terminological sense, it is appropriate to define it as post-bipolar. It was characterized by a departure from the confrontational bipolar world to the creation of a consensual, systemic international model based on cooperation, while maintaining the influence of a superpower, specifically the USA.

The transitional stage – 2005–2014: was characterized by the transition to a crisis-ridden multipolar world of international politics based, firstly, on the strengthening of the role of a certain international actors – the European Union, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation; secondly, on the growth of security risks and challenges, associated in particular with the outbreak of the revolutionary events of the Arab Spring in the countries of the Greater Middle East in 2010–2013 and their diverse consequences; thirdly, on the erosion of the existing international legal order as a result of Russia’s imperial expansionist policy, which found expression in the wars against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014).

The second stage has been ongoing since 2014 and can be defined as neo-post-bipolar. It is marked by a further increase in the conflict-proneness of the international system, a security crisis, the chaos of international relations, and the transition to a new or Second Cold War, which some researchers even refer to as a “global hybrid war” (V. Gorbulin, M. Stanchev, Yu. Felshtynsky).

The Belgian scientist A. Samuel, in his book “The New World Landscape”, even believes that humanity has already entered a “new international world”. The American scientist J. Rosenau, in his work “Turbulence in World Politics”, spoke of the “world of post-international politics”. First of all, we are talking about the politics of a “split world”, where two simultaneously interdependent and irreconcilable fields have

formed. On the one hand, these are traditional interstate relations, which are determined by the “laws” of classical diplomacy and strategy; on the other hand, the interaction of “actors outside sovereignty”, that is, non-state subjects of international relations or state ones that have gone beyond the existing international legal order. The relationships between these two groups of international actors are complex and have a web-like structure. This means that any shock in one of the areas immediately resonates in the others, regardless of the boundaries between domestic and international processes, which, although leveled, persist.

J. Rosenau notes that the world of “post-international politics” is characterized by chaos and unpredictability, the distortion of identity, and the reorientation of traditional ties of authority and loyalty. In other words, the growth of the number of participants introduces significant uncertainty into the system of international relations. Therefore, ensuring the military security of states remains an urgent task. Added to this are the challenges associated with the growing influence of integration and globalization processes, the stakes in economic competition, the problems of international terrorism, and other issues. At the same time, it is necessary to pay special attention to the fact that in the modern world, the current concepts and structures of confrontational security are constantly being transformed into concepts and structures of security based on cooperation. This aspect characterizes the complex interplay and interdependence of national and international aspects of security. A new understanding and interest in each subject are emerging, aimed at ensuring national security through strengthened international security. However, such an understanding, even in the light of modern challenges and threats, is not a panacea for the traditional arbitrariness of powerful state actors in the international arena. One of the latest examples is the annexationist and militaristic policy of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine, which has actually destroyed the security and political consensus of the post-bipolar era and brought international relations to the level of chaos and an increase in the risk of a major global war.

The speed and depth of changes in such a “world of post-international politics” have at least three main consequences.

First, there has been a transition from a bipolar world to a complex or, to some extent, transitional non-post-bipolar world. “Network” theorists (primarily J. Rosenau and the couple A. and D. Anderson) especially emphasize that in the modern world, everything is so intertwined that a return to the previous structure of the world order is impossible.

Second, this transitional world has become unpredictable; it is no longer possible to resolve international security issues solely through old military force methods, with participation limited to state actors in the international political process.

Third, information technologies play a critical role in the modern world (including in the sphere of world politics). This has enabled the characterization of modern society as an information society, which has a profound impact on the evolution of traditional politics, diplomacy, and strategy in international relations. These consequences can be reduced to one conclusion: a complex restructuring of the entire global political space is underway, which, according to the renowned Polish internationalists S. Bielen and R. Kuźnyar, is characterized by turbulent changes in the modern system of international relations and is accompanied by the twilight of liberal democracy.

Director of the Institute of Political Analysis and International Relations S. Tolstov reasonably noted that a specific feature of the modern international system, if interpreted as a state of “diffusion” of unipolarity, or as the initial phase of the transition to a multipolar (polycentric) model, is the changes related to the implementation of interests and the complication of political motivations in relations between leading states, as well as a significant increase in the number of states involved in participating in the dialogue on fundamental global problems and the search for potential joint solutions. In this sense, polarity is primarily expressed as a complex of factors and motivations in the relations between the “old” and “new” major states (dynamically developing economies), including former third-world countries that have significant projected development potential. Other countries also play an indirect role in these processes, joining situational regional combinations of interests and forms of

interaction, and (depending on their individual characteristics and capabilities) participating in regional balances, communities, and coalitions.

Hence, if we deepen our understanding of global political trends, not only from the point of view of history, but also from the point of view of the sociology of international relations, based on the study of how the state influences society and the study of the mechanisms of influence of social communities and institutions on the state and the political order as a whole, we should especially emphasize a fundamentally important feature. All trends in the development of international relations "after the Cold War" evolve in a wave-like manner. This reflects not only the complexity of their course (and, accordingly, the analysis), but also the dialectics of deep internal contradictions, often ambiguity, and even tactical or strategic vagueness or uncertainty. Such an assessment of the general process of evolution of basic trends not only does not contradict modern international relations, but actually reflects their implicit current state.

Globalization processes also lead to an increase in conflict, since they are driven by colossal interests (economic, political, informational, military, etc.), fundamental differences between the potential and capabilities of different countries of the world, cultural and civilizational differences and challenges, as well as the emergence of new and aggravation of many old global problems. All this is reflected in the preservation of the influence of geopolitical, economic, financial, demographic, and environmental factors on international relations. Swedish researchers A. and D. Anderson even created a kind of "network" model in the field of the modern world economy and international economic relations. Based on scientific facts and international practice, the Andersons consider the rapid integration of national economies into the global economic system to be the main reason for transformational shifts. The Andersons' "network" model can be conditionally called a model of the global economy, built on the theory of social networks. From the perspective of the evolution of the modern system of international relations, it is worth noting an increasingly clear trend towards the growing importance and role of geoeconomic factors, which significantly complement and expand the scope of classical geopolitics.

The 2004 “Global Trends 2020” forecast, prepared by the US National Intelligence Council, noted that the geopolitical space dominated by American power would become more complex and diverse. These signs may lead to significant changes in the US’s positioning, as the rise of China will likely cause the US to gravitate towards the role of a “balancer” between China, on the one hand, and Japan and other Asian countries, on the other. It was argued that global development trends require US leadership, but American leadership will need talent and ingenuity to achieve consensus. Sharp disputes over ethics and morality will be accompanied by the hopes of some international actors to maintain the US’s role as the leading guarantor of international security, as only the US will have similar forces and military means for this purpose. However, the architecture of international relations is not adapted to ensure the distribution of responsibility in security matters. According to the American expert community, no other structure or regional organization is capable of assuming such responsibility except NATO. However, it is NATO’s role that has recently caused the most significant objections from other actors of international relations (primarily the Russian Federation and its allies).

On the other hand, in modern (neo)post-bipolar relations of precarious equilibrium, there is a pronounced tendency towards the transformation of the world international order into a “post-American world” (as defined by the American political scientist F. Zakaria). In his book of the same name, he drew attention to the critical dynamics of relations between old and new actors at the global level. In this context, the question of the potential reaction of other states to the reduction or possible fundamental revision of the United States’ role and influence in the international arena remains open. This means nothing more than relative instability and further shifts in the restructuring of the entire modern system of international relations under the influence of transformational evolution and changes in the world of “post-international politics”.

The consequence of this at the current stage of international relations' evolution after the Cold War has been the so-called Second Cold War. This term has been used since the 2010 s to denote the political, economic, military, and other confrontations

between the European Union and the USA, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other. According to Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu. Ryzhov, the fundamental difference of the modern Cold War is that it is being waged in the conditions of wars of a new nature – hybrid. In August 2015, he noted that the Russian authorities, having launched aggression against Ukraine, have led Russia into a historical and strategic trap, and the Second Cold War is approaching its apogee.

“We invite you to the second Cold War”, is the title of an article published in the prestigious magazine *Foreign Policy* by political scientist D. Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. The author was one of the first to describe what political analysts on both sides of the Atlantic are thinking: the system of international relations has changed, and even if Russia reduces pressure on Ukraine, it will not return to its previous state. D. Trenin believes that the Russian occupation of Crimea was the beginning of the Second “Cold War”, a new round of global confrontation between Russia and the West. He argues that the previous 20 years of peace did not mark the end of the old conflict, but were only a temporary truce. Now the “season of competition” between the West and Russia for influence, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, is open again. The question of the further evolution of the entire system of international relations in the non-post-bipolar world, as well as the tendencies of its transformation from a confrontational to a cooperative system, also remains open.

The fact that apparent changes in the trends of transformation of the system of (neo)post-bipolar international relations are becoming evident due to the increase in conflict-proneness, especially under the destructive influence of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2025, is becoming evident. Almost all trends, firstly, do not have a direct vector of development, but rather the appearance of a zigzag line, evolving in a zigzag manner; and, secondly, they have undergone cardinal changes in the course of the transformation of modern international relations from post-bipolar after the Cold War (1991–2005) to neo-post-bipolar in conditions of increasing chaos (from 2006–2014). This reflects not only the complexity of their course and, accordingly, analysis, but also

the dialectic of deep internal contradictions, often ambiguity, and even tactical or strategic vagueness or uncertainty.

The trend towards democratization of international relations was the leading one in the post-bipolar stage (until 2005). However, it has been under serious threat due to Russia's aggressive foreign policy and the growth of authoritarian manifestations worldwide since the second half of the first decade of the 21 st century.

Its *first aspect* is reduced to the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. The conclusion about the transparency of the boundaries between them (along with the conclusion about the loss of the monopoly of states on the role of the executor of the fate of international politics) played a decisive role in the emergence of transnationalism as a theoretical direction in the study of international relations. It is significant that at the center of the third “great debate”, which has been going on between theoretical currents since the end of the 20th century, are the problems of the role of the state as an actor in modern international relations, the features of its interaction with non-state international structures, etc. The primary disputes center on which actors should be preferred, both analytically and politically, in the modern world. The spectrum of theoretical perception is quite broad, extending from the denial of the subjective nature of non-state (non-traditional) participants in international relations to the construction of international systems tied to their constantly growing and even decisive role in international politics.

However, despite heated debates, at the current stage of international life's development, there are still no convincing denials of the leading role of state-centric approaches in analyzing the state and prospects for the evolution of the current international relations system. From the point of view of representatives of the holistic school, the foreign policy behavior of states (as a rule) is determined by means of a conceptually and practically fixed domestic political line. At the same time, it is understood that when implementing foreign policy as an organic reflection of internal processes, state actors must pay due attention to soft power and cultural influences, as

well as multilateral mechanisms for regulating international processes in the post-bipolar world.

The second aspect is the infusion of democratic content into both international relations and domestic political processes. It is observed in all countries (regardless of the type of political regime prevailing in them). A phenomenon such as the progressive politicization of the masses is gaining global distribution. The latter demand access to information, participation in political decision-making, and improvement of their material situation and quality of life everywhere. As a complement to traditional diplomacy, public and even virtual (network) diplomacy comes. This objectively leads to a phenomenon known as the “second direction of diplomacy”, in contrast to its “first direction”, which is official diplomacy. In connection with the emergence of the “second direction of diplomacy”, the question arose about the relations of non-governmental organizations with official structures. A new direction arose – “multi-channel diplomacy”, that is, cooperation of officials (“first direction of diplomacy”) with unofficial representatives.

According to American analysts, public diplomacy is a government activity aimed at promoting national interests and national security through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences, as well as expanding dialogue with other nations. Informing and understanding involve disseminating information about the country’s domestic and foreign policies through all possible channels of communication, taking into account the target audience's unique perceptions and cultural characteristics. The main principle is to focus on the recipient of information: what is important is not what is said, but how the audience perceives it. Hence, an important task of public diplomacy is to ensure the inclusion of the interests of individual states and international regions in the global world order. The primary tools of public diplomacy include the mass media, international and national non-governmental organizations, informal international contacts, and exchanges.

American public diplomacy expert K. Rose identified seven “pillars” of public diplomacy:

1) defense of the political course, that is, gaining understanding from the foreign public;

2) context – search and creation of areas of mutual interest, common ground. When disseminating the fundamental values of the state, it is important to take into account the specifics of foreign audiences and overcome existing stereotypes, focusing on standard features;

3) dissemination of consistent, truthful messages that inspire trust;

4) adaptation of messages for specific audiences. The implementation of this goal is based on research of public opinion and understanding of other cultures;

5) national and transnational media;

6) alliances and partnerships with global corporations, humanitarian organizations, national communities abroad, etc.;

7) support of dialogue and implementation of educational and cultural exchanges to establish trust and mutual understanding.

The third aspect is related to the expansion of the composition and growth of the diversity of political actors. Over the past 80 years alone, the number of member states of the United Nations has increased from 60 to 193. It should be noted that Palestine is an observer state, and the Vatican is recognized by the UN (today there are also 42 dependent territories in the world). At the same time, along with states, the number and heterogeneity of other actors operating in the international arena is growing. Among them are regional administrations, separatist forces, religious movements, independent trade unions, environmental parties, transnational corporations, political associations, and finally, international organizations. As a result, as J. Rosenau emphasizes, the contours of a new, “post-international politics” are emerging. At the same time, as already noted, the interaction and mutual influence of state and unconventional international actors within the boundaries of “post-international politics” are very complex and sometimes difficult to predict. This gives rise to a wide-ranging discussion on the reorganization of intergovernmental international organizations, such as the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as the mechanisms and possibilities of their influence on the regulation of the

modern international relations system are insufficient or ineffective. Thus, the veto right in the UN Security Council or the principle of decision-making based on consensus do not work in the event of the need to resolve the acute conflict-generating situation that arose as a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea in February-March 2014 and Russia's initial undeclared unconventional war against Ukraine in the Donbas, and from the end of February 2022 – the transition to a full-scale war.

The tendency towards changes in the content of threats to international peace and the expansion of the concept of security. Its *first aspect* is due to the strengthening of the role of the bifurcation factor in international relations. J. Rosenau notes that the world of “post-international politics” is characterized by chaos and unpredictability, the distortion of identity, and the reorientation of traditional ties of authority and loyalty. In other words, the growth in the number of participants introduces significant uncertainty into the international relations system. Therefore, ensuring the military security of states continues to be an urgent task. Moreover, challenges associated with the growing influence of integration and globalization processes, the stakes in economic competition, and the problems of international terrorism, among other issues, are also added to this.

When implementing both its foreign policy tasks and international policy tasks, each state performs a number of functions inherent to it. In this sense, O. Shapovalova and Yu. Tsirfa highlight the significance of the state's foreign policy identity. States, as key actors in international relations, are prone to pragmatism, rationalization, and defending their own interests in the international arena, that is, to building a particular foreign policy line of behavior or identity that contributes to the implementation of relevant functions.

Among the foreign policy functions of the state, we can single out the following:

- 1) defensive, which aims to protect and preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, the rights and interests of its citizens;

2) regulatory, which consists of the recognition by subjects of international relations of the norms, principles, and traditions of international communication enshrined in international legal acts;

3) informational and representative, which is carried out by the relevant bodies representing the state in the international arena;

4) organizational and intermediary, which consists in the implementation of foreign and domestic political concepts, doctrines, and programmatic orientations of the relevant state;

5) integrative, the content of which is manifested in the fact that, through international relations, the existence of the entire international community is ensured.

The implementation of the outlined functions directly depends on the specific historical and international situation, the degree of societal and state development, the country's relations with the outside world, and its ability to play a constructive role in world politics. This directly concerns the characterization and assessment of Ukraine's modern foreign policy in the context of countering full-scale Russian aggression.

The second aspect is the transformational plan: it is necessary to pay special attention to the fact that in the modern world, there is a transformation of the current concepts and security structures of the confrontational type into concepts and security structures based on cooperation. This aspect characterizes the mutual influence and interdependence of the national and international aspects of security. A new understanding and interest in each subject, aimed at ensuring national security through strengthened international security, is emerging. At the same time, such an understanding is not a panacea for the traditional arbitrariness of powerful state actors in the international arena. One of the latest examples is Russia's annexationist and militaristic policy towards Ukraine. At the same time, the Kremlin, trying to justify and informationally support its policy, refers to the corresponding actions of the USA and NATO in the territory of, for example, Yugoslavia and the West's support for the independence of Kosovo.

All of the above is connected with the consolidation of new elements in the rules of conduct between states within the framework of the modern international order,

which is primarily characterized by the growth of the determining influence of two cardinal postulates – the right of humanitarian intervention and the illegitimacy of authoritarian regimes (NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, pressure on S. Milosevic in Serbia, the 2003 war in Iraq, threats to North Korea and Iran from the United States, assistance to the uprisings in Libya by France and Great Britain, the Russian annexation of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories, Russia's hybrid and full-scale war against Ukraine).

The novelty of the situation is that the United States and NATO states, and behind them the Russian Federation, relying on their power potential and arbitrarily interpreting the existing international legal norms, began to persistently seek to legitimize the practice of humanitarian interventions and establish in international relations a new principle of selective legitimacy of the governments of sovereign states. However, this trend runs counter to the fundamental principle of non-interference, enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It threatens to increase chaos in the post-bipolar system of international relations. Such a threat becomes especially dangerous from the point of view of, firstly, the above-mentioned inefficiency in the activities of the UN and the OSCE in resolving acute crisis and conflict situations in the modern world (the latest examples are Syria and Ukraine), and, secondly, the gross violation of the regulatory and legal principles of the functioning of the modern world order, including such fundamental international documents as the UN Charter of October 24, 1945 and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975.

Hence, *the third aspect* is conditioned by both the establishment and revision of the newest (modern) mechanisms for regulating the international order. In fact, the reorganization of global structures of world governance has been carried out in such a way that, alongside the universal in scope and official in status UN mechanisms, a semi-closed and informal (in terms of membership and decision-making processes) mechanism has emerged. This concerns the activities of the “Big Eight” (following the invasion of Ukraine in the spring of 2014, Russia was suspended from participating in the activities of this organization, which reverted to its previous format – the G 7). At

the beginning of the 21st century. This informal coalition, in terms of practical influence on world politics, not only became on a par with the UN, but also clearly outlined a tendency to increase its influence in the future.

At the same time, alongside the two branches of the mechanism for regulating international relations – the universal (UN) and the institutional-group (G 7 + North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the contours of a third branch have begun to emerge in the world. Currently, we are talking about a trend towards increasing individual and group influence on the entire system of international world order by the United States and (if necessary) a narrow coalition of states chosen by them to implement a specific goal (for example, the coalition of the United States, Great Britain, Russia in the second Afghan war of 2001–2002 or the American-British military coalition against Iraq in 2003). At the same time, the situation around Syria in 2013–2014 and Ukraine in 2014–2025 indicates the necessity, need and ability of various political actors to seek compromises and reach agreements, primarily by using all the possibilities of modern diplomacy, as well as the use of force against paramilitary forces or aggressor states that disregard the basic principles of international law. This will be extremely challenging to achieve, as recent events in the realm of international relations have not only exacerbated relations between Russia and other major international actors (primarily the USA, the EU, and NATO), but also led to a decline in mutual trust. “Moscow no longer trusts the West, and the West does not trust Moscow. This is terrible”, former USSR President M. Gorbachev emphasized in an interview with the German magazine *Der Spiegel* (10. 01. 2015).

The tendency towards globalization and fragmentation, integration and disintegration of international relations. Its *first aspect* is caused by the globalization of international life, the growth of universality, and interdependence of modern international processes. In fact, the most important essential characteristic of globalization has become the realities of a new quality of “universality” of human existence: it no longer fits into the usual framework of national-state formations and, accordingly, the state-centric paradigm. That is, we are talking about the creation of a

global community, within which existing national-state formations act as quite independent structural units. Based on the analysis of the main trends of world development, sociologist J. Groom noted that the modern vocation of the science of international relations is to create a political sociology of global society.

At the same time, globalization processes lead to increased conflict, as they are driven by colossal interests (economic, political, informational, military, etc.), fundamental differences between the potential and capabilities of different countries of the world, cultural and civilizational differences and challenges, as well as the emergence of new and aggravation of many old global problems. Global problems of humanity are categorized into four main areas: socio-political, socio-economic, socio-ecological, and human problems. Here, one cannot ignore the tendency to increase the threat of man-made problems. An example is the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan caused by a powerful tsunami, or the cynical seizure of the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants by Russian occupiers in February-March 2022. In general, global problems are the most significant and pressing issues that affect the vital interests of all peoples, requiring the collective efforts of the world community to solve them.

At the same time, global changes have stimulated new approaches to solving problems and conflicts between states, leading to adjustments in international politics. Scientists, representatives of the Club of Rome, and politicians have had a significant impact on changing international politics. Thus, B. Russell and A. Einstein in their manifesto (1955) emphasized that in the nuclear age, interstate clashes and attempts to solve problems by force threaten humanity with destruction. The authors of the reports to the Club of Rome called on society, primarily politicians, to “look beyond the interests of the present day”, “concern about the survival of the entire human race”, and “to begin joint, collective, coordinated actions of various organizations and states”. Similar considerations were expressed by A. Sakharov, V. Brandt, E. Kennedy. The science that studies the impact of globalization and global problems on humanity, as well as the search for effective ways to solve them, is called globalistics. In this context, not only in communities across different countries, but also among scientists, the

dichotomy of “for” or “against” globalization is becoming increasingly widespread. According to the results of recent public surveys, the number of those who are “against” is growing. A tendency towards a critical perception of globalization is noticeably evident due to the apparent erosion of national sovereignty. In addition, the so-called “anti-globalists” emphasize the negative consequences of the global dominance of TNC s (transnational corporations) and the only “superpower” today, as well as the numerous shortcomings that accompany this process: a sharp increase in unemployment, increased social tension, a tendency to popularize the world community and marginalization at the planetary level, terrorism, “criminal globalization”, etc. Such circumstances create barriers to modern globalism.

Of course, unipolar globalization “in the American style” in some communities of many countries of the world causes natural resistance – “anti-globalization”. However, globalization cannot be limited to negative manifestations and specific, clearly planned actions of globalization “leaders” and “outsiders”. After all, the core component of this phenomenon is the objective basis, primarily the determinant process of comprehensive economic relations and the corresponding socio-political processes.

The second aspect characterizes the essence of international relations' fragmentation. I. Lolan speaks of the “balkanization of the planet”, the expansion of the zone of regional conflicts. Examples in the (neo) post-bipolar world include the Middle East, the territory of the former SFRY, as well as modern Eastern Europe, with its full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. The widespread shock caused the rise of a wave of terrorism in different parts of the world.

International terrorism emerged as a significant factor in global life and a threat to the world order in the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, political terrorism is a specific tactic of political struggle in the international arena, which consists in the systematic use of ideologically motivated violence. The powerful terrorist group that declared almost the entire Western world as its enemy was the Al-Qaeda organization created by Osama bin Laden in 1988. It carried out a number of large-scale terrorist acts, most of which were directed against the United States. The starting point of a

vivid manifestation of international terrorist activity in the 21st century was the terrorist acts in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (3 thousand victims), which are associated, among others, with Al-Qaeda. In response, the USA and its allies launched global anti-terrorist activities.

On September 12, 2001, the leaders of the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council strongly condemned the terrorist acts against the USA committed on September 11, 2001, and pledged to make every effort to combat the problem of terrorism. The EAPC member states, within the limits of their powers and in accordance with the generally recognized norms and principles of international law, as well as the provisions of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373, will make every possible effort to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Experts have recognized NATO's policy in the fight against modern terrorism, the main directions of which were launched at the Paris Summit in November 2002, as one of the leading.

The fight against international terrorism, although it has dealt a significant blow to the international terrorist movement, has not eliminated it as one of the global problems of the modern world. The recent attacks by Palestinian terrorists against Israel, as well as a series of terrorist attacks in Paris in early January 2015, including the killing of 12 people in the editorial office of the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo, serve as examples of the vitality and danger of this phenomenon.

The third aspect is to identify the phenomenon of economic, social, and political integration and disintegration, which are observed today in almost all regions of the world. An example can be, on the one hand, the processes of unification of Europe, and, on the other, the processes of disintegration in the former USSR or SFRY. Theorists and analysts of international relations rightly draw attention to the fact that the formation of a holistic world is accompanied not only by integration processes but also creates conditions for the fragmentation, exclusion, and marginalization of all those who are unable to participate in and influence international relations.

A significant factor in the stability and predictability of the development of both the European and international systems of relations from the early 1990s to the present

day remains the European Union, which, as of 2025, unites 27 countries with a population of almost 500 million. In the future, it has every chance of maintaining its position as one of the most influential international actors.

Along with the EU, other integration associations play a significant role in regional systems of international relations with an impact on the integrating international component. Examples of such integration constructs are, in particular, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which was formed on January 1, 1994 after the entry into force of the agreement of December 17, 1993 between the USA, Canada and Mexico; Mercosur (Common Market of the South) – an economic union of states in South America created in 1991, which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, and as associate members – Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador; ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is a geopolitical and economic international organization established on August 8, 1967, based on the Bangkok Declaration, and comprising 10 countries located in Southeast Asia (Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam). The trend towards an increasing role of integration processes in the modern system of international relations, including its regional and subregional segments, remains relevant. This can be confirmed, for example, by the integration models China+ASEAN or Japan+ASEAN.

According to the logic of the concept of multipolarity (multipolar international systems are characterized by the presence of many or numerous influential international actors), the likely consequence of the interaction of the main integration formations (their coexistence in the mode of cooperation and competition), as S. Tolstov believes, may be a new intermediate form of the “concert of states”. The purpose of the latter will be to maintain stability and solve problems of planetary importance. The argument in favor of this concept is considered to be changes in traditional groups of contradictions and the primary means of their settlement – an increase in the specific weight of the so-called non-traditional conflicts (civilizational, religious, ethnic), intensification of competition in issues of control over the spread of technologies, an apparent decrease in the role of the military factor in international

relations, the reduction of the possibility of mono-state hegemony, a diffuse increase in the possibilities of systemic influence for a relatively wide range of states.

The fourth aspect is expressed in the preservation of the influence of geopolitical, economic, and financial, demographic, and environmental factors on international relations. At the same time, some of them, for example, financial institutions and the role of transnational corporations (TNC s), etc., even strengthen their influence. This was evident in the manifestation and consequences of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009, affecting both the world community as a whole and its individual segments in particular. In this context, it is appropriate to recall the “network” model of modern world economic relations proposed by Swedish researchers A. and D. Anderson. They, relying on scientific facts and international practice, consider the rapid integration of national economies into the global economic system as the primary reason for transformational shifts. With a certain degree of convention, but quite reasonably, the Andersons’ “network” model can be called a model of the global economy built on the theory of social networks. In analyzing the evolution of the modern system of international relations, this approach enables us to more clearly outline the trend towards an increasing importance and role of geoeconomic factors, which significantly complement and expand the field of classical geopolitics.

The trend of information and communication content. *The first aspect* is due to the fantastic growth of the role of information in the modern world, the speed of its receipt, the possibilities of access to it, and the operation or manipulation of information resources. An example is the distribution of “necessary information” through the Wikileaks resource – Julian Assange's international network social project. This is evidence that the Internet covers the entire sphere of political communications in modern society, modifying and establishing new principles. At the same time, the value of the network grows in proportion to the square of the number of its users (according to “Metcalf’s law”). That is, with an increase in the number of Internet users from 500 million to 1 billion, the value of the Internet and its capabilities increase

fourfold. The global network not only accumulates all the “new knowledge of the world”, but it also allows leading states to exert cardinal influence in their interests, including through pressure, manipulation, blackmail, both on the international system as a whole and on its regional and peripheral structural elements. In general, states that win the “global information race” will receive three types of bonuses: direct, due to increased efficiency in decision-making and implementation; tactical, due to obtaining new functional capabilities; strategic – the ability to establish their own rules of the game in a qualitatively new territory of the information field.

The second aspect is the growth of the role of the Internet in world politics, where it acts in three main capacities. Firstly, we are discussing the Internet as a space of global politics, where the activities of various international institutions are reflected and take place, and new factors of influence on world politics and the positions of states on the planet are also identified. In addition, the Internet serves as a distinct arena of world politics, a separate space. In this sense, it remains on the periphery of world politics. This is due, in particular, to the fact that the issues of its regulation and development as an object are given little attention. Finally, the Internet should also be considered a challenge to world politics, that is, as a kind of technology that shapes the lives of societies, forces international institutions to change, and influences the evolution of humanity in a new way.

An analysis of the Internet as a challenge in the field of international relations reveals the need to be aware of several serious threats posed by it. The use of the network for waging large-scale information wars or carrying out special information operations poses a particular danger (an example can be the information sphere of Ukrainian-Russian relations, or the relations between the West and Russia, or the USA and China).

One of the leading theorists in the field of information wars, M. Libicki, in his book “What is Information Warfare”, defines seven forms of information warfare:

- 1) command-and-control (aimed at destroying communication channels between command and executors);

2) intelligence (collection of important information and protection of one's own information);

3) psychological (propaganda, information processing of the population, demoralization);

4) hacker (sabotage and attacks against the enemy by creating special programs);

5) economic (information blockade and information imperialism;

6) electronic (directed against electronic communications – radio communications, radars, computer networks);

7) cyberwarfare – criminal actions committed using electronic communication networks and information systems or against such networks and systems (Libiki separated cyberwarfare from hacker warfare, seeing in the “cyber warrior” a creature that settles in the system and lives in it). The information industry is a key factor in strategic competition among leading states and international actors, and this trend is expected to intensify in the future.

The tendency to change the nature of relations between telluro- and thalassocracy forces in the world after the end of the Cold War. Its *first aspect* is the evolution of the modern geohistorical phase of planetary dualism as “a certain way of realizing the basic contradiction between the forces of Land and Sea”. The most important aspects here are the features of the structure and the configuration of central power relations. At the same time, two dimensions exist and develop simultaneously: the integration of the thalassocracy and telluric hemispheres under the rule of the dominant center of power – the USA; and the formation of polycentricity to prevent globalist encroachments (alongside the USA, including the EU, Russia, and China). Such a situation, when hegemony in one hemisphere is correlated with polycentricity, is quite dangerous for international peace. It is precisely in the current conditions of international situation aggravation and confrontation, particularly along the US – Russia line, that we observe a threatening imbalance between tellurocracy and thalassocracy at the global level.

As we have already noted, the US National Intelligence Council predicted in 2004 that the geopolitical space would become increasingly diverse over the next 15–20 years. This, accordingly, would affect the undisputed dominance of American power and could lead to significant changes in the positioning of the US. They would primarily gravitate towards the role of a “balancer” between China, on the one hand, and Japan and other Asian countries, on the other, largely due to the rise of China. It was argued that global development trends required the US to lead, but the US would need to draw on talent and ingenuity to achieve consensus. In general, these predictions have largely come true.

Today, in the context of neo-post-bipolarity, sharp disputes over ethics and morality are accompanied by the hopes of some international actors to preserve the US role as the leading guarantor of international security, as only the US possesses the necessary forces and military means for this. However, the architecture of international relations is not adapted to ensure the distribution of responsibility in security matters. According to the American expert community, no other structure or regional organization, except NATO, is capable of assuming such responsibility. However, it is NATO’s role that has recently aroused the most significant objections from other actors in international relations, primarily the Russian Federation and its allies.

Hence, *the second aspect* of this trend in the evolution of modern international relations is the shift towards transforming the world's international order into a “post-American world” (as defined by American political scientist F. Zakaria). In his book of the same name, which became a bestseller, he gave the following apt description of the international system: “In this developing system, the United States occupies the main place, but it is to them that the new order poses the greatest challenges. Most other major powers have yet to define their role – and this process is already in full swing. China and India are becoming increasingly serious players in their own and neighboring regions. Russia has completed its adaptation to post-Soviet conditions and is becoming increasingly influential (primarily due to energy resources and powerful nuclear weapons – *authors*), and even aggressive (this is evidenced by its annexationist and occupation policy towards Ukraine in the form of initially a hybrid, and later a full-

scale war, which has been going on for the tenth year (2014–2025) and has become a kind of threatening trap for Russia itself, which has received powerful Western sanctions, the loss of markets and profits from energy exports, the threat of military defeat in Ukraine – *authors*)”. It should also be noted that Japan, under the influence of recent events related to the destabilization of the security factor in the context of chaotic non-bipolar international relations, is increasingly actively raising the issue of strengthening its positions. Europe is operating on trade and economic platforms with growing power and purposefulness. In Latin American affairs, the voices of Brazil and Mexico are becoming increasingly loud. South Africa is positioning itself as the leader of the entire African continent. These countries are occupying an increasingly significant space on the international stage. In the well-known futurological report of the US National Intelligence Council “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” (2012), the long-term vector of expectations is changed towards the diffusion of “global power”, which forces us to focus on the critical dynamics of relations between old and new global actors. In this context, the question of how other states will react to a reduction or a possible fundamental revision of the United States' role and influence on the international stage remains open. In the current conditions of crises and wars of the neo-post-bipolar era, this means nothing more than relative instability and further shifts in the restructuring of the entire international relations system.

This trend has prospects from the perspective of historical experience, which indicates not only the obligatory plurality of real political subjects and the alternation of the world's political process, but also the short-term nature of outright domination. According to the results of I. Wallerstein's analysis, the ability of a hegemonic state to freely impose its will on other major powers is limited to 25–50 years. Today we are witnesses of the emergence and gradual strengthening of other globalization centers, in particular the PRC and the EU, and Russia, in conditions of acute armed conflict and sanctions, is trying with all its might to create an anti-American/anti-Western coalition. All this allows us to predict that in the strategic perspective (15–20 years), the transformation of the modern system of international relations will take place towards the formation of polycentrism while maintaining the conflict-generating potential at

the global, regional and peripheral levels, with the aspiration of individual powerful players-subjects of the international system for dominance, but also for the possible decline or decrease in the geopolitical and geoeconomic weight of others.

In general, the issue of trends in the evolution of international relations remains a topic of debate in the field of international relations, which is also associated with its lag in understanding global international political trends. This is explained, first of all, by the specifics of the studied sphere of public relations, where it is tough to identify the repeatability / typicality of certain events and processes. Therefore, the main features of both the current stage of development of the modern world order, with its security architecture, and the trends in the transformation of modern international relations are characterized by a relative, probable, stochastic, and transient nature.

At the same time, the constant evolution (which can be fully defined as transformational evolution) and the nature of changes in the world of “post-international politics” (an example is the recent events in the countries of the “Arab Spring” or the first hybrid, and then the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine in 2014–2025) do not allow us to reach a consensus on the generally accepted name of the modern system of international relations. Paraphrasing the conservative British writer, publicist, journalist, and politician D. Price-Jones, we can discuss a “plastic situation” in the formation of a new system of international relations, which has the property of changing relatively quickly and assuming different forms. It is essential to recognize and take into account the tendency of the neo-post-bipolar system of international relations to such a nature of changes. In this regard, the statement of Reich Chancellor Otto von Bismarck is quite relevant: “The task of a statesman is to hear the steps of the Almighty, who walks through history, and to grab hold of his coattails when he passes by”. The primary objective of modern international architecture worldwide is to promote peace, restore the international legal order, foster development, and ensure freedom for the entire global community. Undoubtedly, the formation of a new world order based on democratic principles will be a long and complex process of evolutionary transformation of the modern international relations

system. At the same time, its comprehensive nature should reflect the three fundamental foundations of peace – security, social and economic well-being and development, as well as democracy and respect for human rights and freedoms. All international actors should make efforts to create these fundamental principles, and first of all, states (including Ukraine, as an influential regional European country), guided by a well-considered, well-balanced, and predictable policy for partners, aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for the progressive development of the Ukrainian state and society. In this context, the means of increasing security for us will be building trust, expanding political dialogue and cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally within the framework of the pan-European process, as well as with state and non-state international actors on the global stage. At the same time, given the primacy of the security dominant in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war and after its completion, membership in the North Atlantic Alliance (or other equivalent and real security configurations) and the European Union is of particular importance for Ukraine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Авер'янов, С.В., *Безпекова діяльність АСЕАН у Південно-Східній Азії* [ASEAN Security Activities in Southeast Asia]. Кваліфікаційна наукова праця на правах рукопису. Дисертація на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата політичних наук за спеціальністю 23.00.04 – політичні проблеми міжнародних систем та глобального розвитку. Київ: Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка Міністерства освіти і науки України, 2021.
- Брехуненко, В. (ред.), *«Братня» навала. Війни Росії проти України XII–XXI ст.* [“Brotherhood” rush. Wars of Russia against Ukraine of the XII–XXI centuries]. Київ: НАН України. Інститут української археографії та джерелознавства ім. М. С. Грушевського, 2016.
- Волович, О., *Історія як поле змагання «Українського світу» і «Русского мира»* [History as a field of competition between “Ukrainian world” and “Russian world”]. Зовнішні справи. 2014, № 12, сс. 19–23.
- Гай-Нижник, П. П., *Росія проти України (1990–2016 рр.): від політики шантажу і примусу до війни на поглинання та спроби знищення* [Russia vs. Ukraine (1990–2016): From a policy of blackmail and coercion to a war of absorption and attempted destruction]. Київ: «МП Леся», 2017.
- Галушка А., *Змова диктаторів. Поділ Європи між Гітлером і Сталіном 1939-1941* [Conspiracy of Dictators. The Division of Europe between Hitler and Stalin 1939-1941], Харків, Клуб сімейного дозвілля, 2018.
- Горбулін, В. П. 2016. *Крим. Війна: передумови російської агресії* [Crimea. War: prerequisites of Russian aggression]. URL: <https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/ua/Dialnist/2399.html>.
- Горбулін В. (ред.), *Світова гібридна війна: український фронт* [World Hybrid War: The Ukrainian Front], Київ, НІСД, 2017.
- Грицак, Я. 2022. *В Україні вирішується доля усього світу* [The fate of the whole world is decided in Ukraine]. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/110916>.
- Гунчак, Т. (ред.), *Російський імперіалізм від Івана Великого до Революції* [Russian imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution]. Київ : «Києво-Могилянська академія», 2010.
- Дацюк, С. 2022. *Війна за нову цивілізацію* [War for a new civilization] // Українська правда. 27 February. URL: <https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/datsuk/621afbbb14d6c/>.
- Дністрянський, М. С., *Загострення геополітичних взаємин у період постмодерну та становище України* [The aggravation of geopolitical relations in the postmodern period and the situation of Ukraine]. Львів : ЛНУ імені Івана Франка, 2021.
- Дорошко, М. & Балюк, В., *Гібридна війна Росії проти України після Революції гідності* [Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity]. Київ: Ніка-Центр, 2018.
- Задорожній, О.В., *Міжнародне право в міждержавних відносинах України і Російської Федерації 1991–2014* [International law in the interstate relations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation 1991–2014]. Київ: К.І.С., 2014.
- Залізняк, Л., *Україна та Росія: війна цивілізацій* [Ukraine and Russia: the war of civilizations]. Універсум. 2017, № 3-4, с. 4–11.

- Киридон, А. М. (ред.), *Україна. 30 років незалежності* [Ukraine. 30 years of independence]. Київ: Державна наукова установа «Енциклопедичне видавництво», 2021.
- Киридон, А. М. & Троян, С. С., *Російсько-грузинський конфлікт серпня 2008 року: історико-політологічний аналіз* [Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008: historical and political analysis]. Київ-Рівне: PIC КСУ, 2009.
- Кіпіані В., *Друга світова Непридумані історії (Не) наша жива інша* [Second World War True Stories (Not) Ours Living Other], Київ: Біват, 2019.
- Коваль М., *Друга світова війна 1939-1945* [Second World War 1939-1945], Київ, В-во «Наукова думка», 2004.
- Кононов, И. Ф., *Понятие цивилизации в научных, идеологических и повседневных дискурсивных практиках военного времени в Украине* [The concept of civilization in scientific, ideological and everyday discursive practices of wartime in Ukraine]. Вісник Харків. нац. ун-ту ім. В. Н. Каразіна. Сер.: Соціологічні дослідження сучасного суспільства: методологія, теорія, методи. 2018. Вип. 40, с. 11–28. doi.org/10.26565/2227-6521-2018-40-02.
- Корнієвський, О., Филипенко, А. 2021. *Ретроспективна рефлексія «поразки» в суспільній свідомості народів Центрально-Східної Європи* [Retrospective reflection of “defeat” in the public consciousness of the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe]. URL: https://niss.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2021-05/korniievskiy_filipenko_red_06.11.2020-1.pdf.
- Кричковська, У. *Три чверті українців виступають за вступ до Євросоюзу* [Three-quarters of Ukrainians support joining the European Union] // Європейська правда. 23.09.2025. URL: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2025/09/23/7220835/>.
- Кузьо, Т., *Чи стане Україна наступною мішенню «доктрини Путіна»?* [Will Ukraine become the next target of "Putin's doctrine"?]. Високий замок (Львів). 2008, № 158 (3807), 27 серпня, с. 5.
- Лазарович, М. В., *Російсько-українська війна (2014–2017 роки)* [Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2017)]. Івано-Франківськ: Лілея-НВ, 2017.
- Лоренс Р., *Друга світова війна за зачиненими дверима* [World War II Behind the Closed Doors], Київ, Темпора, 2010.
- Магда Є., *Гібридна війна: вижити і перемогти* [Hybrid War: Survive and Win], Харків, Біват, 2015.
- Мартинов А., *Перша світова війна в сучасній німецькомовній історіографії: теми й концептуальні ідеї досліджень* [World War I in Contemporary German Historiography: Topics and Conceptual Ideas of Research], in “*Міжнародні зв’язки України: наукові пошуки і знахідки*”, 2016, вип. 25, с. 397-423.
- Михальченко, Н., *Украинская региональная цивилизация: прошлое, настоящее, будущее* [Ukrainian regional civilization: past, present, future]. Киев: ИПиЭНИ имени И.Ф. Кураса НАН Украины, 2013.
- Мотиль, О. 2022. *Групове зґвалтування в Україні* [Gang rape in Ukraine]. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/111497>.
- Офіцинський, Ю., *Сучасна російсько-українська війна (за матеріалами газети «The New York Times» 2013–2017 років)* [The modern Russian-Ukrainian war (according to the materials of the newspaper “The New York Times” from 2013–2017)]. Ужгород: ПІК-У, 2018.

- Парахонський, Б. О. & Яворська, Г. М., *Онтологія війни і миру: безпека, стратегія, смисл* [Ontology of war and peace: security, strategy, meaning]. Київ: НІСД, 2019.
- Перепелиця, Г.М., *Україна – Росія: війна в умовах співіснування* [Ukraine – Russia: war in conditions of coexistence]. Київ: Видавничий дім «Стилос», 2015.
- Перун, В. *Опитування: більшість українців готові на референдумі підтримати вступ України до ЄС і НАТО* [Poll: Most Ukrainians are ready to support Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO in a referendum]. URL: https://lb.ua/society/2025/06/26/683801_opituvannya_bilshist_ukraintsiv.html.
- Плохій, С. 2022. *Ця війна є війною за всю Європу* [This war is a war for all of Europe]. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/110984>.
- Постанова Верховної Ради України. 2022. *Про Заяву Верховної Ради України “Про вчинення Російською Федерацією геноциду в Україні”* [Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine On the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On the Russian Federation Committing Genocide in Ukraine”]. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2188-20#Text>.
- Почепцов, Г., *Смисли і війни: Україна і Росія в інформаційній і смисловій війнах* [Meanings and wars: Ukraine and Russia in information and meaning wars]. Київ: Києво-Могилянська Академія, 2016.
- Рєєнт О. (coord.), *Велика війна 1914–1918 рр. і Україна* [The Great War and Ukraine], In 2 Books, Book 1, *Історичні нариси* [Historical Essays], Київ, ТОВ «Видавництво «КЛІО»», 2014.
- Смолій, В. А. 2022. *Історик і війна* [Historian and war]. Retrieved from: <http://resource.history.org.ua/item/0016388>.
- Снайдер Т., *Криваві землі. Європа між Гітлером і Сталіним* [Bloody Lands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin], Київ, Лауріс, 2018.
- Толстов С. *Міжнародна система початку ХХІ століття*, “Зовнішні справи”, 2013, № 9–10.
- Троян С. (ред.), *Світові війни в історії та долі людства (до 100-річчя початку Першої і 75-річчя початку Другої світових воєн)* [World Wars in the History and Destiny of Humanity (to the 100th Anniversary of the First and 75th Anniversary of the Second World War)], Київ, ДП «Пріоритет», 2014.
- Троян С. (ред.), *Перша світова війна у фокусі історії (дипломатичні та політичні колізії Великої війни)* [World War I in the Focus of History (Diplomatic and Political Conflicts of the Great War)], Київ, Кондор-Видавництво, 2016.
- Троян С. (ред.), *Перша світова війна і революції: вектори соціокультурних трансформацій* [The First World War and the Revolutions: Vectors of Sociocultural Transformations], Київ, Кондор-Видавництво, 2017.
- Троян С. (ред.), *Велика війна 1914–1918 рр.: витоки, характер, наслідки* [The Great War of 1914–1918: Origins, Character, Consequences], Київ, Видавничий дім «Кондор», 2018.
- Троян С. (ред.), *Перша світова війна у фокусі «плинної нестабільності»: міжнародна і внутрішня політика* [World War I in the Focus of “Volatile Instability”: International and Domestic Politics], Київ, Видавничий дім «Кондор», 2019.
- Турченко, Ф. & Турченко, Г., *Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна* [The Novorossia project and the latest Russian-Ukrainian war]. Київ: Інститут історії України, 2015.
- Якубова, Л., *«Русский мир» в Україні: на краю прірви* [“Russian Peace” in Ukraine: on the edge of the abyss]. Київ: ТОВ «Видавництво “КЛІО”», 2018.

- Acharya A., *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Acharya A. & Buzan B., *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary*, Cambridge and New York 2019.
- Agreement on the Establishment of the Common Economic Zone. 2003. Free trade agreement between Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russian federation. URL: <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/4731/download>.
- Agreements establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States. 1991. URL: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL\(1994\)054-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e).
- Akande, D. 2022. *Use of force under public international law – the case of Ukraine*. URL: <https://rm.coe.int/cahdi-62-akande-use-of-force-under-pil-the-case-of-ukraine-25-march-20/1680a67f82>.
- Akulov M.I., *Kontseptsiya chasu v aktorno-merezheviy teorii: osoblyvosti pobudovy ta kontseptual'ni superechnosti* [The concept of time in the actor-network theory: peculiarities of construction and conceptual contradictions], Kyiv 2021.
- Appiah-Otoo, I., Russia-Ukraine War and US oil price. *Energy Research Letters*, 2023, 4(1), article number JEL: C42 Q41. doi: [10.46557/001c.37691](https://doi.org/10.46557/001c.37691).
- Ashworth, L.M., *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations*, London, 2014.
- Asymetria i hybrydowość – stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów, pod red.: W. Sokały i B. Zapały, Warszawa: Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2011
- Audretsch, B.A. & Momtaz, P.P. & Motuzenko, H.H., & Vismara, S. *War and entrepreneurship: A synthetic control study of the russia-ukraine conflict*. Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research, 2023.
- Badie B., *New Perspectives on the International Order. No Longer Alone in This World*, London, Palgrave Maximilian, 2019.
- Barsukova, O. (2023). *They fight and volunteer: How did the war affect the lives of Ukrainians? Poll*. URL: <https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2023/02/24/253034/>.
- Bartosiak J. & Zychowicz, P., *Wojna o Ukrainę. Wojna o świat*, Poznań: Rebis, 2023.
- Bartosiak J. & Friedman G., *Wojna w kosmosie. Przewrót w geopolityce* [War in space. A revolution in geopolitics], Warszawa 2023.
- Behnassi, M. & El Haiba, M., Implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for global food security. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 2022, 6, 754-755. doi: [10.1038/s41562-022-01391-x](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01391-x).
- Bellinger III, J.B. 2022. *How Russia's invasion of Ukraine violates international law*. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/article/how-russias-invasion-ukraine-violates-international-law?amp>.
- Bieleń S., *Turbulence in the Post-Cold War Era*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2021.
- Bocancea, S., *The war in Ukraine. A regional conflict with global effects*. Iași: Polis Books, 2023.
- Bodak, V.A. & Pantiuk, M.P. & Haliv, M.D. & Ilnytskyi, V.I. & Vikhliaiev M.Y. (Eds.), *The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-2022): Historical, political, cultural-educational, religious, economic, and legal aspects*. Riga: «Baltija Publishing», 2022.

- Braumoeller B., *The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Bruszeński, M. & Kozubel, M. & Szopa, M., *Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska. Pierwsza faza*. Warszawa: Bellona, 2023.
- Brzezinski Z., *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, 1997.
- Bucharest Summit Declaration. 2008. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008. URL: http://www.summitbucharest.gov.ro/en/doc_201.html.
- Buniak, Waleria. 2023. Henprokurory pidpysaly uhodu pro stvorennia Centru z rozsliduvannia zlochniv ahresiyi Rosiyi u Haazi [Prokuratorzy Generalni podpisali porozumienie w sprawie powołania Centrum Badania Zbrodni Rosyjskiej Agresji w Hadze]. URL: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/208617/2023-03-05-genprokurory-pidpysaly-ugodu-pro-stvorennia-tsentru-z-rozsliduvannia-zlochniv-agresii-rosii-u-gaazi/>.
- Bunyak, V. 2023. *Prosecutors General signed an agreement on the establishment of the Center for the investigation of crimes of russian aggression in the Hague*. URL: <https://detector.media/infospace/article/208617/2023-03-05-genprokurory-pidpysaly-ugodu-pro-stvorennia-tsentru-z-rozsliduvannia-zlochniv-agresii-rosii-u-gaazi/>.
- Buzan B., *The United States and the Great Powers*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004.
- Buzan B. & Lawson G., *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge studies in international relations; 135), Cambridge 2015.
- Buzan B. & O. Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge, 2003
- Callon M. & Law J. & Rip A. (eds.), *Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World*, London 1986.
- Churchill W.S. (Spencer), *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm*. Vol. 1. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948.
- Chwalba A., *Samobójstwo Europy. Wielka wojna 1914–1918* [Europe suicide. The Great War 1914–1918], Kraków, Wyd-wo Literackie, 2014.
- Clark S. & S. Hoque (Edit.), *Debating the Post-American World. What Lies Ahead?* London–New York, 2012.
- Cohen S., *Geopolitics of the world system*, Lanham–Boulder–New York–Oxford, 2003.
- Cohen S., *Geopolitics: the Geography of International Relations*, Lanham–Boulder–New York–London, 2015.
- Constantiniu F., 1941. *Hitler, Stalin și România: România și geneza Operațiunii „Barbarossa”* [1941. Hitler, Stalin and Romania: Romania and the genesis of Operation “Barbarossa”], București, Editura Univers encyclopedic, 2002.
- Danylenko Y., *Yak zupynyty potraplyannya zakhidnykh komponentiv do rosiys'kykh raket. Holovne z dyskusiyi Atlantic Council* [How to stop Western components from entering Russian missiles. Highlights from the Atlantic Council discussion], 2023. URL: <https://speka.media/yak-zupyniti-potraplyannya-zaxidnix-komponentiv-do-rosiiskix-raket-golovne-z-dyskusiyi-atlantic-council-9d4519>.
- Deleuze G. & F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, London–New York, 2003.

- Deyneka A. V., *Evrystychnyy potentsial aktorno-merezhevoyi teoriiy dlya sotsiologichnoyi kontseptualizatsiyi ahentnosti* [Heuristic potential of actor-network theory for sociological conceptualization of agency], Kyiv 2019.
- Deyneka A.V., *Stratehiyi pozytsionuvannya aktorno-merezhevoyi teoriiy v dyskursi suchasnoho sotsiologichnoho teoretyzuvannya* [Positioning strategies of actor-network theory in the discourse of modern sociological theorizing], *Aktual'ni problemy sotsiologiyi, psykholohiyi ta pedahohiky*, 2017, vol. 1 (32), pp. 60–77.
- Dib, M., Military aggression against Ukraine: Russia's rhetoric and the international legal framework. *ELF – Policy Paper*, 2022, 17, 1-14. [doi: 10.53121/ELFPP17](https://doi.org/10.53121/ELFPP17).
- Dnisriansky, Myroslaw, *Zagostrennia geopolitycznych vzajemyn u period postmodernu ta stanovysze Ukrainy* [The aggravation of geopolitical relations in the postmodern period and the situation of Ukraine], Lviv: Lviv National University, 2021.
- Doroshko, Mykola & Baliuk, Valentyn, *Gibrydna viyna Rosii proty Ukrainy pislia Revoliucii Gidnosti* [Russia's Hybrid War with Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity], Kyiv: Nika-Centr, 2018.
- Elsea, J., *Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. Glenn Russel, 2014.
- Enciu N., *Marea Unire din 1918: o strălucită victorie a geografiei asupra istoriei nedrepte* [The Great Union of 1918: a brilliant victory of geography over unjust history], in *“Revista Limba Română”*, 2018, N 1-2, anul XXVIII, P. 216-231.
- “Existential” is Dictionary.com's Word of the Year. 2019. URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/word-of-the-year-existential-is-the-word-of-the-year-dictionary-dot-com/>.
- Fedunyak S., *Vplyv rosiys'ko-ukrayins'koyi viyny na diyal'nist' providnykh institutiv bezpeky v konteksti formuvannya novoyi modeli mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn* [The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the activities of leading security institutions in the context of the formation of a new model of international relations], *Mediaforum*, 2022, vol. 11, pp. 131–140.
- Felsztinski J. & Stanczew M., *Trzecia wojna światowa? Bitwa o Ukrainę* [The Third World War? Battle for Ukraine], Warszawa, Wyd-wo Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2015.
- Felshtinsky Y. & Stanczew M., *Blowing Up Ukraine: The Return of Russian Terror and the Threat of World War III*. London 2022.
- Ferguson, N., *The Politics of Catastrophe*. London: Penguin Press, 2021.
- Fisanov V., *Ukrayina u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh Postvestfal's'koyi doby: zmina heostratehichnoyi roli* [Ukraine in international relations of the Post-Westphalian era: changing geostrategic role], *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu: Modern Historical and Political*, 2022, vol. 46, pp. 51–61, [doi: 10.31861/mhpi2022.46.51-61](https://doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2022.46.51-61).
- Fox, M. A., *Hybrid Warfare: The 21st Century Russian Way of Warfare*. Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 2017.
- Friedberg A. L., *The Future of American Power*, “Political Science Quarterly”. Spring 1994, Vol. 109, No. 1.
- Galtung J., *Die andere Globalisierung. Perspektiven für eine zivilisierte Weltgesellschaft im 21. Jahrhundert*, Münster, 1998.

- Galtung J., *A Structural Theory of Imperialism – Ten Years Later*, Typescript. URL: <https://www.transcend.org/galtung/papers/A%20Structural%20Theory%20of%20Imperialism%20-%20Ten%20Years%20Later.pdf>.
- Geiß R., *Russia's Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law Grind Slowly but They Do Grind*, in Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, 2015, Vol. 91, p. 426–449.
- Genschel, F. & Leek, L. & Weyns, J., War and integration. The Russian attack on Ukraine and the institutional development of the EU. *Journal of European Integration*, 2023, 45(3), 343-360. doi: [10.1080/07036337.2023.2183397](https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2183397).
- GFP *Military Strength Ranking*, 2023. URL: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>.
- Girault R., *Diplomatie européenne: Nations et impérialisme* [European Diplomacy: Nations and Imperialism, 1871-1914], 1871-1914, Paris: Masson/Armand Colin, 1979.
- Gi-Wook Shin; 2022, *In the Wake of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, Korea Should Join Its Peers in Defending the Liberal International Order*. URL: <https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/wake-russia%E2%80%99s-invasion-ukraine-korea-should-join-its-peers-defending-liberal-international>.
- Glenn, R. (2009). Thoughts on «Hybrid» Conflict. URL: <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf>.
- Global Firepower – 2023 world military strength rankings (2023). URL: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/>.
- Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, a publication of the National Intelligence Council. URL: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf.
- Goertz G. & Diehl P. & Balas A., *The Puzzle of Peace. The Evolution of Peace in the International System*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Gorbatenko, Wołodymyr. 2022. *Raszyzm*. URL: <https://vue.gov.ua/Рашизм>.
- Gorbulin, V. P. (ed.), *Svitova gibrydna viyna: ukrainskyy front* [Global hybrid war: the Ukrainian front], Kyiv: NISD, 2017.
- Gorbulin, V. & Badrak, V., *Over the abyss. 200 days of the Russian war*. Kyiv: Bright Books, 2022.
- Gray C., *War, Peace and International Relations. An Introduction to the Strategic History*, London and New York, Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.
- Green, V., *Russia Ukraine, Putin Zelenskyy: Your Essential Uncensored Guide To The Russia Ukraine History And War*. London: Independent Publishing Network, 2022.
- Grycak, Jarosław. 2022. *V Ukraini vyrishuietsia dolia vsiogo svitu* [Na Ukrainie rozstrzygają się losy całego świata]. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/110916>.
- Haass R. N., *The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance*, “Foreign Affairs”, May/June 2008, Vol. 87, No. 3.
- Haass, R. N., *The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance*; w: Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2008, vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 44–56.
- Hart P., *I Wojna Światowa 1914–1918. Historia militarna* [World War I 1914-1918. Military history], Poznań, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2014.
- Hathaway, O.A. 2023. *How Russia's invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order*. URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/how-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-tested-the-international-legal-order/amp/>.

- Henasambleya OON. *Henasambleya OON ukhvalyla rezolyutsiyu z vymohoyu do Rosiyi pokynuty Ukrainu zarady vseosyazhnoho, spravedlyvoho i mitsnoho myru: 141 krayina "za"* [The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding that Russia leave Ukraine for the sake of a comprehensive, just and durable peace: 141 countries "for"], 2023. URL: <https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/oon-uchvalyla-rezoljuciju-shodo-vijny/6976346.html>.
- Herasymchuk T., *Mizhnarodnyy poryadok XXI stolittya: osnovni teoretyko-kontseptual'ni pidkhody* [International order of the 21st century: basic theoretical and conceptual approaches], Mizhnarodni zv'yazky Ukrainy: naukovy poshuky i znakhidky, 2016, vol. 25, pp. 335–355.
- Herpen Van M. H., *Wojny Putina. Czeczenia, Gruzja, Ukraina 2014* [Putin's wars. Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine 2014], Warszawa, Wyd-wo Prószyński Media, 2014.
- Herpen, M. H. Van, *Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism*. Second Edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.
- Hlihor C. & Shkundin G. D. & Soare V. & Stikalin A. S. (eds.), *Rusia și România în timpul Primului Război Mondial* [Russia and Romania during the First World War], București, Ed. Top Form, 2018.
- Hoffman, F., *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
- Horodyns'ka V., *Viys'kova tekhnika ta mil'yardy dolariv: shcho otrymala Ukraina vid partneriv za rik viyny* [Military equipment and billions of dollars: what Ukraine received from partners during the year of the war], 2023. URL: https://24tv.ua/economy/mizhnarodna-dopomoga-2023-skilki-viyskovoyi-finansovoyi-dopomogi_n2270406.
- Huntington, S. P., *The Lonely Superpower*; w: Foreign Affairs, 1999, vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 35–49
- Ikenberry, J., *The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War*; w: M. P. Leffler, O. A. Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge history of the Cold War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 535–556
- Jacobsen T., Charles Sampford, Ramesh Thakur (Ed. by). *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?*, Hampshir, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008.
- Kapstein E.B., M. Mastanduno, *Unipolar Politics*, New York, 1999.
- Khraban, T.E., Adoption of coping strategies by Ukrainian civilians in the first fifteen days after the outbreak of military conflict in 2022. *Insight: The Psychological Dimensions of Society*, 2022, 7, 59-74. doi: [10.32999/2663-970X/2022-7-5](https://doi.org/10.32999/2663-970X/2022-7-5).
- Kissinger H., *How to avoid another world war*, 2022. URL: <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-push-for-peace/>.
- Kleczkowska A., *Wojna hybrydowa – uwagi z perspektywy prawa międzynarodowego publicznego* [Hybrid war – remarks from the perspective of public international law], in "Sprawy międzynarodowe", 2015, N 2, S. 93 – 110.
- Knoke D. & Kuklinski J., *Network Analysis*, Beverly Hills 1982.
- Knoke D. & Pappi F. & Broadbent J. & Tsujinaka J., *Comparing Policy Networks: Labour Politics in the US, Germany and Japan*, Cambridge 1996.
- Kolodnyi, A. & Fylypovych, L., The Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2022: Monitoring of state-confessional relations in Ukraine. *Schid*, 2022, 3(4), 17-22. doi: [10.21847/1728-9343.2022.3\(4\).268686](https://doi.org/10.21847/1728-9343.2022.3(4).268686).

- Korsunskyy, S. 2022. *Russia's aggression against Ukraine: Lessons from our war*. URL: <https://glavcom.ua/columns/korsunsky/agresiya-rosiji-proti-ukrajini-uroki-nashoji-viyni-855899.html>.
- Kostin, A. 2023. *Press conference on the work of the prosecutor's office during the year of full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation*. URL: <https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/preskonferenciya-andriya-kostina-pro-roboti-prokuraturi-zarik-povnomasstabnoyi-agresiyi-rf>.
- Krauthammer, Ch., *The Unipolar Moment*; w: Foreign Affairs, 1991, vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 23–33.
- Krytyka. 2022. URL: <https://krytyka.com/en/articles/heavy-weapons-now>.
- Krzak, Andrzej, *Wojny przyszłości po rosyjsku – wojna hybrydowa, informacyjna i psychologiczna na tle konfliktu ukraińskiego* [Future Wars, Russian Style – Hybrid, Information and Psychological Warfare Against the Background of the Ukrainian Conflict]; [w]: Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 2018, N 18, ss. 11–39.
- Kuleba, Dmytro, *The War for Reality: How to Win in a World of Fakes, Truths, and Communities*. Kyiv: Knyholav, 2019.
- Kuzio, T., *Putin's War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime*. London: Publishing Platform, 2017.
- Kuzio, T., *Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War*. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2020.
- Kuźniar, R., *Pozimowojenne dwudziestolecie: 1989–2010. Stosunki międzynarodowe na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, Warszawa, SCHOLAR, 2011.
- Kuźniar R., *Zmierzch liberalnego porządku międzynarodowego 2011–2021* [The Twilight of the Liberal International Order 2011–2021], Warszawa: Wyd. Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2022.
- Kyrydon A. M., *Aktorno-merezheva teoriya* [Actor-network theory], 2019. URL: <https://vue.gov.ua/>.
- Kyrydon A. & Troyan S., *Conceptual Fundamentals of Post-Westphalian International Relations*, Roczniki Nauk Społecznych, 2020, vol. 12 (48), No 4, pp. 69–85.
- Kyrydon A. & Troyan S., *International relations as a system and a discipline: From the westphalian to the post-westphalian world order*, Studia i Analizy Nauk Polityce, 2021, No 1, pp. 107–121.
- Kyrydon A. & Troyan S., *The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014-2022): Basic preconditions and causes*, Balkan Social Science Review, 2022, vol. 20, pp. 157–179.
- Kyrydon A. & Troyan S., *Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska w kontekście bezpieczeństwa globalnego* [The Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of global security], Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja, 2023, № 29, s. 75–92.
- Kyrydon, A. & Troyan, S., *The West and the Russian-Ukrainian war: The aspect of military-technical assistance*. In *Ukraine and the world in the conditions of military challenges* (pp. 31-45). Sumy: Sum DPU, 2023.
- Kyrydon, A. & Troyan, S., *What are the most important lessons of Ukraine's resistance to full-scale Russian aggression?* In *BREAKING: Russia's war against Ukraine in the layers of time and spaces of the past. Dialogues with historians. Book 3* (pp. 580–585). Kyiv: NAS of Ukraine. Institute of History of Ukraine, 2023.
- Kyrydon, A. M. & Troyan, S. S., *Rosyjsko-gruzynskiy konflikt serpnia 2008 roku: istoryko-politologichnyy analiz* [Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008: historical and political analysis]; Kyiv-Rivne: RIS KSU, 2009.

- Kyrydon, Alla & Troyan, Serhiy, *The civilization war 2014-2022: the national liberation war of Ukraine in XXI century (theoretical discourse)*; w: The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2022): historical, political, cultural-educational, religious, economic, and legal aspects: Scientific monograph, Riga, Latvia: “Baltija Publishing”, 2022, pp. 523–534.
- Laqueur W., *Russia and Germany. A century of conflict*. Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1965.
- Latour B., *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. Oxford 2005.
- Leonhard J., *Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges* [Pandora’s Box. History of the First World War], München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2014.
- Liadze, I. & Macchiarelli, C. & Mortimer-Lee, P. & Patricia Sanchez, J.P., Economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war. *The World Economy*, 2023, 46(4), 874-886. [doi: 10.1111/twec.13336](https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13336).
- Łoś S., «Świat się w mych oczach dwukrotnie zawalił...»: wspomnienia [„The world has collapsed twice in my eyes...”: memories], Kraków, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej; Warszawa, Muzeum Historii Polski, 2017.
- Magda, Jewgen, *Gibrydna vijna: vyzyty i peremogty* [Wojna hybrydowa: przetrwać i wygrać], Harkiv: Vivat, 2015
- Mahda, Y., *Hybrid aggression of Russia. Lessons for Europe*, Kyiv: Kalamar, 2017.
- Małkiewicz, A. & Szymaniec, P., *Wojna nowego wieku? Agresja Rosji przeciw Ukrainie 2022–2023*, Tarnowskie Góry: Inforteditions, 2023.
- Mandelbaum, M., *The Down of Peace in Europe*. New York: Priority Pr Pubns, 1996.
- Matlary J.H. & Heier T. (Edit.), *Ukraine and Beyond. Russia's Strategic Security Challenge to Europe*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Matviychuk Y., *Na Zakhodi hostro krytykuyut' Kissingera, yakyy “zaproponuvav Ukrayini pominyaty terytoriyi na myr”* [Kissinger is sharply criticized in the West, who “offered Ukraine to exchange territories for peace”], 2022. URL: <https://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/reakcia-na-slova-kisingera-pro-ukrainu/6589368.html>.
- Mearsheimer J., *John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis*, The Economist, 2022, 19 March.
- Mearsheimer J., *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, New Haven, Conn 2018.
- Mearsheimer J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York 2001.
- Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Budapest, 05. 12. 1994. URL: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf>.
- Mink, G. & Neumayer, L. (Ed.), *L’Europe et ses passés douloureux* [Europe and its painful pasts]. Paris: La Découverte, coll. «Recherches», 2007.
- Motyl A. J., *Kissinger is dead wrong about the Russian war against Ukraine*, 2023. URL: https://www.factsandarts.com/index.php/current-affairs/kissinger-dead-wrong-about-russian-war-against-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR3q8oDBWPmW95WLmVfl1CT59mM8iosFKk2uw14vMNS4srAZpF-J_bAwQg.
- Motyl, A.J., *Imperial Ends: The Decline, Collapse, and Revival of Empires*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

- Mougel N., *World War I casualties*, REPERES, CVCE, 2011.
- Münkler H., *Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914 bis 1918* [The Great War. The world 1914-1918], Berlin, Rowohlt, 2013.
- Myhalchenko, Nikolaj, *Ukrainskaya regionalnaya cyvilizacyya: proshloye, nastoyasziye, budusziye* [Ukraińska cywilizacja regionalna: przeszłość, teraźniejszość, przyszłość], Kyiv: National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2013.
- Nechaieva-Yuriychuk N. & Troyan S., *Evolution of the Westphalian Order under the Influence of the World Wars: Historical and International Relations Aspects*, Codrul Cosminului, 2020, vol. 26, No. 1, July, pp. 187–206.
- Nechaieva-Yuriichuk N. & Troyan S., *Modern problems of international security: a look through the prism of J. Mearsheimer's structural theory of offensive realism*, Studii Naționale de Securitate: Revistă științifico-practică, 2022, No. 1 (5), pp. 90–103.
- Nechaieva-Yuriichuk N., “*Nichoho ne sudylosya*”. *Shans, yakyy dala svitovi pandemiya COVID-19 (notatky na polyakh knyhy Farida Zakariyi)* [“Nothing was destined”. The chance given to the world by the COVID-19 pandemic (notes in the margins of Farid Zakaria’s book)], Wschód Europy, 2023, vol. 9, No 1, pp. 211–221.
- Neiberg S. M., *Taniec furii. Wybuch pierwszej wojny światowej oczami Europejczyków* [Dance of Fury. The outbreak of the First World War through the eyes of Europeans], Kraków, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013.
- Newman E., *Failed states and international order: constructing a post-Westphalian world*, in *Contemporary security policy*, 2009, Vol. 30, N 3, p. 421–443.
- Nye J. S. Jr. (2002), *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, New York.
- Onuf N., *Center-Periphery Relations: What Kind of Rule, and Does It Matter?* “All Azimuth”, 2017, Vol. 6, N 1.
- Orhan, E., The effects of the Russia – Ukraine war on global trade. *Journal of International Trade, Logistics and Law*, 2022, 8(1), 141-146.
- Otu Petre, *Pace și război în spațiul românesc secolul al XX-lea* [Peace and war in the 20th century Romanian space], București, Editura Militara, 2016.
- Panyushkina Y., “*Populizm ne vyrishuye problem, a prosto znakhodyt' vynykh*”. *Veduchy CNN Farid Zakariya pro holovni vyklyky suchasnosti* [“Populism doesn't solve problems, it just finds the culprits”. CNN presenter Farid Zakaria on the main challenges of our time], 2019. URL: <https://thepage.ua/ua/interview/populizm-ne-virishuye-problem-a-prosto-znahodit-vynnih-veduchij-cnn-farid-zakariya-pro-golovni-vikliki-suchasnosti>.
- Parahonsky, Borys & Yavorska, Galyna, *Ontologia viyny i myru: bezpeka, strategiya, smysl* [The Ontology of War and Peace: Security, Strategy, Meaning], Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2019.
- Parakhonsky, B. & Yavorska, G., The origin of war from the powerlessness of peace: the semantic logic of war. *Strategic Panorama*, special issue, 2022, 12-24. doi: [10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.02](https://doi.org/10.53679/2616-9460.specialissue.2022.02).
- Perepelycia, Grygoriy, *Ukraina – Rosia: viyna v umovah spivisnuvannia* [Ukraine – Russia: war in conditions of coexistence], Kyiv: Stylos Publishing House, 2015.
- Pietraś M. (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne* [International Political Relations], Lublin 2021.

- Plokh, S., *Lost Kingdom: A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin*. London: Penguin Books UK, 2017.
- Plokh, Serhiy. 2022. *Cia viyna ye viynoyu za vsiu Europu* [Ta wojna jest wojną dla całej Europy]. URL: <https://zbruc.eu/node/110984>.
- Portnov, Andriy, *Mizh «Tsentral'noyu Yevropoyu» ta «Russkim mirom»: Suchasna Ukrayina u prostori mizhnarodnykh intelektual'nykh dyskusi* [Między „Europą Środkową” a „światem rosyjskim”: współczesna Ukraina w przestrzeni międzynarodowych dyskusji intelektualnych], Kyiv : NISD, 2009.
- Postanova Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy; 2022, Pro Zayavu VR Ukrainy “Pro vchynennia Rosiyskoyu Federacieyu genocydu v Ukraini” [Uchwała Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy. O oświadczeniu RW Ukrainy „W sprawie popełnienia przez Federację Rosyjską ludobójstwa na Ukrainie”]. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2188-20#Text>.
- Preda D., *Romăna și Antanta. Avaturile unei mici puteri într-un război de coalitie 1916–1917* [Romania and Antanta. The beating of a small power in a coalition war 1916–1917], Iași, Institutul European, 1998.
- Przebinda, G., *Ostatnia wojna Putina. Rozprawa filologa z Rosją*. Kraków: Znak, 2023.
- Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, *Wojna hybrydowa – wydanie specjalne*, pod red. Antoni Podolski, Warszawa: Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Centralny Ośrodek Szkolenia im. Gen. Stefana Roweckiego „Grota”, 2015.
- Qureshi, A. & Suhail, M.A. & Ahmad, G. & Ashraf, D., Russia-Ukraine war and systemic risk: Who is taking the heat? *Finance Research Letters*, 2022, 48, article number 103036. doi: [10.1016/j.frl.2022.103036](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.103036).
- Remarks by President Charles Michel at the press conference of the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv (2023). URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/03/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-press-conference-of-the-eu-ukraine-summit-in-kyiv/>.
- Report on implementation of the association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union for 2022. (2022). URL: https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/inline/files/zvit_pro_vykonannya_ugody_pro_asociaciyu_z_a_2022_rik.pdf.
- Resolution 2132. 2016. Political consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe. URL: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?fileid=23166&lang=EN&search=KjoqfGNvcnB1c19uYW1lX2VuOiJPZmZpY2lhbCBkb2N1bWVudHMj>.
- Reznikov O., “Antykremliivs'ka koalitsiya vzhe skladayet'sya z 54 krayin, yaki viryat' u peremohu Ukrayiny” [“The anti-Kremlin coalition already consists of 54 countries that believe in the victory of Ukraine”], 2023. URL: <https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/78967/>.
- Reznikov, V., *The anti-Kremlin coalition already consists of 54 countries that believe in the victory of Ukraine*. 2023. URL: <https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/78967/>.
- Riabchuk, Mykoła. 2022. *Ukrayintsi vid rosiyan vidriznyayut'sya lyubov'yu do svobody* [Ukraińcy różnią się od Rosjan umiłowaniem wolności]. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-38671637.amp>.
- Roloff H. & Tiedev P., *Vermittlungen zwischen Washington und Moskau. Kissinger soll neuen Kalten Krieg verhindern* [Negotiations between Washington and Moscow. Kissinger is supposed to prevent a new Cold War], 2016. URL: <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/donald-trump/kissinger-will-zwischen-russland-und-usa-vermitteln-49482764.bild.html>.

- Rosenau, J., *Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Rosenau J., *New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Globalization and Localizing Dynamics*, "Security Dialogue", 1994, Vol. 25, N 3.
- Rosenau J., *Study of World Politics*. Vol. I. Theoretical and Methodological Challenges, London–New York, 2006.
- Rosenau J. & J. P. Singh (Edit.), *Information technologies and global politics: the changing scope of power and governance*, New York, 2002.
- Rosenberg J., *International Relations in the Prison of Political Science*, "International Relations", 2016, Vol. 30, Nr 2.
- Rüdiger von Fritsch, *Putins Krieg und die Folgen*, Berlin: Aufbau Verlage, 2022.
- Rusia și România în timpul primului război Mondial / Red.: Hlihor K., Shukdin G.D., Soare B., Stykalin A.C., București, Ed. Formă superioară, 2018.
- Russian Federation Announces "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine; 2022, As Security Council Meets in Eleventh-Hour Effort to Avoid Full-Scale Conflict. URL: <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14803.doc.htm>.
- Samuel A., *Nouveau paysage international*, Lyon, 1990.
- Sartre, J.-P., *Les Chemins de la liberté* [The Paths to Freedom]. Paris: Gallimard, 1945–1949.
- Sasse, G., *The war against Ukraine. Background, events, consequences*. Berlin: C.H. Beck, 2022.
- Scurtu I. (coord.), *Istoria Românilor (1918 – 1940)* [The Romanian History (1918-1940)], Vol. VIII, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003.
- Scurtu I., *Declarația privind unirea Basarabiei cu România* [Declaration regarding the union of Bessarabia with Romania], in "Studii și Comunicări/DIS", 2018, N 11 (XI), P. 45-56.
- Scurtu I., *Marea Unire din 1918 in context european* [The Great Union of 1918 in the European context], București, Academiei Romane, 2003.
- Shapovalova, O. I., *Systemnyy perekhid vid Yaltyns 'ko-Potsdams 'koyi do postbipolyarnoyi systemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn: nezavershena dekonstruktsiya* [Systemic transition from Yalta-Potsdam to the post-bipolar system of international relations: unfinished deconstruction]; w: Naukovyy visnyk Dyplomatychnoyi akademiyi Ukrayiny pry MZS Ukrayiny, 2014, vyp. 20, pp. 94–107.
- Shapovalova, O. I., *The structural parameters of the post-bipolar system of international relations*; w: Actual problems of international relations, Release 119 (part I), Kyiv: KNU, 2014, pp. 34–51.
- Sherr, J., *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad*. London: Chatham House, 2013.
- Smutok, B., *The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported on enemy losses as of October 20, 2023*. URL: <https://chas.news/news/genshtab-zsu-rozpoviv-pro-vtrati-voroga-stanom-na-20-zhovtnya-2023-roku>.
- Snyder, Timothy. 2022. *The State of the Russo-Ukrainian War*. URL: https://snyder.substack.com/p/the-state-of-the-russo-ukrainian?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=auto_share&s=w&fbclid=IwAR3SrP6zUnBKjDm2XvjBITek9AIC3QBWvymgnDgcAIz54T3ojvSIwtdlHsQ.

- Snyder, T. 2023. *Why the world needs a Ukrainian victory. Theses of an American historian and writer about why it is important for the world community to help Ukraine win*. URL: <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2023/01/27/162331/>.
- Sokolenko, Y. 2023. *More than anyone else: Total US aid to Ukraine has already reached \$66.2 billion – WP*. URL: <https://www.unian.ua/war/bilshe-nizh-bud-komu-zagalniy-obsyag-dopomogi-ssha-ukrajini-vzhe-dosyag-66-2-milyarda-wp-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-amp-12352932.html>.
- Solod'ko S., *Aktorno-merezheva teoriya yak sotsiologichna skladova intelektual'noho proektu Bruno Latoura [Actor-network theory as a sociological component of the intellectual project of Bruno Latour]*, Sotsiologiya: teoriya, metody, marketynh, 2014, vol. 4, pp. 156–170.
- Sologoub, I., Ukraine's EU integration: A long way home. *Intereconomics*, 2022, 57(4), 218–224. doi: [10.1007/s10272-022-1066-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-022-1066-1).
- Sørensen, G., *What Kind of World Order?: The International System in the New Millennium*; w: Cooperation and Conflict, 2006, vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 343–363
- Stoltenberg, J. 2023. “Supporting Ukraine is not only a moral decision”: Stoltenberg cited the lessons of Russian aggression. URL: <https://suspihne.media/389768-pidtrimka-ukraini-ce-ne-lise-moralne-risenna-stoltenberg-nazvav-uroki-rosijskoi-agresii/>.
- Sullivan, J. & Bowman, B. 2023. *UN general assembly votes 141-7 for Russian forces to withdraw from Ukraine*. URL: <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/02/24/unga-votes-141-7-russian-forces-withdraw-from-ukraine/>.
- Surge in arms imports to Europe, while US dominance of the global arms trade increases. 2023. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/surge-arms-imports-europe-while-us-dominance-global-arms-trade-increases>.
- Sydoruk, T. 2023. *Lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Ukraine and the world on the threshold of 2023*. URL: <https://english.nv.ua/opinion/lessons-of-the-russian-ukrainian-war-for-ukraine-and-the-world-on-the-thresh-old-of-2023-50295389.html>.
- Szostek, J., *Popular Geopolitics in Russia and Post-Soviet Eastern Europe*. Europe-Asia Studies. 2017. Vol. 69, Issue 2: Special section: Popular Geopolitics in Russia and Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, pp. 195–201. doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2017.1288861.
- Teschke B., *Theorizing the Westphalian system of states: international relations from absolutism to capitalism*, in *European Journal of International Relations*, 2002, Vol. 8(1), p. 5–48.
- Tolstov S., *Mizhnarodna systema pochatku XXI stolittya [The International System of the Beginning of the XXI Century]*, Foreign_Affairs, 2013, vol. 9, pp. 8–11; vol. 10, pp. 8–13; vol. 11, pp. 12–17.
- Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. 1997. URL: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52240.pdf>.
- Trenin D., *Welcome to Cold War II*. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome-to-cold-war-ii/>.
- Troyan S., *Świat po zimnej wojnie: zasady ewolucji współczesnego porządku międzynarodowego [w:] Ład światowy w perspektywie relacji transatlantyckich / Red. nauk. Wojciech Gizicki*. Lublin: Instytut Sądecko-Lubelski, 2014. S. 37–46.
- Troyan, S., *Lokalna cywilizacja w wymiarze globalizacji (przykład Ukrainy) [Local civilization in the dimension of globalization (the example of Ukraine)]*. In Z. Zagórski, S. Kamykowski.

(Ed.), *(Nie) ład a (od) budowa cywilizacji*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2016, pp. 147–160.

Troyan S., *Persha i Druha svitovi viyny u paradyhmi evolyutsiyi Vestfal's'koho svitoporyadku [The First and Second World Wars in the paradigm of the evolution of the Westphalian world order]*, Ukraine–Europe–World, 2019, vol. 23, pp. 49–60.

Troyan, S. S., *Ukrainska pastka dlia rosiyskogo Leviafana [Ukrainian trap for the Russian Leviathan]*; Kyiv: Nika-Centr, 2023.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., Conceptual Fundamentals of Post-Westphalian International Relations [w:] *Roczniki Nauk Społecznych*. 2020. T. 12 (48). No 4. P. 69–85.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., International relations as a system and a discipline: From the westphalian to the post-westphalian world order [w:] *Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce*. No 1. 2021. P. 107–122.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., The civilization war 2014–2022: the national liberation war of Ukraine in XXI century (theoretical discourse) [w:] *The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2022): historical, political, cultural-educational, religious, economic, and legal aspects*: Scientific monograph. Riga. Latvia: “Baltija Publishing”, 2022. P. 523–534.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., Deconstructing stability: the impact of the russian-ukrainian war on the formation of a new system of international relations [w:] *International Relations of Ukraine: Scientific Searches and Findings*. 2024. № 33. P. 10–24.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., Russian-Ukrainian war 2014–2024 as a postponed great European war War [w:] *Diplomacy in international relations: modern challenges and Perspectives*: Collection of materials. Kyiv: National Aviation University, 2024. P. 9–13.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., Saving Russia. Neorealist Theorists and the Interpretation of the Kremlin's International Policy according to the Actor-Network Concept [w:] *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Balkanistyczne*. 2024. T. XXXIII. S. 171–189.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska w kontekście bezpieczeństwa globalnego [w:] *Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja*. Internetowe czasopismo naukowe poświęcone studiom globalnym 2023. № 29. S. 75–92.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A., Wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska jako czynnik rekonfigurowania neopostbipolarności [w:] *Kultura—Historia—Globalizacja*: Internetowe czasopismo naukowe poświęcone studiom globalnym. 2024. № 31. S. 71–81.

Troyan S. & Kyrydon A. & Kociak S., The Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2022): Basic preconditions and causes [w:] *Balkan Social Science Review*. 2022. Vol. 20. P. 157–179.

Troyan, S. & Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, N., Evolution of the Westphalian Order under the Influence of the World Wars: Historical and International Relations Aspects [w:] *Codrul Cosminului*. 2020. Vol. 26. No. 1. July. P. 187–206. doi.org/10.4316/CC.2020.01.011.

Uchwała Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy; 2023, „O stosowaniu przez reżim polityczny Federacji Rosyjskiej ideologii rasyzmu, potępieniu podstaw i praktyk rasyzmu jako totalitarnych i nieludzkich” (przyjęta w dniu 2 maja 2023 r.), URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3078-IX#Text>.

Ukraina, *Ukrayina otrymala status kandydata na chlenstvo v YES [Ukraine received the status of a candidate for EU membership]*, 2022. URL: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-otrimala-status-kandidata-na-chlenstvo-v-yes>.

- Ukraina, *Ukrayina podaye zayavku na vstup do NATO [Ukraine applies to join NATO]*, 2022. URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3583117-ukraina-podae-zaavku-na-vstup-do-nato-zelenskij.html>.
- Vallerstajn, I., *Tri otdelnykh sluchaya gegemonii v istorii kapitalisticheskoy mir-ekonomiki* (The three separate occasions in the history of the hegemony of the capitalist world-economy); w: Oykumena. Almanakh sravnitelnykh issledovaniy politicheskikh institutov, sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh sistem i tsivilizatsiy, vyp. 1, Kharkiv: Konstanta, 2003, pp. 160–169.
- Veksler, V.F. 2022. *Seven lessons that the military and politicians of the world should learn after half a year of war in Ukraine – The Atlantic Council*. URL: <https://forbes.ua/inside/sim-urokiv-yaki-viyskovi-ta-politiki-svitu-mayut-vinesti-pislya-piv-roku-viyni-v-ukraini-the-atlantic-council-27082022-7959>.
- Vidnyans'kyi S. V., *Ukrayina – Yevropeys'kyi Soyuz: novyy etap vzayemovidnosyn v umovakh rosiys'ko-ukrayins'koyi viyny 2014–2022 rr. [Ukraine – European Union: a new stage of relations in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war 2014–2022]*, Mizhnarodni zv'yazky Ukrainy: naukovi poshuky i znakhidky, 2022, vol. 31, pp. 10–37.
- Volovycz, Ołeksij, *Istoria yak pole zmagannia “Ukrainskogo svitu” i “Russkogo mira”* [Historia jako pole rywalizacji między „światem ukraińskim” a „światem rosyjskim”]; w: Zovnishni spravy. 2014, № 12, pp. 19–23.
- Volt, S. 2023. *Five lessons that Russia's war against Ukraine taught the world – Foreign Policy*. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-64594530>.
- Vorburgg, A. & Bluwstein, J. 2022. *Making sense of (the Russian war in) Ukraine: On the politics of knowledge and expertise*. *Political Geography*, 98, article number 102700. doi: [10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102700](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102700).
- VVP, *VVP stran mira – 2022 [GDP of the world – 2022]*. URL: <https://fingeniy.com/vvp-stran-mira-2022-rejting-i-dolya-stran-v-mirovom-vvp/>.
- Watling, J. & Danylyuk, O.V. & Reynolds, N., *Preliminary lessons from Russia's unconventional operations during the russoukrainian war, February 2022 – February 2023*. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2023.
- Wendt A., *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of Cambridge University Press and the British International Studies Association (BISA), 1999. URL: <http://www.guillamenicaise.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Wendt-Social-Theory-of-International-Politics.pdf>.
- Wohlforth W. C., *The Stability of a Unipolar World*, “International Security”, 1999, Vol. 24, N 1.
- Wohlforth W.C., *Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War*, “World Politics”, 2009, Vol. 61, Nr 1.
- Wojczal, K., *To jest nasza wojna. Ukraina i Polska na wspólnym froncie*. Warszawa: Prześwity, 2023.
- Wojnowski, Michał, *Koncepcja „wojny nowej generacji” w ujęciu strategów Sztabu Generalnego Sił Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej*; w: Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, 2015, N 13, ss. 13–39
- Yakubova, L., *“Russkiy mir” v Ukraini: na krayu prirvy [„Rosyjski świat” na Ukrainie: na skraju przepaści]*, Kyiv: “CLIO” Publishing House, 2018.
- Zajac J. & Zięba R., *„Budowa zintegrowanego systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski” [„Building an integrated national security system for Poland”]*, Ekspertyza wykonana dla Ministerstwa Rozwoju Regionalnego, w ramach prac prowadzonych przez Radę Ministrów

- nad Strategią Rozwoju Kraju na lata 2011–2020, Warszawa, 2010. URL: file:///C:/Users/user1/Downloads/Budowa_zintegrowanego_systemu_bezpiecze.pdf.
- Zajac J. & Włodkowska-Bagan A. & Kaczmarek M. (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe Polska–Europa–Świat* [International Security Poland–Europe–World]. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej, Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2015.
- Zakaria F., *The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest*, New York–London, 2008.
- Zakaria F., *Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World*, Dublin: Penguin Books, 2021.
- Zakaria F., *Opinion Russia is the last multinational empire, fighting to keep its colonies*, 2022. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/31/ukraine-fighting-russia-imperialism-eastern-europe-algeria-kenya/?fbclid=IwAR38R0WBY5I9A9Oi_Rk2-Xe21UZz2yPX2IY3tL9m4VQG4B8aBQbI_sx-q-0.
- Zakaria F., *Opinion: It's time to start thinking about the endgame in Ukraine*, 2022. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/16/ukraine-war-endgame-russia-europe-us-goals/>.
- Zakaria F., *Opinion: There is a path to ending the Ukraine war*, 2023, <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/24/opinions/fareed-zakaria-ukraine-column/index.html>.
- Zięba R. (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie* [International Security After the Cold War], Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008.
- Zięba R. (Ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku* [International security in the 21 st century], Warszawa: POLTEXT, 2018.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Serhiy TROYAN, Doctor Habilit. of Historical Sciences, Professor. He is a Professor of the Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies of the State University “Kyiv Aviation Institute” (Kyiv, Ukraine), Professor of the University of Rzeszów (Poland). *Research interests*: world history, international relations, history of diplomacy, research methodology, foreign and domestic policy of Central and Eastern Europe (including modern Ukrainian-Polish relations). He published more than 600 scientific works in Ukrainian, English, Polish, and Russian, which are devoted to various aspects of the history of international relations. Head of the multi-volume projects «The Great War 1914–1918: retrospective analysis» and “Colonialism – Neocolonialism – Postcolonialism: Historical and International Studies”.

Scientific discipline: history, political science, sociology.

Alla KYRYDON, Doctor Habilit. of Historical Sciences, Professor, Honoured Master of Sciences and Engineering of Ukraine. She is Director of the State Research Institution «Encyclopedia Press» (Kyiv, Ukraine). Her research interests encompass issues such as Memory Studies, methodology of historical research, state-church relations, the history of international relations, Ukrainian-Polish relations, problems of identity in the context of globalization, history of Ukraine etc. She is author and co-author of more than 600 scientific publications (in Ukrainian, English, Polish, and Russian). She is the leader of the project «Great Ukrainian Encyclopedia».

Scientific discipline: history, political science.

Svitlana KOSYAK, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of Department of Social Sciences, Cherkasy Institute of Fire Safety named after Chernobyl Heroes of National University of Civil Defence of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine). Her research interests encompass issues such as Memory Studies, methodology of historical research, the history of colonialism and international relations. She is author and co-author of more than 50 scientific publications.

Scientific discipline: social sciences, history.

Nataliia NECHAIEVA-YURIICHUK, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of History, Political Science and International Relations, Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University. Her research interests encompass issues such as Memory Studies, the history of international relations, problems of identity in the context of globalization etc.

Scientific discipline: political science, history.

Наукове видання

**Сергій Троян
Алла Киридон
Світлана Косяк
Наталія Нечасва-Юрійчук**

НЕОПОСТЫПОЛЯРНИ МІЖНАРОДНІ ВІДНОСИНИ: ТУРБУЛЕНТНІСТЬ У КОНТЕКСТІ РОСІЙСЬКО- УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Монографія

(англійською мовою)

Підписано до друку 03.11.2025
Формат 60x84/16. Друк офсетний
Гарнітура TimesNewRoman. Умов. друк. арк.: 11.4
Наклад прим.: 100. Замовлення № 0311/25

Видавець: ТОВ «НВП «Інтерсервіс»
м. Київ, вул. Бориспільська, 9
Свідоцтво: серія ДК № 3534 від 24.07.2009 р.

Виготовлювач: ФОП Андрієвська Л. В.
м. Київ, вул. Бориспільська, 9
Свідоцтво: серія В03 № 919546 від 19.09.2004 р.